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Monitoring mechanisms (MMs) have become important issues in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the quest to reduce corruption.  It is equally important to understand factors 
associated with MMs since such factors determine the effectiveness of MMs in 
reducing agency problems.  It is vital to understand the channels through which these 
factors can influence MMs.  While quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) have been 
associated with high audit quality, its mediating effect between organizational 
attributes (OAs) and MMs has not been empirically tested, especially in Nigeria.  
This study examines the relationship between OAs and MMs.  Secondly, it extends 
extant literature by examining the relationship between OAs and QDAs.  Thirdly, it 
examines the relationship between QDAs and MMs and determines the role of QDAs 
as a plausible mediating variable between OAs and MMs.  Using the data of Nigerian 
non-financial listed companies the results provide empirical supports that ownership 
structure (managerial ownership and individual block-holders), board (size, 
meetings, independence and gender) and compensation structure are significantly 
associated with MMs in the right directions. In addition, Type-II-agency-conflicts, 
board independence, risk management committee and compensation structure 
significantly and positively relate to QDAs.  The most satisfactory result is the 
significant positive influence of QDAs on MMs indicating that quality auditing is an 
essential requirement in enhancing adequate MMs.  The findings of this study 
provide support for the association of OAs and MMs with intervention of QDAs for 
good corporate governance.  Therefore, the board of directors in Nigerian listed 
companies should be encouraged to adopt the right mix of OAs and MMs to ensure 
quality financial reporting through quality auditing to protect shareholders’ interests.  
Likewise, audit firms in Nigeria should invest more on technology and intellectual 
capital to ensure quality auditing.  Also, the regulatory agents should ensure 
necessary enforcement of codes of corporate governance and monitoring for 
compliance. 
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Mekanisme pengawasan (MM) merupakan isu yang penting di wilayah Sub-Sahara 
Afrika dalam usaha membendung rasuah. Penting juga untuk difahami ialah faktor 
yang dikaitkan dengan MM kerana faktor sedemikian boleh menentukan 
keberkesanan MM untuk meminimumkan masalah agensi. Selain itu, adalah penting 
untuk difahami wahana yang membolehkan faktor ini mempengaruhi MM. Meskipun 
juruaudit kualiti dibezakan (QDA) telah dikaitkan dengan kualiti audit yang tinggi, 
namun kesan perantara antara ciri organisasi (OA) dengan MM belum lagi diuji 
secara empirik khususnya di Nigeria. Kajian ini meneliti hubungan antara OA 
dengan MM. Kajian juga menambah kosa ilmu sedia ada dengan melihat hubungan 
antara OA dengan QDA. Kajian turut menyelidik hubungan antara QDA dengan MM 
serta menentukan peranan QDA sebagai pemboleh ubah perantara yang munasabah 
antara OA dengan MM. Hasil regresi yang menggunakan data daripada syarikat 
bukan kewangan yang tersenarai di Nigeria menyokong bahawa struktur pemilikan 
(pemilikan pengurus dan pemegang blok individu), lembaga (saiz, mesyuarat, 
kebebasan, dan jantina) dan struktur pampasan berkait secara signifikan dengan MM. 
Konflik agensi Jenis II, kebebasan lembaga, jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko, dan 
struktur pampasan juga didapati berkait secara signifikan dan positif dengan QDA. 
Dapatan juga memperlihatkan pengaruh QDA yang positif lagi signifikan terhadap 
MM. Perkara ini menunjukkan bahawa kualiti audit merupakan satu keperluan asas 
untuk meningkatkan MM dengan secukupnya. Dapatan kajian juga menyokong 
hubungan OA dengan MM dengan campur tangan QDA untuk tadbir urus yang baik. 
Oleh yang demikian, lembaga pengarah di syarikat tersenarai di Nigeria perlu 
didorong untuk menggabungkan OA dengan MM secara berkesan bagi memastikan 
terhasilnya laporan kewangan yang berkualiti menerusi kualiti audit untuk 
melindungi kepentingan pemegang saham. Firma audit di Nigeria patut melabur 
lebih dalam teknologi dan modal intelektual bagi mempastikan pengauditan yang 
berkualiti. Selain itu, agen penguat kuasa perlu memastikan berlakunya 
penguatkuasaan kod tadbir urus dan pengawasan pematuhan yang secukupnya.  
 
Kata kunci: mekanisme pengawasan, ciri organisasi, auditor berbeza kualiti, kos 
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1.0 Background of the Study  
The desire to ensure that stakeholders’ interests are not injured heightens with global 
economic meltdown (as in the case of Enron and others), fraud and failures in 
businesses (Algharaballi & Goyen, 2012; Shichor, 2015).  The outcome of the 
economic meltdown is an outfall of opportunistic attitudes in corporations leading to 
unhealthy financial reports (Cadbury, 1992).  The economic downturns led to 
corporate collapses, mergers and bankruptcies, inadequate accounting disclosure and 
lack of transparency in financial reporting (Kuschnik, 2008; Al-janadi, Rahman, & 
Omar, 2013).  It erodes the trust and confidence of shareholders in the management 
of the companies (Cadbury, 1992).  It necessitates company owners, governments, 
and regulatory agents to seek to review their prevailing monitoring mechanisms 
(Georgiev, 2013) and codes of corporate governance (Al-Rassas, Al-Rassas, 
Kamardin & Kamardin).  The review is to prevent and monitor corruption and also to 
manage the conflicts between owners and the management of corporations 
(Georgiev, 2013; Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001) through adequate internal and 
external monitoring mechanisms (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Kao, Chiou, & Chen, 
2004;  Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-mejia, 1997; Irani & Oesch, 2013; Al-Janadi et al., 
2013; 2006 CBN Code; Kuschnik, 2008; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Dabor & 
Ibadin, 2013).   
 
Companies and audit market are yet to effectively address monitoring mechanisms 
and significantly enhance good corporate governance in Nigeria.  While corruption 
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increases at an alarming rate, raising the tempo of poverty, unemployment and 
insecurity on daily basis, the value of currency, naira is continually dwindling in the 
international market, and the basic facilities such as good road, water, and electricity 
supply are also lacking (Ilori 2012; Okpara, 2011; Mayungbe, 2012; Hamilton & 
Gabriel, 2012).  There is an urgent need to address issues of effectiveness, 
accountability, transparency, ethics, and reliability in financial reporting.  The 
evidence for these are observable from Nigerian daily news on extensive corruption 
and economic fraud reported in newspapers, magazines, and media (Transparency 
International, 2016; Tribune Newspaper, 4 November 2016; Premium Times, 22 
September 2015, 17 July 2016;  Punch Newspaper, 3 November 2016; EFCC News, 
6 March 2014; PWC, 2016; KPMG, 2016; EFCC, 2014, 2015, 2016;). 
 
Similarly, the academic community, opposition leaders, civil societies and 
shareholders' associations have been crying, condemning corruption and fraud, 
especially in the light of the economic downturn in Nigeria.  The outcry is noted in 
sparkling press release headlines on political and corporate frauds: ’25 Nigerian 
CEOs in Fraud Scandal” (Adedoyin, 2012), “How Saraki converted Kwara 
Government funds to personal use – Code of Conduct Bureau” (Okakwu, 2016), “I 
gave a judge N450,000 not bribe (Kumolu, 2016), ”DPR to clamp down on fake 
lubricant producer” (Nwogu, 2016), “Judging the Judges” (Terver, 2016), “NNPC, 
Nigeria Police partner on pipeline vandalism” (Onwuemenyi, 2012), “Corruption, 
Crime and Criminality” (Akinola, 2016), “Anybody who expects corruption-free 
judiciary would be living in the dream land” (Jegede, 2016). “Suspended Edo 
traditional ruler admits altercation with woman, apologises” (Ezekiel, 2016), “EFCC 
arraigns Patrick Joseph Osoase for N28m Fraud” (Uwujaren, 2014) “Obanikoro 
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undertakes to return N480m, submits passports to EFCC” (Akinkuotu, 2016), 
“Impact of Corruption on Nigeria’s economy” (PWC, 2016), “The Tricky Business 
of Administering Natural Resource Revenues” (Feinstein, 2014), “Man docked over 
fake N2bn national assembly contract” (Idris, 2016), “Nigeria’s Booming Borders: 
The Drivers and Consequences of Unrecorded Trade“ (Hoffmann & Melly, 2015), 
“Exposed!! India High Commissioner Exposes Diezani’s $14b Shady Oil Deal” 
(Okonkwo, 2015). 
 
The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the responsibility to 
regulate the Nigerian capital market; Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) helps to 
review the compliance of companies’ submissions to the required Company and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) disclosures, accounting principles and standards, and 
capital market listing requirements.  These regulatory bodies often rely on the 
financial regulations for their supervisory responsibilities. Nigerian Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) formerly Nigerian Accounting Standard Board (NASB) 
develops and publishes accounting and financial reporting standards for Nigerian 
corporations to prepare the financial reports and financial related matters for NSE 
and the general public.  However, the accounting and financial reporting standards 
seem resistible to fraud and corruption in Nigerian listed companies. 
 
In addition, the government of Nigeria approved Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
Act, 2011; established: Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), 2004; 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), 
2000; The Money Laundering Act, 1995; The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 
2004; Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1991; The Advance Fee Fraud and Other 
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Fraud Related Offences Act, 1995; The Failed Banks (Recovery Debts) and 
Financial Malpractices in Banks Act, 1994; The Miscellaneous Offences Act, 1984; 
adopted: the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) in 2010 and other 
anticorruption instruments to strengthen its regulatory authority and legal system and 
attain good governance in private and public firms (Laws, 2012; Elijah, 2007; 
Chinedu, Titus, & Thaddeus, 2010).  However, these Acts have not achieved a 
substantial success (Chinedu et al., 2010; Okobi, 2011).  The failure to reduce 
corruption and fraud to the minimum in Nigerian companies may likely be from 
weak implementation and enforcement of the laws. 
 
Most specifically, several probes on corporate corruption and fraud are allegedly 
attributed to abuse of office, misappropriation of funds, the absence of transparency 
and accountability in the Nigerian companies due to moral hazard.  These are made 
glaring in cases of the Chief Executives (Adedoyin, 2012).  The regulators (SEC, 
NSE, and others) have intensified the monitoring for compliance to codes of 
corporate governance, accounting standards, and ethics.  The enforcement agents 
(FRC, EFCC, and others) embark on probing listed companies for fraud, 
expropriation of assets, and other forms of corruption.  
 
Management and controlling shareholders’ moral hazards, information asymmetry 
between the management and shareholders and among the shareholders are costly 
and very dangerous in the light of their impact on the national and global economy.  
These unscrupulous attitudes have dent Nigeria’s image and cause investors to lose 
their confidence to engage in business in Nigeria.  Extant literature provide evidence 
that foreign investors were withdrawing from Nigerian capital market following the 
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economic meltdowns  (Haladu, 2016; Ngene 2015).  It also reveals that fraud 
perpetrators often intentionally conceal irregularities in their reports.  Likewise, it 
suggests a good number of internal and external monitoring mechanisms that are 
necessary to expose the opportunistic attitudes (Fodio, Ibikunle, & Oba, 2013; Al-
janadi, et. al.,  2013; Abdulmalik & Che-Ahmad, 2016; Nielsen & Haugaard, 2000; 
Holt, 2009; Hamdan, Mushtaha, & Al-Sartawi, 2013; Harris & Merwe, 2012; 
Francis, Michas, & Seavey, 2013; Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009). 
 
In addition, research has shown that quality financial reports emanating from strong 
monitoring mechanisms influenced by quality-differentiated auditors can help to 
restore their trust and confidence in Nigerian companies (Fodio, Ibikunle, & Oba, 
2013; Hegazy & Tawfik, 2015; Jusoh & Che-Ahmad, 2014). 
 
Monitoring mechanisms, quality-differentiated auditors, and risk management 
committee are carefully selected as special areas for this study because (1) of their 
connection to the five components of internal control (COSO, 2013), especially, risk 
assessment, control activities and monitoring activities. (2) the prevailing Acts are 
not immune to the countless internal and external risks of moral hazards in the 
Nigerian listed companies. 
  
The literature on the organizational attributes, demand, and preferences for the 
monitoring mechanisms are very few, especially as related to Nigerian non-financial 
sector.  This study addresses the gap in the literature by investigating the mediating 
effect of quality-differentiated auditors on organizational attributes (ownership 
structure, composition and activities of the board of directors, and compensation 
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structure) and monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing) 
in Nigerian non-financial listed companies using agency theory supported by 
stakeholder and signalling theories. 
 
There are other factors that can serve as mediating variables for the relationship 
between organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms going by cause and 
effect principle of mediating variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986) are International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Code of Corporate Governance (CCG) and 
Information Technology (IT).  Reason being that such factors are caused or brought 
to limelight in the aegis for good corporate governance and were established to 
strengthen monitoring mechanisms to ensure the achievement of corporate goals.  
However, quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) are chosen because of their 
influence on the quality of financial reports.  It is expected that when a QDA is 
engaged, proper scrutiny of records is done to ensure compliance with the standards, 
codes, and policies to produce high-quality audit (DeAngelo, 1981).  The result of 
record scrutiny by a QDA is high-quality financial reports (De Franco, Gavious, Jin, 
& Richardson, 2011). 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
It is apparent from the background to this study that corruption dominates businesses 
in Nigeria and therefore creates rooms for agency problems in the Nigerian listed 
companies.  Therefore, there is a need to explore the effect of quality-differentiated 
auditors on the relationship between the organizational attributes (ownership 
structure, composition and activities of the board of directors, and compensation 
structure) and monitoring mechanisms (Appah, E; Emeh, 2013; Van Slyke, 2006; 
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Adeyemi & Fagbemi 2010; Adeyemi, Okpala, & Dabor, 2012; DeAngelo, 1981; 
Dedman, Kausar, & Lennox, 2013; Gerakos, 2013;).  Extant literature reveal the 
existence of information asymmetry, disparity in the interests of management and 
shareholders, opportunistic attitudes of management and controlling shareholders and 
weak enforcement of codes of corporate governance as the foundational causes of 
economic melt-down (Sarens, & Abdolmohammadi, 2011; Al-Rassas et al., 2016; 
Minnis & Sutherland, 2015).  Each of these features of financial distress is a 
principal factor to poor corporate governance in Nigerian listed companies (Okobi, 
2011; Nworji, Adebayo, & David, 2011; Ilori, 2012; Sanusi, 2010; Okpara, 2011).  
These are evidenced in the case of Cadbury, Nigerian and other cases noted in the 
background of this study. 
 
To the best of the knowledge of the researcher, only two studies (Mustapha, 2009; 
Anderson, Francis, & Stokes, 1993) had attempted to examine the three dimensions 
of monitoring mechanisms, directorship, internal, and external auditing at a time.  
The extant literature demonstrates that (1) Failure for a company to address the need 
for monitoring mechanisms amounts to unending information asymmetry between 
the management and the shareholders (Sarens, & Abdolmohammadi, 2011).  (2) The 
incidents of economic meltdowns, business mergers, and failures as in Enron in the 
US, Cadbury in Nigeria and others are the evidence of monitoring failure (Kuschnik, 
2008).  (3) Transparent information is required to reduce the conflict of interests 
between management and shareholders and among shareholders (Verriest, 
Gaeremynck, Sabbelaan, & Author, 2008), a failure which there may be a reduction 
in investment (Irani & Oesch, 2013).  (4) Monitoring mechanisms, when 
appropriately applied, ensure high and timely financial reporting quality that 
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engender transparency and accountability (Appah & Emeh, 2013).  Hence, the 
emphasis of codes of corporate governance in individual countries, (2011 SEC Code 
in the case of Nigeria) is to guarantee the credibility of financial reports, limit the 
self-interest attitude of the management, reduce or eliminate corruption and promote 
shareholders’ interests (Habbash, 2012; Dockery, Tsegba, & Herbert, 2012; Ibrahim 
& Samad, 2011; Appah, & Emeh, 2013).   
 
The annual corruption perception index of Transparency International (TI) for 
decades has always placed Nigeria as one of the most corruptive countries scoring 
between 25% and 27% where other countries are scoring between 80% and 92% 
though there are countries rated as low as 8% (TI, 2016).  Nigeria came 138 out of 
161 countries rated in 2015 with a score of 27% (TI, 2016).  Also, Nigeria is still 
struggling with the outfall of the economy recession of 2008 with its currency being 
devaluated consistently (Haladu, 2016; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Amassoma, 
2016).  Some listed companies have been wind up, while some merged. 
 
It is crucial to study monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external 
auditing) because they are the networks the shareholders can apply to check the 
excesses of the management and the controlling shareholders (Connelly, Hoskisson, 
Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Malek & Saidin, 2013).  The 
shareholders apply the monitoring mechanisms to attain credible financial reports 
that secure their interests (Malek & Saidin, 2013).  However, monitoring 
mechanisms are issues in Nigeria because many of the listed companies as observed 
from data collected have this in place, yet corporate fraud prevails even at an 




In addition, this study chose to examine the organizational attributes (ownership 
structure, composition, and activities of the board of directors and compensation 
structure) because of their importance to the variation in the performance of a 
company (Zheng, Yang, & McLean, 2010).  The structure of a company’s ownership 
determines the extent to which it minimizes agency conflicts, information asymmetry 
and expropriation of assets in an organization (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2013).  
Likewise, the strength of the independence of a board of directors is connected to its 
level of demand for monitoring mechanisms and this affects the performance of the 
company.  In addition, individuals involved in many of the cases earlier cited fit into 
one or two attributes of an organization.  Even, those involved in political fraud 
channelled the transfer of funds through the companies where they are controlling 
shareholders or the CEO. 
 
As already discussed, this study chose to examine quality-differentiated auditors as 
the possible mediating variable in the relationship between organizational attributes 
and monitoring mechanisms in Nigerian listed companies because of their influence 
on the quality of financial reports.  It is important to study the effects of quality-
differentiated auditors, considering the extent to which shareholders, especially the 
minority shareholders and other users of the audited general purpose financial 
statements rely on the audited accounts.  Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2003) claim 
that owners of companies are likely to make a high demand for reliable accounting 
and quality auditing in countries that have a strong legal system for the protection of 
the investors.  However, the credibility and reliability of the accounting are 
10 
 
associated with engagement of quality-differentiated auditors, mostly known as Big-
4
1
 (Francis et. al., 2013). 
 
Likewise, most of the listed companies are with the size, complexities and 
information system management that inform the competition that led to the 
differentiation of the quality of auditing in the audit market (Ferguson, Pinnuck & 
Skinner, 2013; DeAngelo, 1981).  Also, Nigeria's current state of the economy 
requires foreign direct investment (Okpala, 2012) and extant literature have revealed 
that foreign investors are aware of the grave information asymmetry in Nigerian 
companies.  Hence, they are likely to demand quality-differentiated auditors for 
thorough supervision of the management and the local shareholders (Iwasaki 2011; 
Okpara, 2011; Adekoya, 2011; Haladu, 2016).  Companies with foreign investors 
may not engage smaller audit firms due to lack of international network, which is one 
of the advantages that quality-differentiated auditors have over other auditing firms 
(Sirois, Marmousez, & Simunic, 2011). 
 
In addition, the mediating role of quality-differentiated auditors remains unclear and 
there is no evidence from the extant literature reviewed that its mediating effect has 
been investigated.  Studies reviewed focus more on direct relationship between 
organizational attributes and monitoring mechanism or quality-differentiated auditors 
(Ferguson et al., 2013; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Dedman et al., 2013; 
                                                 
1
 The largest international audit firms were formerly referred to as Big-8 before the merger of some 
audit firms, which later reduced the firms to Big-6 and subsequently Big-5.  The fall of Arthur 
Andersen in 2002 as a result of ENRON scandal reduced the international firms to Big-4 from Big-5.  
For the purpose of this study, Big-4 will be used for the large audit firms irrespective of the timing of 




Mustapha, Ismail, & Minai, 2011; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2009; Anderson, Mansi, & 
Reeb, 2003; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010).   
 
Similarly, Nigerian non-financial listed companies' accounting in Nigeria relies on 
statutory, regulatory, and institutional frameworks.  These consist of the Company 
and Allied Act (CAMA) 1990 and 2004 as amended, Code of Corporate Governance 
by Security and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2011), Financial Reporting Council 
Act (FRC, 2011), and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria.  The 
frameworks provide guidelines on company registration, operation, and closure; the 
duties of parties to the contract of a company, principles, and practices of accounting 
(ICAN, 2010), accounting standards, and code of conduct for Accountants (IESBA, 
2013).  Quality audit is required for the companies to abide by these frameworks to 
ensure transparency, proper accountability, accounting reliability and effectiveness 
(Arowolo & Che-Ahmad, 2016).  The study of DeAngelo (1981) defines audit 
quality as the probability that the auditor will discover and report the breach to the 
codes, standards, principles and other accounting guidelines.  Extant literature 
document that a quality-differentiated auditor is capable of discovering 
misstatements in  accounts by ensuring compliance with regulations and standards, 
which results in higher performance for their clients (Kaplan, Menon, & Williams, 
1990; Abdulmalik, Shittu, & Che-Ahmad, 2016).  This dictates the compelling desire 
to investigate the mediating impact of quality-differentiated auditors on the 
relationship between organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Furthermore, the studies reviewed suggest future researchable areas such as existence 
and economic nature of the Big 4 premium (Ferguson et al., 2013); improving 
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auditors’ ability for fraud detection (Coram, Ferguson, & Moroney, 2008); the 
organizational attributes, demand and preferences for the monitoring mechanisms 
(Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011) especially as related to Nigeria; earnings 
management and corporate governance from the perspective of the family ownership 
and non-family ownership companies from the angle of private companies 
(Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011); Other factors likely to affect the demand for 
voluntary audit - the strength of family ties to the board and equity ownership of the 
directors (Dedman et al., 2013) among others.  The expectation of this study, 
therefore, requires a fill in the gap created from the extant literature through the use 
of the mediating variable, quality-differentiated auditors. 
 
Likewise, there is an urgent need to regain investors' confidence in the management 
of Nigerian listed companies (Adekoya, 2011).  An accomplishment of this has to be 
through appropriate monitoring mechanisms that can protect the interest of the 
shareholders, especially the minority shareholders and other stakeholders against 
management’s office abuse (Adekoya, 2011).  Contrary to the expectation, the 
findings of the previous studies varied as they were of mixed and inconclusive 
opinions (Ali & Nasir, 2014; Ferguson & Scott, 2014; Lennox & Pittman, 2010).  
For instance, in a study of 235 non-financial public listed companies in Malaysia, 
Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2011), find that the board independence, non-multiple 
directorship, in-house internal audit function, size of the audit committee and 
independence, and the company size could help to overcome earnings management 
problems.  In another study of 25 listed insurance companies in Nigeria, Fodio, 
Ibikunle, and Oba (2013) find that the audit committee size, board size, and 
independence significantly associate with earnings management negatively. 
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Furthermore, the legal and regulatory frameworks responsible for the enforcement 
and monitoring to ensure that corporations comply with the laws and codes of 
governance in Nigeria are weak, inefficient and inadequate (Okobi, 2011; Nworji et 
al., 2011).  Thus, the experience in Nigeria has been exactly as in the failure to 
implement the strategy of corporate governance standard (Ilori, 2012).  Business 
failures in Nigeria are rooted in this fact (Sanusi, 2010).  Ironically, Nigeria recently 
has its reputation as African largest economy restored following GDP rebasement 
(Okonjo-Iweala, 2014), when poverty, insecurity and unemployment rate increase 
daily.  The currency of Nigeria, naira is continually getting debased in the 
international market.  Basic facilities such as good road, water, and electricity supply 
are lacking.  This situation calls for research, especially as it is comparatively a 
unique concept in a developing country like Nigeria (Ilori 2012) where the regulators 
(government departments, professional and independent bodies) seems to have failed 
to effect their oversight roles for public and private corporations (Okpara, 2011).  
Research on monitoring mechanisms, organizational attributes, and the quality-
differentiated auditor is imperative when we consider the enormity of daily news on 
corruption and economic fraud reported in newspapers, magazines, and media 
(Mayungbe, 2012). 
 
In addition, country specifics may make a difference (Beneish & Vohn, 2008). 
Hence, Dahawy (2009) claims that African countries are not adequately equipped to 
implement corporate governance as done in the developed countries because of the 
prevailing economic and political features in such countries (Waweru, 2014).  Also, 
Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2012) claim that companies in 
developing countries and those in developed countries are different in many 
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dimensions such as ownership, financing, size and constraints.  Compared to 
developed and transiting countries, research in quality-differentiated auditors, 
organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms in Nigerian listed companies, 
especially non-financial sector is scarce.   Even as noted earlier, the prior findings of 
such existing literature in the developed and transiting countries are with mixed 
results and limitations (Ali & Nasir, 2014; Lennox & Pittman, 2010).  The incessant 
occurrence of bankruptcy, mergers, financial fraud and financial crime in the listed 
companies of the Nigerian economy (Mayungbe, 2012) despite the engagement of 
professionals in preparing and auditing the sector’s financial statements prompted the 
researcher to embark on this study. 
 
Likewise, the persistent corruption, bankruptcy and business failures notwithstanding 
the existence of codes of corporate governance and rules and regulations for good 
corporate governance are eye openers to study a mediating effect on the relationship 
between organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms.  As of now, to the 
best of the knowledge of the researcher, there is barely an empirical study on the 
mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors on the relationship between  
organizational attributes (ownership structure, attributes, and activities of the board 
of directors, risk management committee, and compensation structure) and 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing), especially in 
Nigerian listed companies.  Likewise, agency, stakeholders and signalling theories 
have been used in relevant literature in the context of western culture, the validity of 
which may be contrary in non-western cultures (Ekanayake, 2004).  However, the 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of code of corporate governance using appropriate 
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monitoring mechanisms in Nigeria is not for lack of relevant laws but failure to 
implement and enforce the rules of the laws (Okpara, 2011). 
 
Thus, it is clear that, in Nigeria, (1) There are gaps in the practical aspects of 
corporate governance concerning the relationship of factors in the audit market such 
as quality-differentiated auditor, organization attributes, and monitoring mechanisms. 
(2) There is a need for empirical studies and investigations to fill these gaps.  It is 
obvious that (3) Agency conflicts exists between management and shareholders as 
well as among shareholders. (4) There are rules and regulations for good corporate 
governance in Nigeria but the implementation and enforcement are very weak. (5) 
Organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms should be adequately mixed to 
have a fulfilled corporate governance. (6) Quality audit is required to attain 
transparency, accountability, reliability and validity of financial reports to align the 
interests of management and shareholders. (7) It is necessary to examine a mediating 
factor in the relationship between organizational attributes and monitoring 
mechanisms. 
 
Therefore, it is important that a meaningful understanding and deliberate research on 
organizational attributes, monitoring mechanisms, and quality-differentiated auditors 
will help to (1) align the interests of the management and shareholders. (2) resolve 
agency type II conflicts among the shareholders. (3) reduce information asymmetry 
in Nigerian companies. (4) enhance reliable and transparent financial reporting. 
 
In addition, investigation of the mediating effect of the quality-differentiated auditors 
is important as it transmits the causal effect of the organizational attributes on 
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monitoring mechanisms through the production of high-quality and reliable financial 
reports.  The understanding of this mediating variable will enhance adequate supply 
and demand for quality auditing in the Nigerian audit market and also strengthens the 
demand for directorship, and internal auditing. 
 
Furthermore, this study chose to examine the impact of the new code of corporate 
governance to determine its effectiveness in addressing the weakness in the 
implementation and enforcement of due processes in organizational activities. 
 
1.2 Research Questions   
The study attempts to offer answers to the following questions in the light of the 
above-mentioned scenario:   
1. To what extent do organizational attributes (ownership structure, composition 
and activities of the board of directors, and compensation structure) influence 
the demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external 
auditing)? 
2. To what extent do organizational attributes (ownership structure, composition 
and activities of the board of directors, and compensation structure) influence 
the engagement of quality-differentiated auditors? 
3. Does the engagement of a quality-differentiated auditor influence the 
relationship between organizational attributes (ownership structure, the 
composition and activities of the board of directors, and compensation structure) 




4. Does the new code of corporate governance, 2011 SEC Code have any effect on 
the demand for monitoring mechanisms? 
 
1.3  Objectives of the Study   
The specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To examine the relationship between organizational attributes (ownership 
structure, composition and activities of the board of directors, and compensation 
structure) and the demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, 
and external auditing). 
2. To examine the relationship between organizational attributes (ownership 
structure, composition and activities of the board of directors, and compensation 
structure) and the engagement of quality-differentiated auditors. 
3. To examine how the engagement of quality-differentiated auditors can serve as a 
channel through which organizational attributes (ownership structure, 
composition and activities of the board of directors, and compensation structure) 
can cause the demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and 
external auditing). 
4. To examine the effect of 2011 SEC Code on the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms. 
These objectives highlight the significance of the study. 
 
1.4  Significance of the Study 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and audit market 
following a gap in the existing literature, exploring the mediating effect of quality-
differentiated auditors on the relationship between organizational attributes and 
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monitoring mechanisms in Nigerian non-financial listed companies.  Prior studies 
were on demand for monitoring mechanisms such as demand for external auditing 
(Dedman et al., 2013; Gerakos, 2013; Ferguson et al., 2013) board of directors and 
corporate governance (Appah & Emeh, 2013; Mohamad, Rashid, & Shawtari, 2012; 
Habbash, 2012; Swastika, 2013), internal audit and agency theory (Sarens & 
Abdolmohammadi, 2011; Havelka & Merhout, 2013; Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2010; 
Barua, Rama, & Sharma, 2010;  Engel, Hayes, & Wang, 2010; Ho & Hutchinson, 
2010), roles of the board of directors (Okpara, 2011; Dabor, & Ibadin, 2013) and 
roles of audit (Okobi, 2011;  Gupta, Weirich, & Turner, 2013; Babatunde, 2013), 
independence of auditors (internal and external), audit committee and board of 
directors (Wright & Charles, 2012; Appah, & Emeh, 2013; Marra, Mazzola, & 
Prencipe, 2011; Ali & Lesage, 2013; Mohamad et al., 2012).  These studies focused 
primarily on the needs, roles, remuneration and independence matters in relation to 
the monitoring mechanisms (Appendix B).  However, attention is given to the effect 
of the organizational attributes on demand and supply for the mechanisms and the 
resultant reduction in agency costs, which aid the going concern of an organization is 
very low. 
 
Most of these studies are on one specific mechanism only. This study, therefore, 
includes all the three monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external 
auditing) outlined in the 2011 SEC Code.  To the best of the knowledge of the 
researcher, only two studies examined the three mechanisms in addition to wide 
contextual variables such as ethnicity, total assets, listing status, information system 
structure, leverage, compensation structure, ownership structure and multinational 
status.  The studies with the three monitoring mechanisms are Anderson et al. (1993) 
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in Australia and Mustapha (2009) in Malaysia.  The formal documents that the 
overall monitoring cost may decrease as a firm acquires more assets.  However, there 
would be more auditing compared to directorship and more internal auditing 
compared to external auditing.  The latter claims that concentrated ownership, 
managerial shareholders, block-holders, leverage, multinational status and ethnicity 
are significantly related to monitoring mechanisms and agency cost. 
 
The present study uses the basic analysis of Mustapha (2009) since she built on 
Anderson et al. (1993).  The data for this study is from non-financial listed 
companies in Nigeria.  However, the difference between this study and Mustapha 
(2009) are that: this study focuses solely on Nigerian non-financial listed companies, 
using the following four new variables and data for years 2010 to 2012 as against a 
year data (2006) they used: 1) board of directors; 2) government ownership; 3) 
principal-principal conflict and 4) quality-differentiated auditor, a mediating 
variable.  The study is able to compare the situation of one year each before and after 
the implementation of the reviewed code using data for years 2010 to 2012 to 
determine the impact of the code on Nigerian non-financial listed companies.  This 
study is important because country specifics may make a difference practically 
between countries in all the variables for the study in respect of agency costs, 
quality-differentiated auditors, organizational attributes, and demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (Beneish & Yohn, 2008). Such country specifics relate to governance, 
political, legal, internal control systems, market factors and regulatory frameworks. 
 
Furthermore, while using the basic analysis reported by Mustapha (2009), some other 
analysis methods were adopted for robust tests and results. Organizational attributes 
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impacting on monitoring mechanisms used in this study are all-inclusive. Attributes 
such as ownership structure, board structure, compensation structure, have not 
received much attention in previous studies as related to a combination of supply, 
and demand for monitoring mechanisms.  Consideration of all the variables at a time 
enables provision of comprehensive findings, especially in Nigeria and Sub-Sahara 
region because many of them have not been empirically examined nor have 
consistent results in previous literature considered in this study.  The study considers 
total assets as a measurement indicator for the size of the organizations, which is one 
of the control variables for the research.  Other control variables are loss, complexity, 
performance, and growth. 
 
In addition, this study contributes to the literature on corporate governance of 
developing countries.  Nigeria is a developing country where corporate governance 
practices are not the same as practiced in developed countries like United States of 
America, United Kingdom, Australia and Europe or transiting countries like 
Malaysia and Indonesia.  Prior studies indicate that not much research had been 
effected on monitoring mechanisms in developing countries like Nigeria and that 
such mechanisms are still evolving (Okpara, 2011; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010;  
Fauzi, Mahoney, & Rahman, 2007; Fauzi, Rahman, Hussain, & Priyanto, 2007).  
 
This study chose Nigeria because of its exclusive fame for fraud and corruption (TI, 
2014).  Also, Nigeria is an emerging market with three dominant ethnic groups, 
which are Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa but more than 250 ethnic tribes (Curry, N.D).  It 
is the giant of Africa with the rebasement of GDP in 2014 (Okonjo-Iweala, 2014).  
The population of Nigeria was about 186.99million in April 2016 (Worldmeters, 
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2016) as the seventh largest country in the world.  Details of the population are as 
contained in Appendix C.  Thus, the setting provides an interesting outlook to the 
findings of this study. 
 
For practical contribution, the findings of this study can assist organizations to align 
the monitoring mechanisms with the organizational attributes as may be applicable in 
the light of quality-differentiated auditors to satisfy the needs of their stakeholders.  
This study can help organizations to have detailed appreciative economic 
justification for each monitoring mechanism and its role in corporate governance.  It 
is capable of improving the mechanisms for the protection of all stakeholders' 
interests in organizations.  Likewise, it can also enhance professional standard 
practice among auditors and directors. 
 
Lastly, this study can create a ground for policy makers and regulators such as the 
FRC, SEC, CBN, NAICOM and others to further stress the establishment and 
implementation of the monitoring mechanisms in the Nigerian listed companies to 
build very strong corporate governance in each company.  It suggests that internal 
audit must be taken serious and well strengthened to eliminate unnecessary agency 
costs. 
 
1.5  Scope of the Study   
A wide scope is left untouched as in research gaps identified from the prior literature.  
Therefore, this study empirically tests the research questions listed in section 1.2 on 
the three monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing) 
within the scope of agency complemented by stakeholders and signalling theories.  
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The study uses the audited annual reports of the listed companies for years 2010 to 
2012.  It also uses questionnaire to collect data on internal auditing as the 
information is not available in any of the annual reports.  The year 2010 is the year 
prior to approval and implementation of 2011 SEC Code while 2012 is the year after 
the adoption of the new code.  The application of data of a year before and a year 
after implementation of the codes shows us the result obtainable before and after 
implementation of the reviewed code. 
 
The study focuses on non-financial listed companies in Nigeria, excluding banking 
and insurance sectors due to their peculiarities. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Study   
This thesis is in six parts, Chapters One to Six.  Chapter One is for Introduction, the 
justification for the study, its objectives, and contributions. Chapter Two is for the 
literature review of theories and empirical findings on supply, demand, and 
preference for monitoring mechanisms and organizational attributes affecting the 
supply and demand for governance/monitoring. Chapter Three is for research 
methodology, explaining the research, the conceptual framework and theoretical 
justifications for the hypotheses development. Chapter Four is on research design, 
instruments, and measurement of variables and data analysis techniques for the 
study. Chapter Five is for recommendation and conclusion, presenting results and 
findings from the econometric diagnostic analysis, descriptive statistics and the 
regression estimation results. Lastly, Chapter 6 discusses and summarizes the results 






2.0  Introduction 
This chapter reviews prior research in respect of the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal and external audit).  The chapter also considers 
the demand and supply of external audit.  It likewise considers the features by which 
organizations make requests and the best of these monitoring mechanisms.  The 
literature on the organizational demands for the monitoring mechanisms are 
discussed in section 2.1 as related to the demand for each of the monitoring 
mechanisms used in the study.  Section 2.2 discusses literature on the underpinning 
theories, agency stakeholders' theories.  Section 2.3 considers the corporate 
governance in Nigeria.  Section 2.4 discusses the organizational attributes 
(ownership structure, the board of directors, and compensation structure) that 
influence an organization to demand the monitoring mechanisms.  Section 2.5 is on 
literature for financial reporting.  Section 2.6 considers quality-differentiated 
auditors.  Section 2.7 discusses quality-differentiated auditors as a mediating 
variable.  Section 2.8 considers the antecedents of quality-differentiated auditors.  
Section 2.9 provides the summary of the chapter.  
 
2.1  Monitoring Mechanisms   
Monitoring mechanisms (MMs) are the channels, systems, and procedures through 
which the shareholders guide the performance of the management (Connelly et al., 
2010).  MMs (directorship, internal, and external auditing) are tools to monitor 
agency costs (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011).  Also, adequate MMs secure value-added 
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audit quality (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010).  Corporations use it to guard the interests 
of the shareholders, especially the minority shareholders from the unscrupulous 
behaviour of the management and board members (Connelly et al., 2010).  MMs are 
useful in resolving conflicts of interests among the stakeholders of an organization 
(Appah & Emeh, 2013).  The stakeholders are the shareholders, bondholders, 
management, the board of directors, government, and the general public (Appah & 
Emeh, 2013; Habbash, 2012).  MMs help to discipline poorly performing Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) and management in an establishment (Jiang, Cummins, & 
Tzuting, 1971).  MMs aid detection of errors in the process of financial reports 
(Appah & Emeh, 2013).  It helps to improve the correctness of financial and non-
financial reports that management gives to the shareholders and prevent 
management’s possible unprincipled assertiveness (Appah & Emeh, 2013).  The 
roles of the MMs, especially, the external audit is to ensure the credibility of 
financial reporting (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Malek & Saidin, 2013). 
 
A company that fails to comply with the rules of corporate governance opens door to 
fraud or corruption, abuse of power and office, weak internal controls and 
supervision, poor or bad regulations, mismanagement of assets and liabilities, 
business failures that can result in bankruptcy, lack of transparency and 
accountability in financial reporting, mergers and corporate collapse (2006 CBN 
Code; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Okobi, 2011; Dabor & Ibadin, 2013).  Likewise is 
the fact that culture of corruption permeates the whole system of the country and 
serve as one of the foundational causes of the challenges and failures being 




These monitoring mechanisms (MMs) have generated foremost modifications in 
public and private sectors' business environments, especially in accounting and 
auditing (Hamdan et al., 2013).  There are many existing literature on MMs, 
especially in the western world.  Some of these are directorship structure and 
remunerations (Latif, Kamardin, Nisham, Mohd, & Adam, 2013; Wahab & Pak, 
2011), internal and external auditing (Che-Ahmad, Houghton, & Yusof 2006; 
Mohamad-Nor, Shafie, & Wan-Hussin 2010; Mansor, Che-Ahmad, Ahmad-Zaluki, 
& Osman, 2013; Kuschnik, 2008)  audit committee and audit fee (Engel et al., 2010; 
Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara & Nagel, 2012; Ferguson et al., 2013; Husnin, 
Nawawi, & Salin, 2013;  Nazri, Smith, & Ismail, 2012), audit committee and internal 
audit (Agoglia, Doupnik & Tsakumis, 2011; Barua et al., 2010; Sarens, De Beelde, & 
Everaert, 2009), audit delay (Gupta et al., 2013;  Bambang, Abu, Mukhtaruddin, & 
Imam 2013; Emeh, 2013), internal information technology and audit process 
(Havelka & Merhout, 2013).  It is worthy to note that each mechanism of corporate 
governance is capable of substituting or complementing the others within a given 
dimension of good governance (Habbash, 2012).  Hence, directorship, internal, and 
external auditing complement one another as monitoring mechanisms for good 
governance (Gupta et al., 2013).  The monitoring mechanisms recognize in most 
codes of governance are: 
 
2.1.1  Directorship  
Directorship refers to the office of directors, who are the people engaged to manage a 
corporation on behalf of business owners or shareholders (Freeman, 1994; Liu, 
2012).  Directorship can be executive or non-executive directors, the combination of 
which is the board of directors of a company (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011).  
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Directorship is appointed to act as principal to oversee the activities of management 
(Jusoh & Che-Ahmad, 2014) to maximize a company's value (Liu, 2012) and 
minimize agency costs (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011).  The timeliness of 
management reporting is a function of the effectiveness of the monitoring ability of 
the board of directors as related to communication, and coordination (Appah & 
Emeh, 2013). 
 
Carver (2014) examines the discrepancy between the actions of the directors and the 
consequences of such actions.  He used 159 firms in the United States.  The study 
claims that retention of directors on the audit committee is positively related to the 
power of the CEO.  Li, Mangena, and Pike (2012) investigate the relationship 
between the characteristics of the audit committee and intellectual capital disclosure 
using 100 U.K listed firms.  The study claims that directors' shareholding has a 
positive association with intellectual capital disclosure.  Mustapha and Che-Ahmad 
(2011) conduct a study on agency theory and managerial ownership using 235 public 
listed companies in Malaysia.  The study shows that independence of the board of 
directors and audit committee (a sub-committee of the board) and non-multiple 
directorship are part of monitoring mechanisms that are capable of resolving the 
problems with earnings management.  Al-Janadi et al. (2013) carried out a study of 
the mechanisms of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure with 87 listed 
companies from Saudi Arabia.  The study claims that there is a highly positive 
significant relationship in the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and 
voluntary disclosure.  Fodio, Ibikunle, and Oba (2013) studied corporate governance 
mechanisms and reported earnings quality in 25 quoted Nigerian insurance 
companies.  The study claims that size and independence of the board of directors 
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and size of the audit committee negatively and significantly associate with earnings 
management.  However, the study finds that the independence of the audit committee 
positively relates to the quality of reported earnings.  Some of the other literature on 
directorship monitoring mechanism are Aldamen et al. (2012), Abernathy, Kang and 
Krishnan (2011), Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010), Nazri et al. (2012), Malek 
and Che-Ahmad (2013), Mohammad, Rashid, and Shawtari (2012), Ibrahim and 
Samad (2011), Husnin et al. (2013), Semenova and Hassel (2013), Chaharsoughi and 
Rahman (2013), Amran and Che-Ahmad (2009) and Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010).  
This study examines the organizational attributes that impact the directorship as a 
monitoring mechanism and quality-differentiated auditors that mediate between 
them. 
 
2.1.2  Internal Audit  
The Institute of Internal Audit (IIA), an international body that provides dynamic 
leadership for the global profession of internal auditing, defines internal auditing as: 
"An independent, objective assurance and consulting activity meant to add value and 
improve the firm's operations, rendering assistance to the entity to achieve its 
objectives through systematic, disciplined approach evaluating and improving the 
effectiveness of the processes of risk management, internal control, and governance" 
(IIA, 2014). 
 
Auditing (internal or external) is one of the factors recognized by agency theory as a 
key monitoring mechanism (MM) designed to regulate the conflict of interests and 
cut agency costs (Adeyemi & Fagbemi 2010; Adeyemi, Okpala, & Dabor, 2012; 
DeAngelo, 1981).  Internal auditing is an internal MM expected to ensure 
compliance with the prevailing financial reporting standards and relevant accounting 
rules and principles within the scope of standards and guidelines provided by the 
Institute of Internal Audit (IIA).  The scope of standards and guidelines provided by 
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IIA are on pertinent topics like fraud governance, risk, and control, independence, 
and objectivity, information technology, internal audit function; quality assurance, 
audit committees and boards of directors and COSO internal control-integrated 
framework (IIA, 2014).  The MM is designed to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the processes in an establishment by positive criticism of weaknesses 
in the company's operations (Cohen & Sayag, 2010).  The standards and guidance, 
otherwise referred to as international professional practices framework (IPPF) is 
organized as mandatory guidance and recommended guidance for internal auditors 
(IIA, 2014).  The emphasis laid on this MM by the institute and codes of corporate 
governance in many nations of the world shows the prominence of the internal 
control systems.  This mechanism serves as a measure to ensure corporate 
accountability and transparency or combat financial crimes, corruption and fraud in 
establishments (Gupta et al., 2013).  However, it is not certain that internal auditing 
could be satisfactorily independent (Wright & Charles, 2012). 
 
Iwasaki (2011) examines corporate audit structure and its determinants in Russia.  
The study documents that a combination of the forces of internal and external 
accounting audit is a high notch of independence and expertise and enhances good 
corporate governance and discipline in the management.  The study further argued 
that the strength of the bargaining power of the outside directors impacts the extent 
of the independence and expertise required by the internal audit structure of the 
company.  Abbott et al. (2010) examine the association between the oversight of the 
audit committee for the internal audit function and the nature of internal audit 
function.  The data used were from 134 Chief Internal Auditors in New York.  The 
study claims that there may be a greater internal audit function with the demand for 
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better internal controls.  Barua et al. (2010) investigate the association between the 
features of the audit committee and the degree of investment in internal auditing 
using 181 SEC registrants in the US.  The study claims that the investment in internal 
auditing negatively relates to the presence of auditing experts on membership of 
audit committee.  Ho and Hutchinson (2010) explore the linkages between various 
characteristics and activities of the internal audit and external audit fees using 53 
Hong Kong listed companies.  The study finds that external auditors rely on the 
function of internal audit and results in lower external audit fees.  The study, 
therefore, suggests that the internal audit’s contribution may substitute some 
substantive processes of external auditing and result in monitoring costs reduction.    
Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011) investigate factors relating to the relative size 
of the internal audit using 73 Belgian companies.  The study claims that the size of 
internal audit function has a positive association with the management ownership, a 
negative relationship with independent board members and that the control 
environment significantly affects the monitoring mechanism.  Havelka and Merhout 
(2013) explore the quality of internal information technology audit process in the 
United States.  They find that the effectiveness of internal audit is impacted by 
relevant audit information, team spirit, technical skills, communications and 
collaboration skills, the organizational climate, and professionalism.  Some of the 
other literature on internal auditing are Ho and Hutchinson (2010), Che-Ahmad and 
Mansor (2009), Wright & Charles, (2012), Barac and Coetzee (2012), Moorthy, 
Seetharaman, Mohamed, Gopalan and San (2011), Al-Rassas et al. (2016). This 
study examines organizational attributes that impact on the choice of internal 




2.1.3  External Audit  
External audit is an external monitoring mechanism meant to ensure compliance with 
due processing and financial reporting standards within the scope of standards set for 
auditing (AICPA, 2014).  Some of the existing auditing standards for the compliance 
assurance are statements on auditing standards (SASs), statements on standards for 
attestation of engagements (SSAEs), statements on quality control standards 
(SQCSs) and archived pre-clarity SASs (AICPA, 2014).  The roles of the monitoring 
mechanisms, especially, the external audit are to ensure the reliability and quality of 
financial reporting (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Malek & Saidin, 2013; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, Peytcheva, & Wright, 2013).    The effectiveness of external 
auditing results in financial credibility, which is highly required especially when 
agency problems are severe (Hope, 2013). 
 
Zeghal, Chtourou, and Sellami (2011) examine whether mandatory adoption of 
international accounting standards has a link with lower earnings management using 
353 French listed companies.  The study claims that the quality of the external audit 
is one of the important factors for enforcement of international financial reporting 
standards.  Francis and Wilson (1988) investigate the association between quality-
differentiated audits and firm’s agency costs.  The study claims that the demand for 
higher-level audit quality increases with greater agency costs.  Che-Ahmad et al. 
(2006) study how ethnicity and foreign ownership affect the choice of auditor using 
1149 Malaysian listed companies.  The study finds that the ethnic structure in a 
company ownership is one of the factors that determine the decision to choose an 
auditor.  The study also finds that companies that are foreign-owned associate with 
quality-differentiated auditors.  Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2011) investigate 
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managerial ownership in relation to agency theory using 235 Malaysian listed 
companies.  The study claims that companies are likely to incur more external 
auditing costs when the leverage is high.  Ho and Hutchinson (2010) find that 
external auditors rely on the function of internal audit.  Iwasaki (2011) claims that 
management and outside directors impact the recommendation by the board for 
auditor’s appointment of the external auditors at the AGM.  Fodio, Ibikunle, and Oba 
(2013) examine the extent to which governance dynamics strengthens the financial 
reporting process and quality using 25 Nigerian listed insurance companies.  The 
study finds that independent external audit has a positive relationship with 
discretionary accruals.  This study examines organizational attributes that impact on 
the choice of external auditing and quality-differentiated auditors that mediate 
between them. 
 
2.2  Underpinning Theories 
2.2.1 Agency theory   
Freeman (1994) lists governance and agency among six principles of fair contracts.  
These six principles (Entry and Exit; Governance; Externalities; Contracting Costs; 
Agency and Limited Immorality) are expected to govern corporations (Freeman 
1994).  The agency in Business Law is concerned with the combination of 
contractual, quasi-contractual and non-contractual relationship involving the agent 
and the principal.  The agent is the one authorized to do things on behalf of the 
principal to come up with a legal relation with a third party (Ekanayake, 2004).  
Thus, agency theory establishes the contracts between the agents and the principals.  
Agency theory, therefore, suggests that a corporation is a connection of contracts 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The theory suggests that 
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corporations should not be treated as persons because their behaviour is like a 
market’s equilibrium performance (Jensen & Smith, 1985).  Agency theory suggests 
that corporate governance provides the structure for companies to set their 
objectives, accomplish the objectives and monitor performance by minimizing 
agency costs in the interests of their shareholders (Ikpefan & Ojeka, 2013).  Hence, 
the three monitoring mechanisms can be best explained in the agency theory 
framework.  Therefore, Ekanayake, (2004), suggests that most corporate governance 
and management control research in the western world are buttressed by agency 
theory.  Agency theory addresses the problems of moral hazard (management's 
failure to act in the best interest of the owners or principals) and information 
asymmetry (Hashim & Devi, 2008).  The study defines information asymmetry as 
the possession of information by management that may (not) be available to the 
principals.  The theory operates from the viewpoint that those in control of an 
organization have the intrinsic motive to use their power to divert the wealth of the 
corporation to themselves at the detriment of the owners of the establishment 
(Fidrmuc & Jacob, 2010).  Thus, agency costs occur from the misalignment of 
interests between the firm's managers and the firm's shareholders (Ibrahim & Samad, 
2011; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011a).  Hence, agency theory proposes monitoring 
and incentive mechanisms as processes to regulate agency costs (Chitnomrath, 
Evans, & Christopher, 2011).  However, the application of the theory may differ 
from culture to culture (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2013).  A prediction of the theory 
is that a company with an agent that is risk-averse will require a higher risk premium 
when exposed to greater risks (Engel et al., 2010).  Thus, a positive relationship will 
exist between audit committee’s compensation and the demand to monitor the 
process of financial reporting (Engel et al., 2010).  Agency theory suggests that the 
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board of directors should adopt an effective oversight mission purposely to protect 
the shareholders’ interests (Uadiale, 2010).  The framework of the agency theory has 
its root in separating ownership from control (Appah & Emeh, 2013).  Tipping is a 
principal-agent problem in agency theory and can arise between employers and 
employees, politicians and civil servants, stockholders and executives, donors and 
charities (Mainelli, 2007) as well as staff and customers or patients or clients’ staff.  
Agency theory is a starting point for corporate governance framework Adegbite, 
Amaeshi, & Amao (2011).  It then follows that an increase in agency costs 
necessitates greater monitoring (Abbott et al., 2010).  Hence, the emphases of agency 
theory are on how to improve the contracts between the parties, principals, and 
agents (de T’Serclaes, Jollands, & Bradley, 2007).  
 
Past literature on corporate governance, monitoring mechanisms, quality-
differentiated auditors and organizational attributes have explained variables in their 
studies using various theories.  However, the agency theory is frequently used, but 
the extant literature that argue that agency theory is not sufficient and that alternative 
theories are needed to holistically explain corporate governance in emerging 
economies (Yusof, 2016; Muratbekova-Touron, 2009) 
 
2.2.2 Stakeholders Theory 
Freeman (1994) emphasizes that stakeholder theory is concerned with the 
relationship of the agents, principals and third parties.  Stakeholder theory gives the 
description of a corporation as a collection of supportive and economic interests 
possessing core value (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  The theory is concerned with 
the management and ethics of an organization (Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003).  
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Every stakeholder has a duty to cooperate with other stakeholders for an improved 
circumstance that can result in economic value or profit (Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 
2004).  Stakeholder theory is instrumental in establishing the framework through 
which a corporation can examine the connections between achievement of corporate 
goals and stakeholder management (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  Stakeholder 
theory suggests that a firm is a nexus of contracts between itself or the top 
management (contracting agents) and the stakeholders (Jones, 1995).  It assumes that 
a firm: 1) holds contracts with many stakeholders. 2) It is managed by professionals. 
And 3) operates in a competitive market whose pressures affects behaviour but with 
no penalty for inefficient behaviour (Jones, 1995).  The theory suggests that a 
corporation has an influence on the external environment and accountable to a wider 
audience aside its shareholders (Effiok, Effiong, & Usoro, 2012).  Stakeholder theory 
is descriptive and has its focus on the stakeholders in the firm's operating 
environment with less attention on the social aspect of the firm (Buchholz & 
Rosenthal, 2005).  This theory suggests that recognition of stakeholders is a function 
of their interest in an organization (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  These researchers 
further stress that each stakeholder group is to be considered for its sake and not in 
the interests of shareholders or any other group.  The theory goes beyond descriptive 
value by giving recommendations regarding attitudes, structures, and practices as 
related to management of the affairs of a corporation and all entities or persons that 
affect the policies of a corporation (Donaldson & Prston, 1995).  Freeman (1994) 
proposes three principles for reformation of company laws. These are: 1) Stakeholder 
Enabling Principle by which a company is to manage the interest of the stakeholders 
i.e. employers, employees, customers, financiers and the communities. 2) The 
Principle of Director Responsibility, which provides a guideline for a company 
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director to handle the businesses of the organization in line with the stakeholder 
enabling principle. 3) The Principle of Stakeholder Recourse empowers the 
stakeholders to act against failure by expecting the directors to pilot the affairs of the 
company.  Thus, values are maintained for the shareholders (Freeman et al., 2004) 
and so enable corporate governance to legally and ethically guarantee capital 
providers appropriate rewards for their investment in an organization (Nworji et al., 
2011).  While agency theory sees a corporation as a connection of contracts, 
stakeholder theory perceives an organization as a connection of actors (Donaldson & 
Preston, (1995).  The stakeholders are individuals or institutions directly or indirectly 
affected by the activities and policies of a corporation (Knox & Gruar, 2007; 
Maignan & Ferrell, 2004).   However, this theory is being criticized for 
ineffectiveness in business accountability.  Jensen (2000), Marcoux (2000) and 
Sternberg (2000) argue that management is likely to satisfy self-interests in the 
pretence of appealing to the interest of a group of stakeholders as it is not possible to 
satisfy all (Phillips et al., 2003).  Phillips et al. (2003) however, argued that the 
management is to serve only one master, which is the organization but have to 
answer multiple constituencies in the course of the service to the master.  
Accountability will rather increase when management is accountable to multiple 
constituencies (Phillips et al., 2003).  It is also being criticized for failure to pursue 
the long-term value maximization for the shareholders.  Phillips et al. (2003) argue 
that the same critics (Jensen, Sternberg, and others) recommend the instrumental 





2.2.3 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory is useful to resolve problems that relate to information asymmetry 
in corporate relationship because the basis of its assumption is that information 
asymmetry exist among a corporation’s partners (Mouna, & Anis, 2013; Bear, 
Rahman, & Post, 2010).  Tang, Lai, and Cheng (2012) document that the theory 
explains that signals from the actions of an organization reflect its reputation.  The 
study further claims that the reputation that the signals suggest is used by 
stakeholders to form opinions concerning the capability of the organization to create 
value for them.   Mouna and Anis (2013), therefore, suggest that dividends are 
signals of expected cash flows.  It is concerned with the symbolic actions or green 
values by which a corporation can attract prospective investors, customers and other 
stakeholders (Walker & Wan, 2012).  Hence, management pays dividends to give 
positive signals on the prospects of the corporation (Musiega, Juma, Alala, 
Damianus, & Douglas, 2013).  The theory predicts that the more the profitability of a 
corporation, the more the information it discloses to the market (Zare, Khedri, & 
Farzanfar, 2013).  The theory suggests that investors are likely to invest in promising 
companies and intervene in board composition and top management structure 
(Chowdhury, Dungey, & Pham, 2014).  The rationale for this as contained in the 
study is that the two are important governance mechanisms or agents responsible for 
making strategic decisions on behalf of the investors of a corporation.  The study 
further documents that the investors of a corporation is likely to embark on such 
monitoring actions to ensure that the two agents take decisions to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth.  The theory suggests that parties in the contracts of a 
corporation intentionally or otherwise may convey relevantly but possibly not readily 
observable information applying signals expressing certain meanings to the other 
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parties (Bear et al., 2010).  The theory also advocates that management that invites or 
has an interest in quality-differentiated auditors to ensure high-quality audit gives the 
external stakeholders signals for a very good corporate governance (Wu, 2012). 
 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
The conceptual definition of corporate governance is connected to our discussion in 
this paper.  Suberu and Aremu (2010) describe corporate governance as the process 
of operation or governance of corporate entities, especially the public listed 
companies. It is a means of providing disclosures and transparency in respect of the 
conduct of the companies and boards of directors for the purpose of accountability to 
the shareholders (Suberu & Aremu, 2010).  It also helps to ensure compliance with 
legal obligations and remissions as well as a social responsibility to the operating 
environment or society at large (Suberu & Aremu, 2010).  Adeyemi and Fagbemi 
(2010) claim that countries that aim at gaining global credibility need sound 
corporate governance.  Even though there are laws to guard minority shareholders in 
Nigeria, there is a failure in the enforcement of the law.  Hence, it is a serious 
corporate governance issue in the country resulting from weak monitoring and 
enforcement by government and regulatory institutions (Okpara, 2011).  The 
monitoring mechanisms can help to resolve the challenges of the system of Nigerian 
corporate governance and guarantee that corporations comply with the codes of 
governance (Inyang, 2009). 
 
The rulership button change from military to the civilian system of government 
renewed interest in corporate governance in Nigeria (Ilori, 2012; Adeyemi & 
Fagbemi, 2010).  According to Okpara (2011), corporate governance started evolving 
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as post-structural adjustment program (SAP) with the growth of private ownership 
and financial institutions.  It continues to receive more attention with the plans to 
achieve the vision 2020, incessant mergers, bankruptcies, economic meltdowns, 
sustainable development and improvement in the economic competitiveness of 
Nigeria (Josiah, Okoye, & Adediran, 2013; Chinedu et al., 2010).  Corruption has 
been rampant for decades cutting across all systems of the country, and the 
government has been coming up with new laws and regulations and also reviewing 
the prevailing laws in the light of the incurable disease called corruption (Chinedu, 
Titus, & Thaddeus, 2010).  Some of such laws are Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) Act, 2011; The Money Laundering Act, 1995; 2011 SEC Code; 2006 CBN 
Code; CAMA 2004 as amended; The Advance Fee Fraud Related Offences Act, 
1995; 2009 NAICOM Code; Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), 
2004; 2008 PENCOM Code; The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004. 
 
For efficiency required in the contracts between the parties (principals, agents, and 
other stakeholders), 2011 SEC Code mandates the board of directors to be liable and 
responsible for the acts and affairs of an establishment.  The code of governance 
stresses further that, the board of directors' principal objective is to ensure that the 
organization is suitably managed.  It also suggests that the board should ensure that 
good corporate governance in a corporation gives a distinct company's strategic goals 
and framework for delegation of its authority.  Furthermore, it suggests that the board 
should ensure that management adheres to the company’s articles and memorandum  
of association, as well as Nigerian applicable laws, integrity of financial reports and 
observation of the highest ethical standards.  Thus, the directorship is expected to be 
effective to reduce agency costs, properly align the interests of the parties to the 
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contracts of an organization and increase corporate transparency.  However, 
experience in Nigeria shows that the boards of directors have failed in their 
monitoring role to reduce agency problems.  Hence, shareholders have been carrying 
a lot of unnecessary agency costs (Ikpefan & Ojeka, 2013).  Board committees are 
also part of board structure.  Hence, the 2011 SEC code listed the following three 
board committees for monitoring by the board: 1) audit committee (AC), 2) risks 
management committee (RMC) and 3) governance/remuneration committee (2011 
SEC Code).  CAMA (1990 Section 359 (3) and 4) requires all public listed 
companies to establish an AC.  2011 SEC Code requires such companies to ensure 
that at least one member of the committee is a financial expert.  AC is to ensure that 
the financial statement of the listed company is of high integrity; prepared in 
compliance with the requirements of legal, regulations and relevant standards.  AC is 
to ensure that the external auditors are qualified and independent.  AC also monitors 
the performance of both the internal and external auditors (2011 SEC Code).  FRCN 
Act (2011), paragraph 50(g) assigned the directorate of corporate governance to 
ensure that AC does not fail to review the scope of the audit, its cost, effectiveness, 
independence, and objectivity.  Risk Management Committee (RMC) is another sub-
committee of the board of directors (2011 SEC Code).  It is also a tool of directorship 
monitoring mechanism.  RMC is to support the board of directors on the agenda, 
policy and guidelines on risk (2011 SEC Code) as required for risks assessment in 
COSO (2013).  RMC is to identify risks that can prevent the entity from achieving its 
objectives.  It has a duty to analyse the risks and determine how to manage the risks.   
RMC has to consider possible risks to assess the risks which may prevent the 
achievement of the organizational goals and; identifying and evaluating changes that 




The third board committee in 2011 SEC Code is the Governance/Remuneration 
Committee (GRC).  The code directs that terms of reference or charter on GRC 
should include the establishment of the criteria for membership of board and board 
committee. GRC should be responsible for the review of the qualification of 
directorship candidates.  It should also see to the review of potential conflict of 
interests; assessment of the contribution of existing directors for possible re-
nomination and make recommendations to the board of directors.  GRC has a duty to 
prepare a job specification for the post of the board of directors' chairman (BDC) and 
the office duration of the candidate for the position.  It should evaluate the skills, 
knowledge, and experience required of candidates for the post of the board 
Chairman, CEO/MD and executive directors. It should make recommendations on 
compensation structure for executive directors.  GRC is to ensure that there are a 
succession policy and plan for the positions of the BDC, CEO/MD, the executive 
directors and the subsidiary managing directors for group companies.  GRC should 
review the company's organizational attributes and ensure that the board evaluates its 
conducts annually. 
 
The code in paragraphs 31.1 and 34.7 mandates the board to have a statement in the 
annual report giving assurance that adequate internal audit function exists in the 
company.  CAMA is, however, silent on the internal audit because it is specific about 
the audited financial statement.  2011 SEC Code, in section 30.4 (b) requires the 
audit committee to establish an internal audit function (IAF) and ensure other means 
of sufficiently appraising the system of internal controls in a company.  In 30.4 (e), 
the committee is mandated to obtain and review at least once in a year, a report by 
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the internal auditor in respect of strength and quality of internal controls with any 
issue or recommendation for improvement.  CAMA directs companies in section 
31.1 and 34.7 to have an effective risk-based IAF.  It also requires them to disclose 
reasons in the annually audited report why it cannot establish such function where 
they fail to have IAF.  The disclosure should also give an explanation on how to 
obtain assurance of effective internal processes and systems.  A company may decide 
to outsource internal auditing instead of creating a department for the service.  
Hence, 2011 SEC Code in section 5.5(viii) directs that an independent director 
should not be a partner or an executive of the statutory audit firm or internal audit 
firm of the company.  Paragraphs 31.3 to 31.13 of 2011 SEC Code contain the duties 
of the Internal Auditors.  The code requires that the effectiveness of the IAF should 
be subjected to external assessment at least once in every three years by independent 
reviewers as defined by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA).  2006 CBN Code also 
directs that the external auditors should not provide internal audit outsourcing 
services to its client companies. 
 
Three of the four codes of governance aside CAMA (2011 SEC Code, 2009 
NAICOM Code and 2006 CBN Code) emphasize the importance of external auditing 
(Ofo, 2013b).  However, this study confirms that even the fourth, 2008, PENCOM 
Code emphasize the importance of external audit in paragraphs: 4.3.13 and 5.2.1 
regarding audited financial statements.  It gives directives on the audit committee 
(AC) in paragraphs 4.4.4 and 5.4.3(l).  Its directives on the external auditor and 
audited accounts are in 56(2), 57 and 58 of the Pension Reform Act, 2004.  It is 
mandatory for every Nigerian listed company to have a statutory audit firm to audit 
its accounts annually (CAMA, 1990; 2004; 2011 SEC Code).  CAMA, (1990 & 
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2004) in section 357 (1) direct each company to appoint an auditor at each annual 
general meeting to audit its financial statements.  The appointed auditor is to hold 
office as the statutory auditor from the conclusion of the meeting to the next annual 
general meeting of the company.  The external auditing is to ensure the credibility of 
financial reporting (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010) by giving reports on risk 
management practices, internal controls and level of compliance with regulatory 
guidelines (2006 CBN Code). 
 
CAMA and all the codes of governance (2011 SEC Code, 2008 PENCOM Code, 
2006 CBN Code and 2009 NAICOM Code) lay emphases on the three monitoring 
mechanisms.  Therefore, organizations have to be structured to rightly demand the 
mechanisms that make for good corporate governance following the rules in the 
codes of governance.  The breach of these rules paved ways to fraud, corruption, 
board and management abuse, weak internal controls and supervision, poor 
regulation, poor management of assets and liabilities, failures in business that led to 
corporate collapses, mergers and bankruptcies, inadequate disclosure and lack of 
transparency in financial reporting (2006 CBN Code; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; 
Dabor & Ibadin, 2013; Okobi, 2011). 
 
The existing rules that may affect the demand and preference for monitoring 
mechanisms in Nigeria are as discussed.  Other institutional factors that may affect 




2.3.1  Regulatory Framework   
The regulatory frameworks for the three mechanisms, directorship, internal, and 
external auditing are in CAMA (1990; 2004 as amended), 2011 SEC Code, 2009 
NAICOM Code and 2006 CBN Code but with little disparities.  Okobi (2011), who 
examines the financial reporting council of Nigeria Act 2011, claims that regulatory 
framework centers on the accounting and disclosure system of a country.  Where 
there are no sound regulatory framework and public governance systems, the result is 
likely to be fraudulent financial reporting (Adeyemi, & Fagbemi, 2010; Adekoya, 
2011; World Bank, 2004).  Unfortunately, this seems to be Nigerian situation in line 
with World Bank, 2004 report on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC) 
Nigeria.  There are laws and codes of governance in Nigeria (Okpara, 2011; 
Adegbite, 2012; Adekoya, 2011).  However, the legal and regulatory frameworks 
that should enforce and monitor compliance with the laws and codes of governance 
are weak, inefficient and inadequate ( Okobi, 2011; Nworji et al., 2011; Ilori, 2012;).  
Nigeria, in its effort to have the kind of leaders needed for a sound regulatory 
framework and public governance systems (Ncube, 2013) decided to converge to 
international accounting standards in the year 2010 (NASB, 2010).  The transition 
period for the listed companies is 2012, given 2010 and 2011 for planning and 
necessary adjustments (NASB, 2010) as could be deduced from the table 2.1 on the 
roadmap to IFRS conversion in Nigeria shown on the next page. 
 
Babatunde and Olaniran (2009), investigate the impact of internal and external 
mechanisms of governance and performance of corporate firms in Nigeria using 62 
Nigerian listed firms.  The study claims that a good legal and regulatory framework 
should take care of all that have to do with the entrance to, operation in and exit of an 
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entity from the business or industry market.  The study also claims that the regulatory 
framework provides the basis for stakeholders of a company to exercise their rights. 
 
Figure 2.1:                                                                                               





















SOURCE:  NASB (2010).  The Report of the Committee on Road Map to the Adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards in Nigeria. 
 
2.3.2 Regulatory Agents/Independent Oversight Bodies 
Regulatory agents or independent oversight bodies are obliged to monitor the 
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practices (Appah & Emeh, 2013).  According to the report on Nigerian standards and 
codes, there are many laws and regulatory bodies for accounting, financial reporting, 
and auditing of companies but with inconsistent provisions (World Bank, 2004). 
Hence, audited financial statements are reviewed and approved by several bodies 
before published. Also, laws and regulations do overlap and are sometimes 
inconsistent with others, which results in inefficiency in implementation (NASB, 
2010).  The honourable former minister of commerce and industry, Senator Jubril 
Martins-Kuye in his speech at the stakeholders' conference on the roadmap to the 
adoption of IFRS in Nigeria on 02 September 2010 recognized the overlapping and 
inconsistency in laws and regulations (Martins-Kuye, 2010).  He, however, raised the 
hope of eliminating such inconsistencies with the passage of Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) bill.   Hopefully, the overlapping and inconsistency problems could 
be resolved with the representation of each of the affected regulatory agents on the 
board of the council of FRC as listed in section 2(d) of the bill.  The government 
established the FRC in 2011 among other responsibilities to oversee corporations' 
compliance with the financial reporting standards and other regulations specified in 
the adopted IFRS and approved the code of corporate governance (FRCN, 2011).  
One of the seven directorates of FRCN, directorate of corporate governance for this 
purpose is designated to: "(a) Develop principles and practices for corporate 
governance. (b) Promote the corporate governance to the highest level. (c) Educate 
the public about the principles and practices of corporate governance. (d) Acts on 
behalf of Council to coordinate all matters relating to corporate governance. (e) 
Promote sound financial reporting and accountability in all sectors of the economy 
with duly audited financial statements as the basis of truth and fairness position of 
the reporting entity. (f) Encourage corporations to operate sound processes of 
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internal control to protect stakeholders' investments and assets of public interest 
entities. And (g) ensure that the audit committees of corporations continually 
appraise the audit scope and effectiveness of the agency costs as well as the auditors' 
independence and intellectuality (FRCN, 2011).”  The study carried out by Oduware 
(2012), suggests that supervision by one regulatory body to handle all financial 
reporting issues is consistent with this.  Therefore, the implication of FRCN's 
monitoring role is to enable other regulatory bodies focus on their main missions.  
The Federal Inland Revenue Services (IFRS) illustrates this in section 3.0 of its year 
2013 information circular by requesting for financial statement prepared in line with 
FRCN Act (IFRS, 2013).  According to Minister of Trade and Investment, Aganga, 
(2011), FRC is expected to align government and private sector responsibilities.  It is 
to: 1) Put opportunistic attitudes of management of public interest entities in check. 
And 2) strengthens the competencies of the boards of directors by addressing board 
and management structures, ownership process, corporate responsibilities and 
compliance with relevant standards (Josiah et al., 2013). 
 
However, the independence of this regulatory agent is doubtful since it operates 
under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investments.  
The power given to the Minister of Industry, Trade and Investments over FRCN is 
too enormous.  The President of Nigeria is responsible for the engagement and 
resignation of the Chairman of the board of the council of FRCN on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Industry, Trade, and Investments.  The minister is 
also responsible for the appointment of other members of the council following 
recommendations from their various professional or statutory bodies.  He is also 
empowered to make regulations because his opinion counts for enforcement and 
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management of the provisions of the Act (FRCN, 2011).  The independence and 
strength of the council were recently put to test in its attempt to probe into the tenure 
of the former CBN governor.  The investigation is in respect of the failure by the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to remit oil revenue into the 
Federation's account (Chima, 2014).  It also includes some other allegations relating 
to the financial statement of the bank for the year 2012 (Chima, 2014; Sanusi, 2014).  
The ex-CBN governor did not only fail to appear before the council of FRCN when 
summoned for investigation, but he also succeeded in getting the court to stop the 
council from probing him (Opeseitan, 2014; Omojuwa, 2014).  These are two 
regulatory agencies, one in charge of the national banks and the other operates as the 
regulator of regulators.  Each of the regulators is exposed to the influence of political 
interference.  The current issue between the two regulators illustrates that regulators 
(government departments, professional and independent bodies) are yet to perform 
their responsibilities as overseers for public and private entities (Okpara, 2011).  One 
of the other regulatory bodies more relevant to this study is SEC that regulates the 
capital market in Nigeria.  The origin of SEC dated back to 1962 when established as 
Capital Issues Committee under the aegis of CBN as an ad-hoc consultative and 
advisory body (SEC, 2012).  It was upgraded to an independent body in 1972 as the 
Capital Issues Commission due to the country's increase in the level of economic 
activities.  The increment results from the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree and promulgation of the Capital Issues Commission Decree in 
March 1973 (SEC, 2012).  The government heightened the powers of the 
commission to cope with the challenges emerging from the market as recommended 
by the Financial System Review Committee in 1976 (SEC, 2012).  The SEC was 
thus established following this recommendation and the promulgation of the SEC 
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Decree No. 71 of 1979 created to supersede the Capital Issues Commission of 1979 
(SEC, 2012).  The government expunged SEC from CBN; however, CBN continues 
to fund the commission (SEC, 2012).  Its board size then moved from nine to twelve 
which include a representative of CBN as its chairman and was effectively 
commissioned on 01 January 1980 (SEC, 2012).  The government re-enacted SEC 
Decree No. 71 of 1979 as SEC Decree No. 29 of 1988 to address lapses found in No. 
71 of 1979 (SEC, 2012).  The Investment and Securities Act (ISA) No. 45 of 1999 
replaced Decree No. 29 of 1988 to promote more efficiency in the capital market 
(SEC, 2012).  ISA No. 45 of 1999 was again replaced by ISA No. 29 of 2007 (SEC, 
2012).  The commission joined the membership of the International Organization of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO) in 1985 (SEC, 2012).  The global international 
standards set by IOSCO form the basis of the rules and regulations for capital market 
in Nigeria since SEC enrolled as a member of IOSCO (SEC, 2012).  The three 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing) work within 
the framework of the regulatory agents.  
 
2.3.3  Accounting Education and Training (AET) 
Relevant professional bodies {like the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria 
(ICAN), Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN), Nigerian Institute 
of Directors (NID) and the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), Nigeria chapter} help 
to ensure that their members are well equipped with necessary skills and competence 
for quality financial reporting, auditing, and governance (ICAN, 2014; ANAN, 2014; 
IIA, 2014; IoD, 2014; Madawaki, 2012).  They build the skills and competence of 
their members through their education, training and certification programs, 
standards, and professional practice guidance.  Likewise, companies that aim to have 
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good governance pay attention to education, training, and engagement of experts to 
enhance efficiency and good performance, as well as shareholders' value.  Hence, 
2011 SEC Code lays much emphasis on the education and training of the directors of 
a company.  The emphasis signifies the importance of education and training to good 
governance and its monitoring mechanisms.  AET is an element in Nigerian roadmap 
to the adoption of international financial reporting standards through the creation of 
dedicated website; curricula updating in training institutions and updating of the 
chart of accounts among others (NASB, 2010).  Even the report on the observance of 
standards and codes (ROSC) for Nigeria recommends that the country should 
strengthen their professional education and training (World Bank ROSC, 2004).  
Also, institutional initiatives such as Society for Corporate Governance Nigeria 
(SCGN), Institute of Corporate Governance Nigeria (ICGN) and Convention on 
Business Integrity (CBI) are developed to promote good corporate governance 
through education and training, research and studies and standards monitoring 
(Adegbite, 2012).  Likewise, Adekoya (2011) recommends moral education for the 
promotion of good corporate governance culture of whistleblowing to enrich 
corporate ethics. 
 
2.3.4  Legal Framework 
Presently, the relevant laws and regulations for corporate governance in Nigeria are 
(a) Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990. (b) International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). (c) International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). (d) 
Nigerian Stock Exchanges Act, 1961. (e) Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act, 
1991. (f) Companies Income Tax Act, 2004. (g) Pension Reform Act, 2013 (as 
Amended) and approved on 30 April 2014 to replace that of 2004 now repealed. (h) 
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Insurance Act, 2003. (i) Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 2006. (j) Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act, 2007. (k) Investments and Securities 
Act, 2007. (l) Petroleum Profit Tax Act, 2004. (m) National Insurance Commission 
Act, 1997. (n) The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004. (o) Economic and 
Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), 2004. (p) The Advance Fee Fraud and Other 
Fraud Related Offences Act, 1995. And (q) The Miscellaneous Offences Act, 1984 
among others (Laws, 2012).  However, those recognized for corporate governance 
purpose are the CAMA, 2011 SEC Code, 2006 CBN Code, 2009 NAICOM Code 
and 2008 PENCOM Code (SCGN, 2014; Ofo, 2014;).  The soundness of these legal 
frameworks is the basis of a good corporate governance framework (Ikpefan & 
Ojeka, 2013).  Inyang (2009) claims that the government has a duty to provide a 
legal framework to incorporate companies.  The study further claims that 
government gives direction for the companies to operate, monitor their activities for 
conformity and protection of shareholders and the society in general through the 
legal framework.  These codes of corporate governance had been adjudged to be 
adequate ((Nworji et al., 2011).  Thus, there is no reservation of haven for the 
political fish (Kayode, 2013).  However, implementation has been a problem mostly 
due to political factors (Okpara, 2011).  The judiciary need to be politically 
independent, impartial and incorruptible to ensure the integrity of the legal 
framework, prevent corruption and enthrone good governance (Moses & Philips, 
2013). 
 
On foreign ownership, Inyang (2009), documents that foreign investors now have 
freedom to own business with no restriction other than incorporating the company 
under CAMA, 1990.  The freedom is an improvement on the law adopted from the 
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colonial master, which restricts foreign investments in certain areas and levels 
(Ahunwan, 2002). 
 
2.3.5  Accounting and Auditing Standards   
The report of the World Bank (2004), Nigerian standards and codes reveal that: (a) 
Nigerian Accounting Standards (SAS) are based on International Accounting 
Standards (IAS).  It claims that SAS are with no equivalence to IAS because the SAS 
are neither reviewed nor updated with current IAS. (b) SASs are "lenient national 
accounting standards." (c) There were no national auditing standards.  Hence, 
auditors were adopting International Standards on Auditing (ISA). (d) Adherence to 
auditing standards and professional ethics was inadequate. (e) The ethical codes for 
Nigerian auditors were short of international requirements. (f) Monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms in all sectors except banking industry are very weak. 
 
CAMA, Section 335 requires that companies should prepare their financial 
statements in compliance with accounting standards except where standards are in 
conflict with the provision of the Act.  The FRCN is responsible for the issuance and 
compliance monitoring of accounting standards (FRCN, 2011).  Okobi (2011) 
examines the financial reporting council of Nigeria act and claims that adoption of 
IFRS, hopefully, will ensure transparent reporting.   It also claims that approval of 
FRC Act for oversight of the implementation of IFRS will ensure the achievement of 





2.3.6  Corruption and Mismanagement   
These two factors are responsible for the fall of Enron, WorldCom, and other giant 
corporations.  The economic downturns led the world to remember the importance of 
corporate governance, social responsibilities and business ethics (Okaro & Okafor, 
2013).  Lack of good corporate governance both in private and public sector coupled 
with colonialism inheritance of secretive political systems facilitate economic crime 
transversely (Akanle, Adebayo, & Adetayo, 2014).  The culture of corruption 
prevalent in Nigeria is one of the foundational causes of challenges and failures of 
corporate governance in Nigeria (Ikpefan & Ojeka, 2013).  Corruption negatively 
affects nations’ economic development and increases their poverty because of bad 
decisions of their governments (Oyewande, 2009).  The codes of governance were, 
therefore, to safeguard the corporations against corruption and mal-administration 
(Adekoya, 2011).  Kayode (2013) appraised corruption in Nigeria and concluded that 
corruption flourishes in Nigeria because of the citizens' and the government's lack of 
will, guilt, and justification.  The study suggests that the judiciary should affirm its 
independence and stop treating certain citizens as sacred cows that are above the law.  
The country report of International Monetary Funds (IMF) of 2011 testify to efforts 
being made to heal the disease through improvement of governance and building or 
strengthening of institutions (IMF, 2012). 
 
Babatunde and Olaniran (2009) examine the coexistence of corrupt and legal deals in 
the relationship between the government and companies and the rationale behind 
such actions using 62 Nigerian listed companies.  The study suggests a decrease in 
the weight of corrupt deals, but not completely eradicated adopting a Cobb-Douglas 
distribution because management will continue to make demands for the deals.   
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They claim that decision makers’ objective is to maximize firm’s profitability in the 
short or medium run with no consideration for the long run expectation of 
shareholders.  They further claimed that such decision makers accept contracts that 
maximize profitability with fewer risks notwithstanding its inclusion of corrupt deals.  
Adekoya (2011) examines the challenges to corporate governance reforms in 
Nigeria.  The study suggests that the concentration of resources and amenities in the 
cities heightens corruption and results in poor corporate governance.  Ahunman 
(2002) examines the nature of corporate governance in Nigeria and prospects of 
reformation.  The study claims that concentrated ownership in Nigeria is problematic 
to minority shareholders because of exploitation by management and majority 
shareholders. 
 
2.3.7  Policy Making Environment   
The performance of monitoring mechanisms depends largely on the operating 
environment of an organization, especially its policy making environment (Ehikioya, 
2009; Ahunwan, 2002).   Adekoya (2011) examines the challenges in corporate 
governance reforms in Nigeria.  The study claims that the governing elites in the 
country have little or no respect for laws because they side-track and violate 
procedures and mechanisms designed for control and monitoring through political 
influence.  The government of Nigeria reviewed the UK legislation on attainment of 
its independence (Inyang 2009).  Britain's Companies Ordinance of 1922 is the 
source of the code of corporate governance before independence.  The government 
replaced it with the Companies Act of 1968 which, however, was the model of 
Britain Companies Act of 1948 (Inyang, 2009).   Ahunwan (2002) suggests that 
foreign investment regulation is an important policy for consideration of 
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shareholders’ protection; because investors pay higher for their shares in countries 
with good shareholders’ protection policy with limitation to minority shareholders 
expropriation.  The study further claims that the government removed the ban on 
foreign ownership in 1995 and replaced it by Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission Decree, which is foreign investment friendly. 
 
2.3.8  Socio-Political, Cultural and Economic Environments   
Almost every activity in the country has a political touch instead of merit and 
competence, especially for recruitments and contracts.  Likewise, the culture and 
social life of a community play a significant role in its economy, and the national 
economy is the aggregate of the financial performance of its business entities and 
individual investor.  Company Act, 1968 inherited from the Nigerian colonial master, 
United Kingdom was replaced by CAMA, 1990 considering changes in the political, 
economic and cultural environment after independence (Okike, 2007).  It was for this 
purpose also that the government established SEC as a replacement of the Capital 
Issues Commission, 1979 (Okike, 2007).  The changes in these laws are expected to 
have some impact on the monitoring mechanisms compared to the process under 
Company Act, 1968 and Capital Issues Commission, 1979.  If corrupt personalities 
are at the helm of affairs of a nation or organization, such community or society runs 
the risks embedded in the lack of accountability, transparency, and good governance 
(Okike, 2007).  Hence, Nigerian codes of corporate governance seek to ensure 
transparency, fairness and accountability in the leadership in both private and public 
sectors (2011 SEC Code; 2006 CBN Code; CAMA, 1990).  Therefore, Ilori (2012), 
emphasize the need for the regulators, as leaders to lead by example by being firm, 
transparent and unbiased in their monitoring and policy making responsibilities.  
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Babatunde and Olaniran, (2009) claim that the board of directors has a duty to ensure 
that the progress of the company advances with no undue political interference.  The 
government expects FRCN to consider country specifics concerning accounting and 
auditing standards to prepare and audit financial statements.  Hence, after adopting 
IFRS, the federal government of Nigeria mandated FRCN in section 8 (1) (a) "to 
develop and publish accounting and financial reporting standards (FRCN, 2011)." 
 
Ahunwan (2012) claims that promulgation of laws based on the development of the 
global economy does little in protecting the shareholders' interests, rather, 
governments should address the source of the governance problems.  The study 
identifies the origins of governance problems as socio-economic and political 
underlined ethnicity, religious tensions, poverty, military rule and human rights 
abuse.  Kayode (2013) in his appraisal of corruption in Nigeria, claims that 
corruption has permeated and contaminated Nigeria's social, political and economic 
structures.  Okike (2007) examines the mechanisms for corporate governance in 
Nigeria.  The study claims that the monitoring mechanisms in Nigeria are very weak 
on examination of the monitoring roles of the oversight bodies, such as the Corporate 
Affairs Commission (CAC) in charge of CAMA, SEC, The Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) and ICAN.  The study, therefore, suggests that the oversight bodies should be 
thorough in their monitoring roles for the monitoring mechanisms (directorship, 
internal and external audit) to be effective.  It claims that the code of corporate 
governance should reflect the peculiarities of the country's socio-political and 
economic environment when applying the global principles on sound corporate 
governance to realize the monitoring effectiveness.  The study also suggests the 
introduction of sanction to delinquent companies.  Adegbite (2012) collaborate this 
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in his study on Nigerian corporate governance regulatory system.  Adekoya (2011) 
likewise collaborate it when he examines the challenges of corporate governance 
reforms in Nigeria.  
 
2.3.9  Information Technology 
Application of monitoring mechanisms requires the ability to manage risks involved 
in governance to enhance excellent corporate performance (2006 CBN Code, Section 
3.6).  Such risks include information technology risks (Akinyemi, 2012).  
Organizations like the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), 
provide standards and guidelines (the international standard adopted in Nigeria) to 
ensure trust and value from information processed using information technology 
(ISACA, 2014).  It calls for attention on control as one of the operational risks 
because its inadequacy or mismanagement can lead to a direct or indirect loss for an 
entity (Owojori, Akintoye, & Adidu, 2011). 
 
2.3.10  Ethics   
The two accounting professional bodies in Nigeria, The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) and the Association of National Accountants of 
Nigeria (ANAN) have drawn professional codes of conducts for their members.  
They drew the codes of conducts from the standards set by the International Ethics 
Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA).  IESBA is a unit of the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC).  ANAN is making direct use of the handbook of 
the code of ethics for professional accountants as produced by IESBA and now using 
2014 edition.  The 2013 copy downloadable from IFAC and ANAN site contains 
changes to the code on three issues: 
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Breach of a Requirement of the Code 
"The IESBA has revised the code to deal thoroughly with actions of qualified 
accountants when they act contrariwise to standards, ethics or code." 
The effective date for the changes made is April 1, 2014, with permission for early 
adoption. 
Conflicts of Interests 
“The revision made by IESBA equips the accountants and auditors both in public and 
private sectors to be able to identify, evaluate, and manage conflicts of interest.” 
The effective date for the changes is July 1, 2014, with permission for early adoption. 
Definition of "Engagement Team" in the Code 
“IESBA clarifies the relationship by which the internal auditors directly aid an 
external audit team. The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) is a party to this revision. The International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 
610 (Revised 2013), Using the Work of Internal Auditors. ISA 610 (Revised 2013) 
includes requirements and guidance addressing the external auditor's responsibilities 
if using internal auditors to provide direct assistance under the direction, supervision, 
and review of the external auditor for purposes of the audit, where such assistance is 
not prohibited by law or regulation.” 
The effective date for this is December 15, 2014, with permission for early adoption. 
 
The code directs a company's secretary to provide information on matters of ethics as 
a central source of management and assistance to the board of directors and the 
company [2011 SEC Code, Section 8.4(f)].  It also mandates that a copy of the code 
should be part of the documents a director collects on appointment as a board 
member.  The purpose is for him to observe same in the conduct of his/her 
responsibilities [2011 SEC Code, Section 20.2 (I)].  In Sections 28.3 (i) and 34. (i), 
the code directs that the board should annually report on the extent of the company’s 
compliance with the code of ethics.  Section 36 is devoted to the code of ethics as a 
guideline for companies to draw their codes of ethics. 
 
2.3.11 Financial Institutions 
Banks, pension administrators, and other financial institutions are actors in corporate 
governance due to the nature of the interaction between them and business entities.  
Hence, Owojori et. al. (2011), claim that credit default by customers, directors and 
people related to the bank executives is one of the major factors that led to the failure 
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of banks.  Akanle et al. (2014) identify financial institutions as one of the social 
factors that influence the politics of fuel subsidy in Nigeria.  Financial outfits can 
have this same influence on other sectors of the economy and an entity.  Hence, 2006 
CBN Code in Section 8.2.5 bans audit firms that have a former bank's ex-officials as 
directors, chief financial officers or chief audit officers in its employment as auditors 
of banks. 
 
2.4  Organizational Attributes   
Organizational attributes are features of internal processes relating to the 
organizational performance of an entity (Boyne, 2003).  They are internal 
components that play vital roles in the corporate performance of an organization and 
explain the differences in the performance of various organizations (Pina, Torres, & 
Marti, 2012; Zheng et al., 2010).  Past financial crisis, business failures, bankruptcies 
and mergers are accredited to deficiencies in governance, failure to implement good 
governance, the absence of strong enforcement bodies, a weak judiciary, political 
instability and audit failures (Arnold, 2012; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2009; Reddy & 
Sharma, 2014).  These studies claim that the effect of these factors attracts scholars 
to investigate the effect of organizational attributes on corporate governance.  Hence, 
there are many literature on organizational attributes.  Lishenga (2011) found that 
companies vary their governance and practices in response to weakening 
performance.  In Nigeria, 2011 SEC Code directs that the board of directors is liable 
to account for the affairs and acts of the company.  It further required that they 
should define a framework delegating the duty to management and specify aspects 
delegated and those reserved for the board.  Some of the organizational attributes in 




2.4.1  Ownership Structure   
Ownership structure varies from organization to organization.  In some, it may be 
management, multinational, government or family ownership or a combination of 
two or more of these.  Abdul-Manaf, Amran, & Che-Ahmad, (2013), claim that 
power distribution between managers and shareholders is a function of ownership 
structure.  Ownership structure may affect the performance of an organization 
indirectly since it is their representatives on the board of directors that are 
responsible for decision making for the organization (Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan, 
2009).  Hence, the structure of ownership explains the variations in the demand for 
the monitoring mechanisms, being an important factor for modelling the corporate 
governance in an establishment (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2013).  Babatunde and 
Olaniran (2009) examine the relationship of components of corporate governance 
with audit quality using 62 Nigerian listed firms.  The study asserts that ownership 
structure is one of the ways by which corporations could modify agency problems.  
Other literature on ownership structure are Amran and Che-Ahmad, 2013; Rahman, 
Mahboob, and Siddiqui, 2011; Adeyemi and Fagbemi, 2010;  Saleh et al., 2009.  
   
2.4.1.1 Managerial Ownership   
Managerial ownership is the ownership structure in which a person is responsible for 
the functions of both the management (control) and shareholding (ownership) in an 
establishment.  Managerial ownership is a form of incentive contract in which a 
manager is allowed to own some shares in the company where he works as an agent 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  The motive for this incentive option is to reduce the 
agency problems in respect of the managers’ self-interest attitudes (Jensen, 1998).  
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Prior studies on governance studies examine this ownership structure and conclude in 
line with agency theory that this ownership style helps to reduce conflicts that 
normally exist between management and shareholders as it converges their interests 
(Saleh et al., 2009; Shittu, Che-Ahmad, & Ishak, 2016).  However, the performance 
of the organization reduces as managers' share of ownership increases (Amran & 
Che-Ahmad, 2013) giving an excess of 25% threshold (Saleh, et al., 2009) or when 
managerial ownership is very low (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Sarens and 
Abdolmohammadi (2011) investigates the factors relating to the internal audit 
function using 73 Belgian listed companies and find that management ownership 
positively relates to the size of internal audit function.  They suggest that increased 
management ownership is likely to affect the board of directors in its decision to 
support larger internal audit functions for close monitoring of management 
performance.  Jusoh and Che-Ahmad (2014) examine the relationship existing 
between ownership structure and company performance of 730 Malaysian listed 
companies.  The study finds that management ownership significantly and negatively 
relates to firms’ performance.  The management may have to expropriate company's 
assets for their personal interests if the managerial share is too low or becomes 
enormous (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2013).  In this case, the principal will need to 
intensify their monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing) 
to protect their interests. 
 
2.4.1.2 Government Ownership   
The ownership of an establishment, in this case, belongs to the government at the 
federal/central or state/province or local level or government institutions or agencies 
or government-linked companies (Saleh et al., 2009).  The possibility of political 
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intervention in such companies is very high (Saleh et al., 2009).  Such political 
interference is evidenced in government increasing its ownership and control of 
corporations starting from the Great Depression experience of the 1930s to 
subsequent global economic meltdowns (Borisova, Brockman, Salas, & Zagorchev, 
2012).  Al-Janadi et al. (2013) investigate how the internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms impact on voluntary disclosure using data from 87 listed 
companies in Saudi Arabia.  The study finds that government ownership (GO) has a 
negative influence on voluntary disclosure.  GO negatively affects the whole 
progress of an organization (Omri, Becuwe, & Mathe (2014).  Borisova et al. (2012) 
using 373 companies from 14 European Union, examine GO and corporate 
governance and find that government is related to lower governance quality.  The 
study finds that its relationship with governance quality is negative in civil law 
countries. 
 
Contrary to the negative impact of government ownership, there have been instances 
when it has a significant effect on corporate governance of an entity.  The significant 
effect is consistent with the finding of Iwasaki (2011), in which the presence of board 
directors that represent the federal government significantly improves corporate 
governance quality.  Borisova et al. (2012) also find that it is positive in common law 
countries.  Omri et al. (2014) find that government ownership positively relates to 
independent directors and the innovative ideas of the management.  Mustapha and 
Che-Ahmad (2013) find that increase in shares of government related institutional 
block-holders positively relates to more demand for monitoring.  Al-Janadi et al. 
(2013) find that government ownership is one of the corporate governance 
mechanisms with a significant contribution that provide quality and voluntary 
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disclosure.  Latif et al. (2013) also find that inclusion of ex-government officials on 
the board of directors has a significant impact on the firm's performance.   
Hence, findings regarding this variable are mixed. 
 
2.4.1.3 Block-holders   
Block-holders are shareholders and can be in any of the ownership class mentioned.  
However, the size of shares involved is very large.  Hence, they are large 
shareholders.  Concentrated ownership can be managerial (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 
2013), family (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2010; Saleh et al., 2009;), foreign (Saleh et al., 
2009), institutional or governmental (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2013; Saleh et al., 
2009;) and can be an individual in as much as the shareholding becomes large.  Also, 
a block-holder can be an insider or an outsider shareholder; an institution or 
individual.  Ownership concentration enhances innovation by enforcing changes 
where and when needed because of its efficiency in controlling the management 
(Omri et al., 2014).  The presence of block-holders on the board and committees can 
result in effective monitoring of the management (Aldamen et al., 2012).  With the 
influence of this class of the shareholders, the audit committee finds it difficult to 
minimize earnings' management and reduce the majority-minority conflict (Habbash, 
2012).  Guthrie, Sokolowsky and Wan (2012) examine the association between CEO 
compensation and board structure and find a significant increase in remuneration of 
CEO in non-compliant firms that have non-employee block-holder directors.  
Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2013) examine outside block-holders’ ownership as 
related to the demand for corporate monitoring using 867 Malaysian listed 
companies.  The study finds that concentrated ownership by block-holders positively 
influences the demand for monitoring costs.  The study shows that agency theory on 
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the relationship between agents and principals may differ between western cultures 
of developed countries compared to that of developing countries.  However, their 
study shows a slight difference from studies in western countries.  The study also 
finds that there is likely to be more demand for monitoring mechanisms, which may 
result in more monitoring costs in firms with block-holders ownership.  The study 
finds that the demand for more monitoring mechanism is more related to institutional 
block-holders that are mostly government related institutions than non-institutional 
or individual shareholders.  Wan-Hussin and Bamahros (2013) examine how the 
internal audit function attributes and audit delay are related, based on 432 Malaysian 
listed companies.   The study finds that audit risk is low in a firm with insider block-
holders who own at least 5% shares because the users of such audited financial 
statements are few.  Hope (2013) examined large shareholders in Canada and 
documents that there are variations in the types of block-shareholders with different 
roles for each of the large shareholders’ type.  Countries with weaker shareholders’ 
protection legislation are likely to be dominated by family-controlled or government-
controlled companies (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; Omri 
et al., 2014).  Eng and Mak (2003) find no association between the presence of 
institutional, individual and nominee block-holders and increased disclosure.  Henry 
(2010) finds that block-holders encourages agency alignment and reduces the level of 
agency costs.  Hence, the findings on block-holders are mixed. 
 
Principal-Principal Conflicts (Type II Agency Problem) 
The conflicts emphasized mostly in most prior literature on the ownership structure 
is principal-agent conflicts (type I agency problem).  However, conflicts also exist 
among the principals especially the majority against the minority (Al-Janadi et al., 
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2013; Effiok et al., 2012;).  The conflict among the principals is referred to as type II 
agency cost (Ho & Hutchinson, 2010; Ali & Lesage 2013).  The principal-principal 
conflict is a product of the ownership concentration whereby the block-owners and 
the owner-managers apply corporation assets for personal use at the detriment of the 
minority owners (Ho & Hutchinson, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Liu, Uchida, & 
Yang, 2012;  Baek, Kang, & Park, 2004).  Expropriation of minority shareholders by 
the management and controlling shareholders can be in the form of outrageous 
salaries, gratuities, bonuses, incentives, donations empire-building power and assets' 
diversion or mismanagement (Di Carlo, 2014;  Hope, Langli, & Thomas, 2012).  Ali 
and Lesage, (2013) claim that even though both the controlling and minority 
shareholders are entitled to the same amount of dividends per share, the controlling 
shareholder can benefit from the controlling power.  Corporations treat minority 
shareholders as outsider interests in consolidated accounts, hence, the treatment of 
the group equity as a liability in the parent company's account (Vollenweider,  
Grossi, & Nilsson, 2011).  Al-Janadi et al. (2013) documents that the control 
shareholders (family members on the board of directors or largest shareholders) have 
more information and will not likely disclose such information to other shareholders.  
Graham, Litan, and Sukhtankar (2002) claim that minority shareholders bear the cost 
of poor corporate governance more than any other investor (Armstrong, Guay, & 
Weber, 2010).  Ali and Lesage, (2013) claim that expropriation of minority 
shareholders impacts the demand for audit services.  Bae, Baek, Kang, and Liu 
(2012) examine the relationship between the controlling shareholders’ expropriation 
incentives and firm values using 608 Korean listed companies.  The study suggests 
that the expropriation of minority shareholders is vital to determine the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm value.  The study finds that corporation 
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performance and large shareholders’ ownership increases in crisis period while low 
shareholders’ ownership decreases.  The study, thus suggests that large and 
government ownerships moderate financial constraints but at the expense of the 
minority shareholders.  Consistent with this is the claim by Francis, Khurana, and 
Pereira (2003) that financial crisis exposes the minority shareholders to wealth 
expropriation by management and large shareholders.  Hence, 2011 SEC Code in 
paragraph 22.3 directs that the board of directors should guard the interests of the 
minority shareholders.  Also, 2009 NAICOM Code, paragraph 3.0(viii) states that it 
is imperative to consider the power of the controlling shareholders over minority 
shareholders to enhance good corporate governance in the insurance industry.  
Likewise, CAMA (2004 as Amended), paragraph 300 is dedicated to the protection 
of the minority shareholders. 
 
2.4.2  Board of Directors (Composition and Activities) 
The board of directors consists people elected by shareholders and in turn, hire the 
managers as agents to run the daily affairs of the entity (Duztas & D_Cle, 2008).  
Hence, Freeman (1994) refers to it as “stakeholders’ governing board”.  The agency 
principle, one of the ground-rules in stakeholders’ theory, suggests that an agent 
must serve the interests of all stakeholders (Freeman, 1994).  Hence, the board of 
directors and managers employed by the board must serve the interests of all 
stakeholders.  COSO, a private sector initiative suggests that boards of directors 
should oversee their entities' internal control system while the senior management 
should be accountable through the system of internal control (COSO, 2013).  
American Accounting Association (AAA), American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), Financial Executives International (FEI), Institute of 
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Management Accountants (IMA) and The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) jointly 
sponsored the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission, (COSO). The boards of directors are assigned the responsibility to 
ensure compliance with the standards of corporate governance (2011 SEC Code). 
The board of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Nigeria released the 
revised code of corporate governance in 2011 with a guarantee for the highest 
transparency, accountability, and corporate governance.  The code also gives a 
rundown of the board committees such as Audit Committee, Risk Management 
Committee and Governance/Remuneration Committee. The board has the 
responsibility to ensure that the committees effectively discharge their duties and 
responsibilities (2011 SEC Code).  Board structure and activities as found in some of 
the literature reviewed comprises board size, leadership structure or CEO/Chairman 
duality, board independence, board composition, CEO tenure, executive directors 
owner (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2009; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Hashim & Devi, 
2008; Latif et al., 2013; Che-Ahmad et al., 2006).  Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) 
examine the relationship between family controlled business and firm value using 
896 Malaysian listed companies.  The study finds that some of the board mechanisms 
influence family companies' performance.  Okpara (2011) investigates the barriers, 
issues, and challenges that are hindering effective development and implementation 
of corporate governance using 296 Nigerian listed companies.  The study claims that 
good corporate governance implementation and promotion is not feasible because of 
the deficiency on the part of boards of directors regarding commitment among other 




2.4.2.1 Board Size and Meetings 
Prior literature reveals that board size significantly influences the performance of 
corporations (Ali & Nasir, 2014).  Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) find that family 
businesses that have large board size perform better than those with a smaller board 
size and separate leadership.  Latif et al. (2013) investigate the extent of multiple 
directorship practices and relationship between board characteristics and firm 
performance using 132 Malaysian listed firms.  The study finds that the size of the 
board of directors has no significant effect on the performance of the entity.  2011 
SEC Code directs that the size of the board should be within the range of five and 
fifteen members.  It further stresses that an entity needs to consider its scale and 
complexity of operations to determine the size of its board.  Lishenga (2011) assess 
corporate governance reaction and declining firm performance using 47 listed firms.  
The study claims that frequent board meetings improve the performance of an 
organization.  Appah and Emeh (2013) claim that larger boards add to the monitoring 
capacity of the board through diverse expertise.  The study also finds no significant 
relationship between board meetings and timeliness of financial reports. 
 
2.4.2.2 CEO’s Tenure 
Miller, 1991 claims that the longer the stay of the CEO, the less rigid and concerned 
he becomes about monitoring.  Hence, he becomes a “stale in the saddle” (Miller, 
1991).  Carver (2014) argues that CEO significantly influences the decision to retain 
directors on the Audit Committee instead of the qualitative requirements of members 
of the committee.  Coles, Mcwilliams, and Sen (2001) tested the relationship 
between governance mechanisms and firm performance using 430 US corporations.  
The study finds a positive correlation between CEO's tenure and CEO duality, 
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managerial ownership, and board ownership but negative correlation with firm size.  
Gomez-mejia and Nunez-nickel (2001) documents that a lengthy tenure of CEO can 
be harmful to the corporation for reasons such as self-satisfaction and conservative 
attitude among others.  Others are for lack of willingness (i) To face new problems or 
challenges. (ii) Not to quit the job and (iii) Not to act until the end of the tenure for 
self-accomplishments as against that of the corporation (Conger & Nadler, 2004).  
Board independence may decline with an increase in CEO's tenure (Sanda, Garba, & 
Mikailu, 2011) due to intimacy that may develop between board members and the 
CEO over years.  On the contrary, Kyereboah‐Coleman (2007) find that CEO’s 
tenure impact positively on corporate governance (Kaur, 2014).  However, such 
positive impact is possible in family ownership companies as they have incentives to 
acquire business’ technology knowledge for monitoring (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 
2009b).  It could also be because they operate in a highly trusted environments 
(Miller & Breton-miller, 2006).  It is also possible when the executive anticipates 
staying long as such individual will avoid opportunistic attitude that may affect his 
career (Miller & Breton-miller, 2006).  Sakawa, Moriyama, and Watanabel (2012) 
find that CEO tenure correlates with the age of the CEO and influences the 
compensation structure for the CEO. 
 
CEO duality describes the situation where an individual occupies the positions of the 
CEO and the chairman of the board of directors at the same time.  Al-Janadi et al. 
(2013) find that separation of the positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board 
of directors negatively influence quality reporting.  Ali and Nasir (2014) investigate 
how corporate governance practices impact on the financial performance of 
corporations.  The study finds that separation of the CEO and the chairman of the 
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board significantly and positively affects firm’s performance.  Adeyemi and Fagbemi 
(2010) find that CEO duality has a significant relationship with audit quality.  
However, Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) find that family businesses that have large 
board size perform better than those with separate leadership structure.  Appah and 
Emeh (2013) also find that CEO duality has no significant relationship with the 
timeliness of financial reports and board meetings. 
 
2.4.2.3 Risk Management Committee (RMC)   
Signalling theory suggests that the establishment of risk management committee 
(RMC) helps the stakeholders’ readiness in the board of directors to ensure high-
quality monitoring mechanisms (Subramaniam, McManus, & Zhang, 2009). Hence, 
the study suggests that establishing a separate committee like RMC solely to handle 
risk profile could be of greater value, especially when the risk in financial reporting 
is increasing.  It also documents that the probability of establishing a risk 
management committee (RMC) increases with an increase in the size of an entity.  
However, the firms' size has no effect on whether or not the RMC should be a 
combined or a separate committee (Subramaniam et al., 2009).  The studies of Yatim 
(2009) and Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011), claim that risk management is 
central to corporate governance, linked to internal control.  Companies with a high 
level of risk awareness, formalized integrity, and clear ethical values highly 
appreciate the monitoring role of the internal audit in respect of risk management.  
Risk management is viewed so important that the report of the committee on "the 
financial aspects of corporate governance" in paragraph 4.24 recommends that it 
should always be on the agenda of meetings of the board of directors (Cadbury, 
1992).  Subramaniam et al. (2009) find that companies with high agency costs 
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establish separate RMC for high-quality monitoring.  Yatim (2009) investigates the 
relationship between risks management committee and board structures using 690 
Malaysian listed firms.  The study documents that the establishment of RMC 
associates with strong board structures.  The study suggests that the board of 
directors that is committed to fortifying its corporate governance and internal control 
is likely to establish an RMC.  The study finds that it takes a strong board structure to 
establish a risk management committee.  Nworji et al. (2011) examine issues, 
challenges and opportunities relating to corporate governance and failures using 105 
respondents from 11 Nigerian banks.  The study claims that improper risk 
management is one of the basic reasons for the failure of banks.  The study, 
therefore, finds that proper risk management is essential for prevention of bank 
distress.  
 
2.4.2.4 Board Composition 
Board composition is vital to innovation decision-making in corporations (Omri et 
al., 2014).  Agency theory suggests that the treasured public firms are those with 
independent directors on the board of directors of an entity (Anderson & Reeb, 
2004).  The degree of the treasure is determined by the ability of the independent 
directors to mitigate conflicts among various groups of shareholders and protection 
of the interests of the minority shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2004).  The officers 
of the board as enumerated in Nigerian 2011 SEC Code, section 4 are the Chairman, 
CEO, Executive Directors, Non-Executive Directors, Independent Directors, 
Multiple Directors, Family and Interlocking Directors and Company Secretary.  It 
directs that the composition should be such that ensure the presence of mixed 
experience.  It further directs that the composition should not compromise the 
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independence of the board members, their compatibility, integrity and availability to 
attend meetings.  The code further expatiates this in paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 that 
board members should be people of upright characters; that are competent, 
entrepreneurial, and committed to the course of good governance.  They should also 
have tangible achievements, knowledge in issues of the board of directors and sense 
of accountability.  
 
The study of Hashim and Devi (2008) investigate board independence, CEO duality 
and accrual management using 200 Malaysian listed companies.  The study finds that 
the board independence was significantly related to income-increasing and income-
decreasing earnings management.  Latif et al. (2013) find that an executive 
directorship is beneficial to an entity but cannot ascertain the extent of their 
independence to judge the performance of management.  The expectation is that the 
extent of which they are capable of aligning the interests of the management with 
those of the shareholders is a function of the level of their ownership.  Likewise, it 
claims that the presence of the founders on the board of directors aid increase in 
performance of a corporation.  The study also suggests that family ownership on the 
board of directors significantly affects the performance of the company.  Lishenga, 
(2011) claims that outsider-dominated (having more non-executive directors) on the 
board improves the performance of an organization.  Al-Janadi et al. (2013) find that 
majority of non-executive directors can independently make decisions and monitor 
management effectively to safeguard shareholders' interests.  Kibiya, Che-Ahmad, 
and Amran (2016) claim that the board independence significantly relates to the 
financial reports’ quality.  However, Fodio et al. (2013) argue that there is a negative 
and significant association between the independence of the board and earnings 
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management.  Hashim and Devi (2008) also argue that independent non-executive 
directors have no significant relationship with income-increasing/decreasing earnings 
management.  Also, Malek and Che-Ahmad (2013) find that director-auditor link by 
independent directors has no impact on the fees for non-audit services.  Adeyemi and 
Fagbemi (2010) find that non-executive director ownership increases the quality of 
auditing.  Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) likewise claim that board ownership relates 
with lower levels of voluntary disclosures; hence, it increases agency costs. 
 
Globally, gender diversity is receiving attention on political and corporate 
governance for accountability, corruption or transparency issues (Ofo, 2013a).  
Lincoln and Adedoyin (2012) examine the relationship between gender diversity and 
board effectiveness.  They claim that gender diversity in board composition can avail 
a wide pool of talent, which enhances effective corporate governance for company 
performance.  Lenard, Yu, York and Wu (2014) investigate the association between 
boards of directors’ gender diversity and corporate performance using 5,754 firm-
year.  The study documents that many countries have legislations that support the 
enlistment of female directors on the board of directors.  Systems with gender 
equality offer effective checks on corruption (Nawaz, 2010).  The study of Shittu et 
al. (2016) on female directorship, director compensation, managerial shareholding, 
and price-earnings multiple of Nigerian firms provides evidence that female directors 
add values to shareholders.  Women attend board meetings more than men (Lincoln 
& Adedoyin, 2012).  However, Lenard et al. (2014) find that board of directors with 




2.4.3  Compensation Structure   
Since there should be a link between the directors and senior management 
compensations and performance of the organization, some literature had examined 
the relationship.  Wahab and Pak (2011) investigate the relationship of tax planning 
activity with directors’ remuneration using 321 non-financial Malaysian listed 
companies.  The study claims that the compensation to the directors contributes to 
tax planning by reducing manipulation on salaries and wages of top management.  
Lishenga (2011) claims that companies can structure the compensation by highly 
contingent or long-term incentive contracts.  The structure can be a combination of 
any of the following: salary, share payments, bonuses, and benefits in kind 
(UNCTAD, 2006).  Armstrong et al. (2010) document the quality of the information 
environment as a performance measure to determine the executive compensation to 
promote a transparent information environment.  The study further claims that such 
performance measures will help the board of directors to align the interests of the 
shareholders and management.  Lishenga (2011) finds greater than 5% insider-
shareholding, high salaries, and bonuses payment to top management improve the 
performance of an organization.  Sakawa et al. (2012) claim that executive 
ownership is a substitute of incentive compensation.  Shittu et al. (2016) provide 
empirical evidence that director compensation affects the intensity of monitoring and 
alignment of the interest of the shareholders and management. 
 
The independence of the board of directors does not affect the decision on the 
compensation of the CEO and non-CEO directors.  Deumes, Knechel, Meuwissen, 
Schelleman and Vanstraelen (2010) suggest that the incentives for members of the 
audit committee (AC) should align with the stakeholders that they represent.  The 
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study claims that this is necessary for the committee to take up its responsibility for 
the selection of the auditor and to supervise audit functions.  AC compensation 
serves as a good proxy for AC quality (Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010).  Engel et al. 
(2010) investigate the relationship between AC compensation and audit fees and 
their relationship with the factors influencing the demand for monitoring.  The study 
finds that the demand to monitor financial reporting process and ACs’ compensation 
are related.  The incentives of AC should be taken serious for proper alignment of 
their interests with the stakeholders but should be carefully done to avoid economic 
bond (Deumes et al., 2010).  Situations that permit individuals to be on multiple 
committees should be avoided for the economic bond that may result from such act 
not to undermine the oversight of the audit committee and audit functions (Deumes 
et al., 2010). 
 
In Nigeria, NAICOM (2009), suggests that members of the board of directors should 
be satisfactorily compensated.  Reason being that they are responsible for 
preservation and enhancement of the value of shareholders, and should be rewarded 
for the time they need to monitor and appraise management's performance. 2009 
NAICOM Code is in agreement with SEC (2011), which include evaluation and 
remuneration of members of the board of directors and senior management on the 
duties of the board. 2011 SEC Code suggests that the board of directors should 
establish a Governance/Remuneration Committee (GRC), membership of which 
should be of non-executive directors only.  It requires that the terms of reference or 
charter for GRC among other listed roles should include recommendations on 
compensation structure for the executive directors.  Section 14 of SEC Code is 
devoted to issues of remuneration of the directors and senior management.  It 
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demands an all-inclusive policy for the compensation with a request that the 
remuneration should relate to corporate and individual performance but adequately 
attractive to motivate and retain skilled and qualified persons for a successful 
running of the corporation.  If the compensation structure is equity-based, the code of 
corporate governance from paragraph 14.4 directed that they should not be at a 
discount except with SEC's authorization.  The effective date for the discount is a 
year after the expiration of the minimum tenure of directorship.  It also directs that 
such remuneration should be subjected to AGM approval.  It further directs that 
shareholdings and all forms of remuneration (equity-based, material benefits, cash 
and otherwise) paid to the directors should be disclosed in the annual report of the 
organization.  CAMA, 1990 considers directors' compensation as related to loss of 
office [paragraphs 262(6), 271, 272, 273(d), 274(2) and (3), 339(d)].   Suberu and 
Aremu (2010) assert that the equity-based compensation to the directors and top 
management heightens a forceful trailing of the shareholders' value. 
 
2.5 Code of Corporate Governance (CCG) 
A code of corporate governance (CCG) is a set of best practices giving 
recommendations on structures and behaviours of organizational attributes (Aguilera, 
Cuervo-Cazurra, & Kim, 2009).  It is a template giving regulations binding listed 
companies for the achievement of shareholders’ value (Yasser, Entebang, & Mansor, 
2011) through high-quality financial reports.  The government of many countries 
came up with codes of corporate governance (Jo & Harjoto, 2011) following 
financial distresses in corporations like Enron, WorldCom and among others (Liu, 
2012).  The purpose of this was to safeguard the interests of the shareholders (He & 
Ho, 2010) through reformation of corporate governance.  Prior literature have 
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therefore examined the impact of codes of corporate governance (CCG) on the 
performance of corporations as relates to the interests of the shareholders (Husnin et 
al., 2013; Soobaroyen & Mahadeo, 2012; Ali & Nasir 2014).  Husnin et al. (2013) 
examine how the internal corporate governance mechanisms relate to audit fee and 
the impact of Malaysia code of corporate governance (MCCG, 2007) on audit fees 
using the data from 300 listed companies.  The study finds that corporations 
restructured the internal monitoring mechanisms such as the audit committee and the 
internal audit functions due to the new code of corporate governance (CCG).  It also 
finds that the MCCG influences audit fees determination.  Soobaroyen and Mahadeo 
(2012) examine the impact of CCG's expectations and requirements on 
accountability by the board of directors using top 100 listed and non-listed 
companies in Mauritius.  The study finds a substantive change in board 
accountability, such that corporations structure their board committees to ensure 
adherence to procedures and proper authorization of managerial decisions.  Ali and 
Nasir (2014) investigate the post-effect of CCG, 2002 implementation in Pakistan.  
The study finds that CCG has a significant impact on corporations’ performance. 
 
Nigeria has also reformed its corporate governance to improve on corporate 
governance by reviewing 2003 SEC Code to promote good corporate governance 
(2011 SEC Code).  The reformation is the government's reaction to 1) failures in 
businesses and the global requirement for best practice and its significance to quality 
financial reports (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010). 2) rapid changes in the corporate 
world that make 2003 SEC Code inadequate (Ofo, N., 2012).  The code of corporate 
governance (CCG) addresses the type I agency problems in developed countries like 
US and UK (Sanda, Garba, & Mikailu, 2011).  The reverse is the case in developing 
77 
 
countries like Nigeria where type II agency problem dominates governance in 
corporations (Sanda et al., 2011).  Paragraph 22.2, 22.3 and 22.5 of 2011 SEC Code 
is, therefore, designated for the protection of the rights of minority shareholders. 
 
2.6  Financial Reporting   
Financial reporting is an important instrument in corporate organizations bridging the 
gap of information that makes unevenness between the management and companies’ 
stakeholders (Malek & Saidin, 2013).  Financial reporting is important in issues of 
corporate governance because it serves as the basis for evaluating the health and 
viability of a firm (Anderson et al., 2003).  Agency theory shows that shareholders 
have no time to get involved in the daily routine/affairs of the company (Freeman, 
1994).  However, financial statements provide information useful for the 
shareholders to monitor and make economic decisions (Malek & Saidin, 2013).  
Financial reporting is an indicator of transparency and accountability (Akhidime & 
Izedonmi, 2013).  It has to do with how to present financial statements in formats 
easily understandable by users of the financial statements (IASB 2010).  It is a means 
of passing financial information or accounting for stewardship (Nwanyanwu, 2013).  
Financial reporting as in IAS 1 is "a structured representation of the financial 
position and the financial performance of an entity."  IAS 1 states further that the 
objective of financial reporting is "to provide information about the financial 
position, financial performance and cash flows of an entity such that will be useful to 
all users to make economic decisions."  It gives the stewardship of management 
concerning the resources entrusted to it.  IPSAS 1, provides information on the 
objectives of financial reporting as: "providing information about the: -Sources, 
allocation, and uses of financial resources. -How the entity finances its activities, 
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which may be useful to evaluate the entity's ability to finance its activities and to 
meet its liabilities and commitments. -The financial condition of the entity and 
changes in it. –And the aggregate information useful in evaluating the entity's 
performance regarding service costs, efficiency and accomplishments."  Financial 
reporting is a means to an end.  Hence, its objective to provide information for 
accountability, transparency, and decision-making as may be useful to its general 
purpose financial statement (GPFS) users (IAASB, 2013). 
 
2.7  Quality-differentiated Auditors (QDAs) 
A quality-differentiated auditor (QDA) is an auditor that succeeds in structuring his 
audit firm in a manner to differentiate his audit services in the audit market for 
clients to make a preference for his audit firm above other firms (Basioudis & Fifi, 
2004; Kaplan et al., 1990).  Che-Ahmad et al. (2006) define a QDA as one of the 
then Big-4 audit firms.  The claim is consistent with existing literature like Palmrose, 
(1988), Francis and Wilson (1988) among others.  An exception to this definition is 
for proven audit failure (Gray & Ratzinger, 2010).   
 
Francis et. al. (2013) find that big-4 has the larger market share in some countries 
because of their greater high-quality audit service, which makes them quality-
differentiated auditors.  Audit market has been noted for high competition in many 
countries of the world (Kaplan et al., 1990).  Hence, the need for the auditors to 
differentiate their service and be preferred for one reason or the other by the 
consumers of their service (Kaplan et al., 1990; World Bank ROSC, 2004).  The 
need for such differentiation among auditors arose from the advancement and 
changes in media, advertisement, and technology, which makes audit market 
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competitive (Kaplan et al., 1990).  The economy of supply and demand also plays a 
significant role in the audit market competitiveness (Okike, 2007).  The study is the 
status quo of corporate governance in developing countries.  It finds that only about 
200 out of about 500,000 registered companies are listed on the Nigerian Securities 
Exchange (NSE).  The qualified accountant that the companies are expected to 
employ as auditors and accountants of the 200 companies are more than 40,000 
(ICAN and ANAN members and others with ACCA, ICPA, CPA).  Thus, demand 
for audit services is likely significantly lower compared to the audit services supply.  
It is not likely that the huge number of registered companies not registered with NSE 
engage the qualified accountants either as auditor or accountants (Okike, 2007).  
They don't have to demand quality-differentiated services because audit failure 
detection is not common in such organizations and there is no legal requirement to 
scrutinize the financial statements of private organizations (Bauwhede & Kens, 
2002).    
 
Likewise, the demand of the clients for high-quality audit service due to changes in 
their size and complexity also contributes to the competition in the audit market 
(Ferguson et al., 2013).  Ferguson et al. (2013) investigate economic forces 
responsible for the emergence of dominant audit firms using listed companies in 
Australia.  The study finds that big companies with complex factor emerged and are 
in need of auditors with sufficient capacities for auditing large companies.  Thus, the 
auditors are forced to meet the demand of corporations by investing on fixed capital 
costs such as technology and intellectual capital for quality staff maintenance 
(Ferguson et al., 2013; DeAngelo, 1981).  It is this ability to increase investments in 
fixed and intellectual capital as demanded by changes in size and complexity of 
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client companies that led to the emergence of QDA (Ferguson et al., 2013).  The 
investment in audit technology (fixed capital investment) provides deterrence against 
the opportunistic behaviour of auditors and increases the deterrents with increases in 
audit firm's size (DeAngelo, 1981).  However, Big-4 auditors may be able to meet up 
with the investment required but may not necessarily provide higher quality audit 
than non-Big-4 auditors as witnessed in the recent financial crisis like Enron and 
others.  Hence, DeAngelo (1981) argues that the audit technology offers an incentive 
for an auditor to lower audit quality purposely to retain a client.   
 
Krishnan, Park, and Vijayakumar (2008) claim that second-tier auditors associate 
with lower earnings management though they tolerate earnings management in pre-
SOX period for clients from Big 4 auditors  (Gray & Ratzinger, 2010).  Huang, 
Raghumandan and Rama (2009) on the other hand, find that Big-4 firms are now 
conservative in the post-SOX period in accepting their new clients and pricing 
decisions.   Howbeit, Big-4 and some non-Big-4 but large audit firms (second-tier 
auditors) can meet up with this demand that results in audit pricing differences 
(Ferguson et al., 2013).  Thus, there are differences in audit quality resulting from 
competition in the audit market (Kaplan et al., 1990).   The differentiation started in 
the mid-1970s and became well noted in mid-1980s with the emergence of Big-4 
(Kaplan et al., 1990).  The competition emanated from the removal (in many 
countries) of the traditional prohibition that forbids auditors to advertise or solicit for 
clients (Deumes et al., 2010).  Auditing profession has been one of the professions 
with heavy regulations until the outbreak of economic crisis (Deumes et al., 2010).  
The competition in the audit market increased and brought changes to the conducts 
of the public accounting profession, such as auditors switching and audit product 
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differentiation (Kaplan et al., 1990).  Regulators in some countries, like Nigeria, limit 
the audit services that an audit firm is allowed to render to its clients to ensure that 
the independence of the auditor is not compromised [2011 SEC Code, Paragraph 
30.4(k)].  Even the demise of Arthur Andersen does not reduce the competition on 
price and audit market concentration by the quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) 
persists (Deumes et al., 2010).   
 
Che-Ahmad et al. (2006) investigate how ethnic association and national issues 
affect the audit services market in Malaysia.  The study claims that the distance of 
the head-office of foreign-controlled companies calls for higher level of agency costs 
and, therefore, will likely demand QDAs.  Defond, Francis, and Wong (2000) 
examine the relationship between auditor industry specialization and market 
segmentation using 348 Hong Kong listed companies.  The study finds that auditors' 
brand name and industry specialization influence audit premiums.  The study also 
claims that specialization in audit market expands audit market segment to include 
differentiation among the Big-4's audit firms.  It further suggests that such 
specialization paves ways to audit production economies and strategy to capture 
market share by lesser audit fees for low-priced audit clients, low balling (DeAngelo, 
1981).  Rose-green, Huang and Lee (2011) investigate the relationship between the 
auditor industry specialization and disclosure of weakness in internal control.  The 
study finds that QDAs and industry specialists are related and that QDAs are likely 
to report weaknesses in internal controls than firms with non-specialist auditors.  
Francis and Wilson (1988) categorize QDAs as 1) the brand name Big-4 vs. non-Big-
4 auditors. And 2) a continuous size variable based on total client sales audited by 
the audit firm.  The study argues that quality-differentiated audit is a control system 
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that helps to alleviate the problems that make monitoring of management difficult for 
diffused ownership.  Numan and Willekens (2012) argue that industry specialization 
helps auditors to differentiate their products and find that the differentiation softens 
price competition in the audit market.  Gray and Ratzinger (2010) document that the 
knowledge concerning clients' industries is vital for quality-differentiated audit and 
that the brand name auditors structure their firms along industry types.  The study 
further claims that outcomes from financial statements reflect the association 
between higher-quality audits and Big-4 industry specialists.  The researchers opine 
that Big-4 auditors issue informative going-concern reports with a better prediction 
for the next-period clients' bankruptcy.  The study also claims that the clients of the 
quality-differentiated firms are less aggressive in earnings management attitudes.      
 
Carpenter and Strawser (1971) and Arnett and Danos (1979), claim that companies 
going public are likely to choose a Big-4, as its auditor to enable it to sell its 
securities at a higher rate.  Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, and Garcia-Cestona (2013) 
examine ways by which firm ownership affects board monitoring functions using 
Spain non-financial listed firms of 2007.  The study claims that when a company has 
a greater independent board of directors, it will likely choose an all-inclusive audit.  
The ability to perform a comprehensive audit depends on the audit firm type.  The 
desire for audit quality to reach the level required by audit market participants 
through QDAs informs the structuring of audit firms (Deumes et al., 2010).  Thus, 
QDAs will reduce the risks of financial reports and material misstatement to the 
barest minimum.  Nasser, Wahid, Nazri and Hudaib (2006) claim that structuring to 
be a QDA helps auditors to lengthen their tenure with clients that desire high-quality 
or quality-differentiated audits.  Such auditors will maintain their independence and 
83 
 
objectivity at a high degree at the same time (Nasser et al., 2006).  Boone, Khurana, 
and Raman (2010) investigate how Big-4 and the second-tier firms render audits of 
similar quality.  The study finds that investors perceive that clients of Big-4 have 
high-quality financial statements.  However, both Big-4 and second-tier audit firms 
have a similar level of performance.  Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) claim that QDA 
firms are encouraged by their structure and reputation to ensure that their clients' 
annual reports give sufficient information to the shareholders and other stakeholders 
or users of the accounts.  
 
However, existing literature on quality-differentiated auditors are with mixed 
findings.  Azizkhani, Monroe, and Shailer (2010) find that the financial crisis that led 
to the demise of Arthur Anderson reduced the quality-differentiated audit value of 
Big-4.  Palmrose (1988) find that it is difficult to make a distinction among the 
QDAs because of inconsistency found in comparing the classification across time 
and intra-industry wise.  Further to this, the study also finds that it is rare to have 
litigations against auditors, which also confirms how difficult it is to distinguish 
among the QDAs.  Likewise, Gray and Ratzinger (2010) claim that other audit firms 
will equally produce quality audit because many of the auditors in such firms are ex-
staff of the quality-differentiated audit firms. 
   
Lennox and Pittman (2010) document that Big-4 audit firms, quality-differentiated 
auditors (QDA) constantly connect with a lower occurrence of accounting fraud 
before and after the advent of the restructuring of corporate governance.  The study 
also claims that companies that may plan to commit fraud may not engage QDAs.  
Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) claim that appointment of QDAs facilitates how 
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information, especially firm-specific information credibly flows to the market.  The 
study, further documents that QDAs play corporate governance roles through the 
timelier release of firm-specific information to defend the interests of the minority 
shareholders.  Al-Janadi et al. (2013) argue that there is a positive association 
between Big-4 and the disclosure of information.  These features empower the QDAs 
to possess a larger share of the audit market (Zhang and Uchida, n.d.).  Mısırlıoğlu, 
Tucker, and Yükseltürk (2013) find that the use of high-quality audit firms is 
significant to the improvement of financial reports under IFRS system of accounting. 
 
2.8 Quality-differentiated Auditors as a Mediating Variable 
The present study is on quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) as a mediating 
variable, which intervenes on the relationship between the organizational attributes 
and monitoring mechanisms.  Prior literature had examined the relationship between 
QDAs and audit market.  Francis and Wilson (1988) investigate the effect of agency 
costs on auditor differentiation.  Palmrose (1988) explores the relationship between 
auditors' litigation and audit service quality.  Kaplan et al. (1990) investigate audit 
structure as a way by which audit firms are differentiating themselves in the audit 
market.  Sun and Liu (2011) test the effects of client specific litigation risk on audit 
quality differentiation.  Han (2012) examines whether Big-4's service is of a high-
quality audit.  Hess, Mohrmann and Stefani (2014) investigate how audit market 
regulation and structure impact audit quality.  In all these studies, the difference in 
audit quality and why clients choose to prefer one to the other are brought to the 
limelight.  To the best of the researcher's knowledge, no study has considered 
quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) as a mediating variable till date.  Likewise, 
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none of the literature reviewed relates QDAs to the three monitoring mechanisms in 
a single research.  
 
A corporation aspires to engage auditors capable of detecting and correcting or 
revealing material omissions and misstatements in their financial statements (Sirois 
& Simunic, 2011).  Large corporations or multinational companies with complexity 
will likely require quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs), especially because of the 
complexity of their operations (Gray & Ratzinger, 2010; Ferguson et al., 2013).  The 
study further claims that corporations prefer the QDAs to others because their cachet 
adds to corporations’ monetary value in the capital and financial markets.  Gray and 
Ratzinger (2010) document that banks, financial forecasters, and analysts among 
other users of financial statement have a preference for QDAs in respect of their 
clients.  The rationale for this is the fact that the size of an audit firm has an effect on 
the auditors' independence (Gray & Ratzinger, 2010; Nasser et al., 2006).  
Companies that desire lower cost of debt also have a preference for QDAs 
(Rodrıguez & Alegrıa, 2012).  It is believed that QDAs are providing high audit 
quality and that non-Big-4 audit firms lack the ability to render similar services 
(Ferguson et al., 2013; Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010).  Hence, the corporations need 
QDAs.  Existing literature, therefore, support that agency cost relates to the demand 
for QDAs (Gray & Ratzinger, 2010).  Francis and Wilson (1988) claim that 
increment in the demand for QDAs is due to the need for corporations to mitigate 
agency costs.  The organizational attributes like ownership structure (Rodrıguez & 
Alegrıa, 2012) board structure (Yatim, 2010), leverage (Pitman & Fortin, 2004), 
information system structure (Kinney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004; Moorthy et al., 
2011) and compensation structure (Francis & Wilson, 1988), firm size (Gray & 
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Ratzinger, 2010), company complexity (Ferguson et al., 2013), firm performance 
(Myers, Myers & Omer, 2014), industry (Rose-green et al., 2011), as well as other 
factors like ethnicity (Che-Ahmad et al., 2006), audit and accounting regulations 
(Sun & Liu, 2011) regulatory agency, judiciary system among others will impact on 
decision for auditors to decide to be a QDA.  Consistent to this is the claim by 
Numan and Willekens (2012) that the demand for an auditor is determined by the 
effect of the client's organizational attributes (such as industry) on the auditor's 
differentiation choice.  
 
Quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) are aware of their reputations before 
authorities of corporations and society at large and will not like to lose either the 
reputation or their client-specific rents.  Hence, they are motivated to provide higher-
quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981).  The auditors are therefore developing formal 
policies, regulations and procedures using tools of auditing firms for audit 
observations, judgment or opinion to ensure quality-differentiated audit (Malek & 
Saidin, 2013).  Iwasaki (2011) clarifies that the benefits of using QDAs are derivable 
from the ability of the auditor to improve the reliability and completeness of the 
information disclosed by the management regarding business matters and financial 
performance.  The study further documents that the ability of the QDAs through 
audit structure to contribute to the corporation stock and financial market 
development will entice corporations to seek for their services.  The study also 
asserts that QDAs will promote corporate auditing that guarantees transparency in 





When an auditor rightly obtains fame for itself as a quality-differentiated auditor 
(QDA), it will successfully impact on the monitoring mechanisms (directorship, 
internal, and external auditing).  QDAs ensure that their clients’ annual reports give 
sufficient information to the shareholders and other stakeholders or users of the 
accounts (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010).  The three mechanisms are, therefore, 
expected to work towards the achievement of this goal to ensure that companies 
follow the appropriate records and procedures.  Extant literature repute that a QDA 
for better monitoring proficiencies in the financial marketplace gives no option to 
switch to a third-tier accounting firm (Gray & Ratzinger, 2010).  The study reveals 
further that such switching may yield a negative reaction from the market.  Even 
though an internal audit function may be strengthened to substitute for external 
auditing process, external auditors are still required by law to assess the activities of 
the internal auditing (Ho & Hutchinson, 2010).  QDAs make investments to improve 
external auditing quality that guarantee identification and report of internal control 
weaknesses (Rose-green et al., 2011). 
 
2.9 Antecedents of Quality-differentiated Auditors 
Many prior literature classify quality differentiated auditors (QDAs) using the size of 
the audit firm mostly into structured audit firm/Big-4/brand name auditor and 
unstructured audit firm/Non-Big-4.  Others are big audit firms, medium size audit 
firms, and small audit firms, otherwise called Big-4, second-tier and third-tier firms 
(Che-Ahmad et al., 2006; Gray & Ratzinger, 2010, Palmrose, 1988; Bauwhede & 
Kens, 2002).  The latter reclassifies the non-QDAs into two (medium and small size).  
Kaplan et al. (1990) classified them as structured, intermediate and unstructured.  
Organizations and public at large base their judgment of audit quality, audit pricing 
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and audit fees decision on this classification, which is size based (Hess et al., 2014; 
Bauwhede & Kens, 2002).  However, regulators and the medium and small size audit 
firms have been agitating against this judgment (DeAngelo, 1981).  The basis of their 
contention is that the professional standards of the accounting profession evenly 
impart every individual member of the profession with no regard for the size of the 
firm where each of the professional members works (DeAngelo, 1981).  Howbeit, the 
study by Kaplan et al. (1990) claims that the clients' environment makes a difference.  
The study asserts that a QDA is likely to attract the clients operating in a stable 
environment while the non-QDAs will be appealing to clients in an unstable 
environment.  However, DeAngelo (1981), in her study on auditor size and audit 
quality, argues that audit quality by QDAs is higher compared to the smaller audit 
firms.  The rationales given by the study for supporting the idea of determining audit 
quality by audit firm size are 1) measuring audit firm size by the number of clients 
put a check on the opportunistic behaviour of the auditor and sensitizes him to 
produce a high-quality audit. 2) QDAs are branded with substantial start-up costs and 
audit technology, which attracts clients to them and for which the existing client keep 
renewing the engagement of such firms. 3) The quality and costs attached to the 
work of QDAs inform fraudulent individuals in the management or board or any 
form of organizational structure to substitute his attitude of exchanging QDAs for its 
right quality.  4) A QDA that falls short of client's expectation for high audit quality 
is the greatest loser of all stakeholders of its client company.  The case of Enron and 
Arthur Anderson is a good example of this. 
 
Murase, Numata, and Takeda (2011) investigate the reputation of low-quality Big-4 
and non-Big-4 auditors.  The study finds that corporations interested in reputation 
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switch to quality-differentiated auditors moving away from the low-quality Big-4 
and non-Big-4 auditors.  Numan and Willekens (2012) claim that differentiation of a 
QDA aligns companies’ preference for auditor with the specialization of the QDA.  
The QDA derives market power through industry specialization (Numan & 
Willekens, 2012).  The QDAs as industry specialists invest in recruiting and training 
staff and acquire information technology for audit effectiveness more than non-
specialist auditors (Krishnan, 2003; Rose-green et al., 2011).  
 
Hess et al. (2014) investigate the audit market regulation and earnings characteristics.  
They claim that auditors' liability in addition to client companies size and complexity 
of the operation affects audit quality.  The study documents that laws are being 
promulgated in many countries following Enron scandal and the like to restrict the 
joint supply of audit and non-audit services.  The study documents that audit market 
concentration had been a concern to regulators.  Hence, they are trying to increase 
the level of competition in the market to reduce the concentration but raise audit 
quality.  The study finds that the effect of the regulations may be negative if the 
competition is low and neutral if the competition is high. 
 
2.9.1 Quality-differentiated Auditors and Ownership Structure 
Iwasaki (2011) documents that the presence of foreign investors and affiliation with 
a business group through stock ownership of a client company are central to the 
determinant of the independence and expertise of the auditor.  The foreign investors 
because of their awareness of grave information asymmetry between management 
and local shareholders are likely to suggest quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs), 
thorough supervision of management and adequate corporate audit structure 
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(Iwasaki, 2011).  The study of Desender et al. (2013), claims that ownership control 
determines the relationship that may exist between the independent boards and 
external audit fees.  Foreign-owned or multinational companies may not engage 
smaller audit firms due to lack of international network, without which client 
companies could recognize the Big-4 firms for such engagement (Sirois et al., 2011).  
However, Francis and Wilson (1988), find no relationship between managerial 
ownership and a QDA.  The study finds a weak relationship between QDA and other 
variables like bonus incentive compensation plan, largest single ownership, leverage, 
debt dividend, new security issues after auditor change, total assets and growth.  
 
2.9.2 Quality-differentiated Auditors and Board of Directors (Composition and 
Activities 
Rodrı and Alegria (2012) claim that board of directors, audit committee and other 
internal mechanisms of corporate governance complement audit quality.  The type of 
the auditor engaged by a corporation determines the extent of the effect of the 
internal mechanisms on audit quality.  The study by Iwasaki (2011), has some 
empirical evidence that the audit committee is part of the decision process for the 
choice of an audit firm.  The study of Desender et al. (2013) claims that the demand 
for an external audit by the board where the controlling shareholders are of a high 
fraction is low.  The study documents that monitoring the opportunistic attitudes of 
management by controlling shareholders can reduce the positive relationship 
between the board of directors and audit fees.  The study also claims that CEO 
duality may likely reduce external supervision specifically in relation with 
inadequacies of management.  The study further claims that the objective of the 
board of director and the auditors are similar regarding identification and 
rectification of management errors to uplift the interests of the shareholders.  It 
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further claims that independent directors will request for more audit services to avoid 
legal obligations, support their monitoring responsibility and safeguard their 
reputational capital.  It also claims that independent directors need to rely more on 
auditors because of their limitation resulting from the availability of little information 
from management compared to a corporate executive that has more information.  All 
the findings stated above illustrate some of the conditions by which the 
organizational attribute, the board of directors can affect the quality differentiation of 
auditors for the purpose of helping the board of directors and structuring their audit 
work for effective internal and external auditing monitoring roles.  
 
2.9.3 Quality-differentiated Auditors and Compensation Structure 
Quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) limits the opportunistic management of 
accrual-based earnings, like executive compensation contracts Boone et al. (2010) 
and stock-based compensation (Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010).  The claim is consistent 
with the claim by Rodrı and Alegria (2012) that linking management compensation 
and firm performance is a mechanism that complements audit quality for monitoring 
purpose in the public companies.  Hence, high-quality reporting obtainable by high-
quality auditing is required to evaluate performance and determine the right 
compensation for the executives (Hope et al., 2012).  Engel et al. (2010) argue that 
audit committee compensation and audit fees are positively related.  The reliability of 
financial reports may be on enquiry where there is an audit qualified report and 
compensation is linked to reported earnings (Chow & Rice, 1982).  The study finds 
that corporations switch auditors when issued a qualified opinion, which is due to 




When the employment contract of the management is explicitly reported-earnings 
based, the management may likely pass accounting adjustments to present false 
reports and declare that the firm and management wealth have been maximized for 
the reporting period (Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998).   
Veronica and Bachtiar (2005) claim that management’s decision/influence 
concerning reported earnings coupled with the effect of the earnings on their 
compensation create agency problems.  However, a QDA is expected to be effective 
to deter such misstatements as the quality of the auditor determines the extent to 
constrain the management from such practices (Becker et al., 1998).  Existing studies 
have illustrated this by examining the influence of quality differentiated auditors on 
earnings management (Zeghal et al., 2011; Che-Ahmad & Mansor, 2009; Soliman & 
Ragab, 2014) due to the importance of their roles in certifying the reliability and 
completeness of financial reports (Fodio et al., 2013). 
 
2.9.4 Quality-differentiated Auditors and Control Variables 
Sirois and Simunic (2011) document that the auditors for the large and public 
companies are the quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs).  Listed companies' 
features regarding size and complexity in operation may disqualify the non-QDAs 
from being engaged as auditors of listed companies because they lack the capacity 
and expertise required of such audit (Sirois et al., 2011).  Likewise, the benefits a 
large listed company can derive from being audited by a QDA will not encourage 




2.9.5 Quality-differentiated Auditors and Directorship Monitoring Mechanism 
Directorship refers to the executive directors, who are the people engaged by 
business owners or shareholders to manage a corporation on their behalf, (Freeman, 
1994; Liu, 2012; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011).  The board of directors is 
expected by agency theory to resolve conflicts of interest that normally exist between 
owners, management, and board of directors as well as among the owners of a 
corporation.  Hence, most codes of corporate governance rules that the board of 
directors should oversee the daily management of a corporation (MCCG, 2007 in 
Malaysia; CAMA, 1990, 2004 as Amended in Nigeria; 2011 SEC Code in Nigeria). 
 
When a corporation plans to go public, the potential buyers are likely to find the 
audited financial statements attached to the prospectus reliable if audited by a QDA 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Kaplan et al., 1990).  When management provides a large 
irregularity of information for independent directors in companies with dispersed 
ownership, the independent directors will rely more extensively on a broad auditing 
(Desender et al., 2013).  Hence, DeAngelo (1981) argue that an audited financial 
statement is an audit output from auditors’ independent verification of the financial 
data prepared by management.  The auditor expresses his opinion in compliance with 
relevant accounting and auditing standards on verification of the financial statements 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Kaplan et al., 1990; Hess et al., 2014).  It is likely that an 
independent chairman will encourage audit scope that will enforce directorship 




2.9.6 Quality-differentiated Auditors and Internal Audit Monitoring Mechanism 
Abbott et al. (2010) find that a significant portion of internal audit budgets is in 
functions outside internal control, which include rendering assistance to the external 
auditor in auditing of the company’s financial statements.  The study by Iwasaki 
(2011), has empirical evidence that the audit firm may suggest ideas to help its client 
company structure its internal audit.   
 
2.9.7 Quality-differentiated Auditors and External Audit Monitoring Mechanism  
The relevance of a quality-differentiated auditor (QDA) to external auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism is in the ability to detect and report any breach in the 
accounting system of the firm’s client (DeAngelo, 1981).  The discovering 
probability is a function of the audit firm’s information technology proficiency, 
coordinating and monitoring mechanisms (Hess, et al., 2014; DeAngelo, 1981).  IT 
proficiency, coordinating and monitoring mechanisms of the audit firms are 
concerned with audit procedures on a given audit and the extent of sampling (Hess et 
al., 2014; DeAngelo, 1981).  The consequence of failure to monitor and detect 
breaches is very expensive especially as clients view accounting and auditing 
standards as corporate governance mechanisms meant for management monitoring 
and corporate transparency improvement (Lishenga, 2011).  Hence, shareholders and 
other stakeholders of a corporation will appreciate a QDA because of his ability to 
detect and report such breaches (DeAngelo, 1981;).  The implication of this is that 
since specialization in certain quality level attracts higher fees, auditors that aim at 
having corporations that seek to engage auditors for uniform quality are likely to 
structure their firms to become experts in such fields.  One of the differentiations is 
in the approach of audit firms to unexpected events and uncertainties in the 
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application of coordination and control mechanisms (Kaplan et al., 1990).  Only the 
QDAs can afford to apply such mechanisms because of the costs of acquisition of 
fixed assets it requires.  Such mechanisms aid timely audit procedures for the 
achievement of specific objectives (Kaplan et al., 1990).  Large public listed 
companies prefer to have a QDA because of his ability and expertise in handling the 
demands dictated by the companies’ size and complexity.  Likewise is the 
international network needed for recognition by foreign owned or multinational 
companies, which a non-QDA does not have.  And its capability to deliver great 
benefits in resolving inherent business risks (Sirois et al., 2011).  Therefore, audit 
market for listed companies is restricted to the QDAs, and auditors willing to be 
appointed by such companies should develop the required capacity and expertise to 
enter the market (Sirois et.al, 2011).  QDAs are of greater value to banks and other 
private lenders compared to non-QDAs because of the ability to improve the quality 
of financial statements’ information (Jeong-bon Kim, Simunic, Stein, & Yi, 2011). 
 
2.10 Summary  
The relationship between quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) and organizational 
attributes as shown above illustrates how organizational attributes affects QDAs.  
Hence, this study documents that if a company's shareholders are to achieve their aim 
for a high-quality financial statement that guarantees earnings management, it has to 
consider the importance of auditors that makes for a good accomplishment audit 
system and corporate management.  The company has to blend its task environment 
with the structure of audit firms with QDAs as the stability of the company's 
environment determines the number of uncertainties that the auditor has to deal with 
(Kaplan et al. 1990).  Iwasaki's study further documents that the essence of the code 
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of corporate governance (the legal framework) is to ensure that the auditor to be 
engaged by the shareholders is independent of executive officers, the board of 
directors and even the shareholders.  Thus, the fairness of external audit is 
guaranteed.  This same legal framework that guides the company to select its auditor 
is responsible for the development and structuring of the audit firms with QDAs 
(Iwasaki, 2011). 
 
To the best of the knowledge of the researcher, only two existing literature combined 
the three monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing) in 
their studies. These are Anderson et al. (1993) and Mustapha (2009).  Anderson et al. 
(1993) examine the relationship between the three monitoring mechanisms and one 
organizational attribute, production investment.  Mustapha (2009) built on the 
literature of Anderson et al. (1993) by expanding the test to include more 
organizational attributes such as ownership structure, information system structure, 
leverage, compensation structure and culture (ethnicity).  None of these two literature 
considers the supply aspect of the audit market. 
 
Existing literature that tested two out of the three monitoring mechanisms are 
Directorship and internal audit (Abbott et al., 2010; Barua et al., 2010; Sarens et al., 
2009; 2011). Abbott et al. (2010) consider audit committee oversight only in all 
directorship dimensions.  Barua et al. (2010) consider audit committee size, 
independence, member tenure and other committees’ membership ignoring other 
dimensions of directorship.  Directorship and external audit (Desender et al., 2013; 
Husnin et al., 2013; Johl, Subramaniam & Zain, 2012; Jusoh & Che-Ahmad, 2014; 
Malek & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Malek & Che-Ahmad, 2013).  The only dimension of 
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directorship considered by Malek & Che-Ahmad (2011) is the interlocking 
directorship. 
 
Existing literature that tested only one out of the three monitoring mechanisms are: 
Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010), Aldamen et al. (2012), Babatunde and Olaniran 
(2009), Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Jamil and 
Nelson (2011), Mustapha et al. (2011) for directorship.  Adeyemi et al. (2012), 
Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010), Ali and Lesage (2013), Che-Ahmad et al. (2006), 
Dedman et al. (2013), Francis et al. (2013), Latif et al. (2013), Nazri et al. (2012) for 
external auditing.  Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010), Akhtaruddin, et al. (2009). 
Aldamen et al. (2012) and Jamil and Nelson (2011) tests are only on some 
dimensions of directorship (audit committee).  The only dimensions of directorship 
treated by Babatunde and Olaniran (2009) are the independence and size of the 
board, the audit committee, director’s shareholding and block-shareholders. The 
study did not consider CEO duality, gender or other board composition. 
 
The researcher for this study believes that this is the first research work, especially in 
Nigeria that investigates quality-differentiated auditors as a mediating variable in the 
relationship between organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms.  
Likewise, it is the first study that tests such relationship in combination with the three 
monitoring mechanisms at a time.  This chapter reviews the literature relating to 
monitoring mechanisms, organizational attributes that affect the monitoring 
mechanisms and quality-differentiated auditors that mediate between them in this 





THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed relevant literature on organizational attributes, 
quality differentiating auditors (QDAs) and monitoring mechanisms.  The discussion 
in this chapter is on the theoretical framework and hypotheses development base on 
the agency theory, stakeholders' theory, signalling and empirical evidence from the 
prior literature.  In this chapter, the study established four models for empirical 
testing of the hypotheses.  The first model (Panel A), examines the effect of 
organizational attributes (ownership structure, board structure, and compensation 
structure) on the demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and 
external auditing).  The second model (Panel B) examines the effect of 
organizational attributes (ownership structure, board structure, and compensation 
structure) on the choice of a QDA.  The mediating effect of QDAs on the 
relationship between organizational attributes and demand for monitoring 
mechanisms is examined in the third model (Panel C).  Panel D examines the impact 
of Nigerian code of corporate governance on monitoring mechanisms. 
 
The study develops three main hypotheses in panel A, examining one attribute in 
relation to the aggregate monitoring mechanisms under one hypothesis.  It likewise 
develops three hypotheses in panel B, examining one attribute in relation to the 
quality-differentiated auditors under one hypothesis.  The study develops one 
hypothesis relating the mediating effect of the QDAs to each organizational 
99 
 
attributes' influence on monitoring mechanisms in Panel C.   It develops one 
hypothesis also on the impact of Nigerian code of corporate governance (NCCG) in 
Nigerian non-financial listed companies.  Section 3.1 presents the nature and 
philosophy of the study.  Section 3.2 presents and integrates the theoretical 
framework of the study.  Section 3.3 discusses the theoretical and empirical support 
for the hypotheses development of the models.  Hypothesis 1, which is the ownership 
structure of the organization, is the first attribute examined in the study.  The study 
examines three categories of ownership structure, which are managerial ownership, 
block-holders' ownership, and government ownership.  Hypothesis 2 is on board 
structure and its dimensions, which are size, meetings, composition, CEO tenure, and 
risk management committee.  Hypothesis 3 is on compensation structure of the 
organization.  Hypothesis 4 is on ownership structure, composition and activities of 
the board of directors, and compensation structure relating to QDA.  Hypothesis 5 is 
on the mediating variable, QDA while hypothesis 6 is on NCCG.  Section 3.4 
discusses the operational definition.  Finally, section 3.5 presents the summary of the 
chapter. 
 
3.1 Nature and Philosophy of this Study 
The nature and philosophy of this study are concerned with the fact that a firm or an 
organization is a set of contracts on how the inputs (labour, materials, and overheads) 
are put together to have outputs and how to share the revenues from the outputs 
among the input items.  It also implies a difference in the interest of each party to the 
contracts.  Nature and philosophy are consistent with the claim of Freeman (1994) 
that an organization is a collection of contracts linked together and that the interest of 
each party in the set of contracts is at variance with the interests of others (Jensen & 
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Meckling, 1976).  The discrepancy in the interests of the parties results in agency 
costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   Hence, the move by the governments, regulators, 
stockholders and the corporation for monitoring mechanisms that can align the 
interests with one another for the best interest of all the parties (Fama, 1980).  Firms 
are also developing schemes to efficiently monitor the performance of each 
stakeholder and the entire team within its set of contracts through the discipline from 
competing with other companies (Fama, 1980).  Such schemes are necessary to 
mitigate the conflict of interests or limit the divergent attitudes of the manager 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Organizations, therefore, give attention to the nature of 
contracts among principals and agents (shareholders, debenture holders, the board of 
directors, creditors, debtors, customers, and employee) in an organization.  Prior 
literature illustrate the nature and philosophy of the monitoring mechanisms in the 
context of agency theory, stakeholder theory, contract theory, signalling theory, role 
theory and other organizational theories as discussed in the literature review.  These 
theories help to provide the managers, auditors, regulatory bodies, and agents as well 
as government some good scientific basis to arrive at appropriate decisions (Jensen, 
1998). 
 
Another philosophy on which this study is built is moral.  Freeman (1994) on the 
basis of this philosophy using stakeholder theory claims that the moral issues in the 
business value-creation activity are the function of the moral status of the community 
where the business operates.  He suggests that both the interests of the investors and 
all contractors should be equally considered to introduce moral notions into the 




Likewise, the philosophy of stakeholder management is very important in this study 
as all stakeholders for a corporation need to be considered for the success of its 
operation and course of existence.  This philosophy is consistent with the claim of 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) that stakeholder management requires attention to the 
right of all stakeholders both within and without the organizational structures.  With 
this theory, the management is not the only stakeholder that needs to be monitored to 
enhance good corporate governance.  Hence, the conflict of interests among 
principals, between agents and the principal or third parties need to be addressed to 
establish a good corporate governance in a company.  The need to monitor both 
management and controlling shareholders is consistent with the claim of Freeman 
(1994, pp 411) that "neither the principal nor the agent is immune."  
 
Furthermore, a business can only work when shareholders and or their agents make 
proper use of the shareholders' property, which is the same as the corporate property 
in a manner to create value  (Freeman et al., 2004).  Also, the created value should be 
to the benefit of all; it should not be used to satisfy the interest of a party at the 
detriment of the interests of others. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
The framework explains the mediating effect of the quality-differentiated auditor on 
the relationship between organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms with 
the agency, stakeholder, and signalling theories as the underpinning theories.  A 
mediating variable is that through which two other variables are partially or 
absolutely related (Huynh & Yaling, 2013).  Stimuli variables affect behaviour 
through the mediation of various transformation processes.  There should be a strong 
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relationship between the stimuli and mediating variable and also between the 
mediating variable and the behaviour variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Landsman, 
Maydew, & Thornock, 2012).  The Stimuli are the independent variables, which, in 
this study are organizational attributes.  Behaviour is the dependent variables, which 
are the demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external 
auditing) and quality-differentiated auditors is the transformation process.   
Mediation idea spring from questions on cause and effect in relationship (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008).  This study, therefore, empirically discuss how organizational 
attributes relate to monitoring mechanisms.  It also considers how organizational 
attributes cause structuring of audit firms and quality-differentiated auditors, in turn, 
influences the demand for monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Agency theory explains the association between the owners of the business, 
otherwise known as shareholders of a listed company (principals, ably represented by 
the board of directors) and the agents that are responsible for controlling the 
economic resources of the organization (management).  The theory is concerned with 
how to align the variation in the interests of the principal(s) and the agent(s).  It 
suggests a separation between ownership and control or management (Fama, 1980).  
However, the increasing movement of ownership concentration to the agents and 
hedge fund ownership are negating this law of separation in developed countries like 
US and UK (Connelly et al., 2010).  The theory provides discernments in respect of 
the problems of goal congruence between the principal and the agents and proffers 
solution to the problems (Ekanayake, 2004).  Hence, it has been used by many to 
explain various variables in corporate governance.  It has effectively explained the 
relationship between one or more attributes of an organization and one or more 
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mechanisms for monitoring activities and performance of management or 
enforcement of certain standards or codes (Ekanayake, 2004; Stroh, Brett, Baumann, 
& Reilly, 1996; Muratbekova-Touron, 2009; Appah & Emeh, 2013; Li et al., 2012; 
Sarens & Abdolmohammadi, 2011; Jensen & Smith, 1985). 
 
Stakeholder theory is more comprehensive than agency theory as it looks beyond the 
relationship between the principal and the agents but includes the third parties.  
Unlike agency theory, it takes cognisance of the society or environment where the 
corporation operates.  Its emphasis is on stakeholders’ value as opposed to 
shareholders’ value in agency theory.  Morals and values are central to the 
management of an organization in this theory.  The theory examines the ends to all 
the activities among the stakeholders and how to accomplish such ends.  It suggests 
that management should aim at satisfying all the stakeholders and also try to achieve 
the corporate goal, which is profit maximization (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  
Stakeholder theory explains firms’ behaviour as related to their social and economic 
performance (Key, 1999).  Like agency theory, researchers used it to effectively 
explain the relationship between one or more attributes of an organization and one or 
more mechanisms for monitoring activities and performance of management or 
enforcement of certain standards or codes (Yusoff, Mohamad, & Darus, 2013; 
Nickell & Roberts, 2013; Gray & Ratzinger, 2010; Fauzi, Svensson, & Rahman, 
2010; Saleh, Zulkifli, & Muhamad, 2010; Sanda et al., 2011).  
 
Signalling theory helps to explicate the actions of the organization as signals useful 
to shape the reputation of a corporation.  It suggests signals that form the basis of 
observations, impressions, and inferences that are formed by the stakeholders of an 
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organization.  The opinion formed following the signals guide the stakeholders to 
evaluate the capability of the corporations as to the satisfaction of their desires.  
Shareholders and bondholders desire to have the wealth maximized.  The desire of 
the users of the company's product or service is quality products or services.  The 
society's desire is that the company will contribute to the growth of the society 
through company social responsibilities (CSR).  The staff desires to be gainfully 
employed and the government desire to collect tax from the company.  Each of these 
stakeholders is on the outlook for assurance signals that the company will meet the 
expected desires.  The assurance is needed because of the existence of information 
asymmetry existing in corporate relationship (Tang et al., 2012).  In the like manner, 
the symbolic actions or green values that a corporation present to its stakeholders is a 
form of marketing and advertisement (Walker & Wan, 2012).  The signals, therefore, 
help each stakeholder to make right decisions or take the right steps regarding the 
relationship with a corporation such as acquiring new stocks, partnering in business 
or employment among others (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2012).  Researchers have used 
this theory to explain the mechanism of enhancing firm value through corporate 
philanthropy (Shapira, 2012; Chan, Chen, Chen & Yu, 2012; Reuer & Ragozzino, 
2012; Eizentas, Krušinskas & Stankevičienė, 2012; Zare et al., 2013). 
 
The research develops its model from this central research question: “How will the 
quality-differentiated auditors mediate between organizational attributes and the 
demands or preference for monitoring mechanisms in Nigerian public listed 
companies?”  The theoretical framework of Anderson et al. (1993), extended by 
Mustapha (2009) as shown in figure 3.1 below, serve as the basis for the proposed 















Figure 3.1:  Theoretical model of Anderson et al. (1993), extended by Mustapha and Che-Ahmad 
(2009): 
The framework presents hypothesized linkage between organizational attributes (IV) and demand and 
preference for monitoring mechanisms (DV).  The straight line shows the direct effect of the attributes 
and the dotted line shows the effects of control variables (CVs) on the DV. 
 
The proposed framework for this study is presented in Figure 3.2.  The model shows 
the hypothesized linkage between organizational attributes (IVs), quality-
differentiated auditors (MV) and demand for monitoring mechanisms (DV).  Overall, 
the figure presents a joint model regarding IVs, MV, and DV.  The proposed 
framework built on Mustapha (2009) is extended in this study with the introduction 
of 1) Board of directors (composition and activities) as an additional independent 
variable. 2) Quality-differentiated Auditors as a mediating variable. 3) Government 



















□ Listing status 
Demand and preference for monitoring 
mechanisms: 
o Total monitoring costs (Model A) 
o Ratio of total directors’ 
remunerations to total auditing costs 
(Model B) 
o Ratio of total internal audit costs to 












Figure 3.2:  Theoretical Framework for the demand for monitoring mechanisms. 
Research Model (Adapted from Mustapha, 2009).   
 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
Hypotheses are developed from prior literature and justifications from agency, 
signalling and stakeholders’ theories in respect of the variables and their dimensions 
(mentioned in Figure 3.1).  The study has five constructs, namely organizational 
structure [ownership structure (managerial ownership, bock-holders ownership, 
government ownership), board structure and activities (size, meetings, composition, 
expertise, CEO tenure, risks management committee), and compensation structure] 
as the independent variable, quality-differentiated auditors as a mediating variable 
and monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing) as the 
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dependent variable.  These characteristics of corporate governance if well 
strengthened will enhance higher performance for the corporation.  Also, if made 
strong, it will align the interest of the management with the interests of the 
shareholders (Dionne & Triki, 2005).  The benefits derivable in strengthening these 
characteristics is consistent with the aim of agency and stakeholder theories to 
eliminate or reduce conflicts and boost the value creation in the interests of all 
stakeholders in an organization (Lishenga, 2011).  Hence, agency theory is useful for 
analysis of the contractual requirements for monitoring that controls the conflicts of 
interests among the stakeholders in an establishment (Jensen & Smith, 1985).  
Stakeholders’ theory is also useful in this respect.  Caroll (1979) and Freeman (1984) 
claim that it helps the management to set the right objectives that enables them to 
meet the expectations of all other stakeholders of the corporation (Cai, Jo & Pan, 
2012). 
 
3.3.1 Ownership Structure 
Agency theory suggests that power sharing between management and shareholders is 
a function of ownership structure.  Also, it emphasizes that ownership should be 
separated from control in which case the agents need to assure the investors of 
necessary returns on their investments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  Jenson and 
Meckling, 1976 claims that agency theory is a theory of the structure of ownership or 
capital of an organization (Duztas & D_Cle, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Ownership structure is very vital to the governance of a corporation (Amran & Che-




3.3.1.1 Managerial Ownership 
Agency theory suggests that management may employ opportunistic behaviour if 
shareholders fail to monitor and control the management.  The agent's interest is 
always at variance with that of the principals.  A manager wants high remuneration 
while the employer wants high returns on his investment in the corporation.  He has 
more information than the principal regarding the operation and activities or business 
of the corporation.  The principal has little or no time because of his engagement in 
other fields.  The principal relies on what information the manager provides.  Lack of 
sufficient information on the part of the principal makes it difficult to establish if the 
action of the agent is in the principal's interest.  However,  the attitude of an agent 
differs when s/he owns/does not own shares in the organization (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Saleh et al., 2009; Sarens & Abdolmohammadi, 2011; Jusoh & Che-Ahmad, 
2014; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2013; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Brunzell & 
Peltomäki, 2015; Shittu, Che-Ahmad, & Ishak, 2016).   
 
Base on the above discussion, this study asserts that managerial ownership enhances 
the alignment of the interests of the management with the interests of the 
shareholders.  This is because, as a shareholder in the company, he now expects 
returns on his investment in the company and as a principal; he also has access to 
information needed to make decisions not only as a manager but also as a principal.  
The alignment of the interests of both the principal and agent, therefore, reduces the 
agency costs.  Therefore, this study considers related hypotheses as shown below: 
H1a Managerial ownership is negatively associated with the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H1ai  Managerial ownership is negatively associated with the demand for 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism 
H1aii  Managerial ownership is negatively associated with the demand for 
internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
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H1aiii Managerial ownership is negatively associated with to the demand for 
external auditing monitoring mechanism. 
 
3.3.1.2 Government Ownership 
Government ownership, in line with agency theory positively relates to the demand 
for monitoring by independent directors.  Governments started acquiring shares in 
public companies as a result of incessant financial crisis starting from 1930 Great 
Depression.  The intention is to ensure good corporate governance in the public 
companies.  It is therefore expected that the involvement of the government in the 
ownership of corporations will ensure compliance with the code of corporate 
governance and relevant standards, principles and laws.  The government is likely to 
demand monitoring to protect the public fund invested from experiencing what 
happened to shareholders of financial crisis-affected companies.   The presence of 
the owners representative on the board of directors will help to achieve this objective 
(Iwasaki, 2011; Omri et al., 2014; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2013; Eng & Mak, 
2003; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Latif et al., 2013).  
 
This study, therefore asserts on the basis of the above arguments that government 
ownership effectively impacts the performance of a corporation.  There is likely to be 
more disclosure with a significant government ownership.    Governments are likely 
to ensure that proper modalities are in place for necessary monitoring of the 
management and the board of directors.  Hence, more cost will be incurred on 
technology, research and development, competent management and high-quality 
audit because the presence of government ownership makes for easy access to funds 
to procure such.  The more the fund provided, the more the monitoring that will be 
required.  Therefore, this study considers related hypotheses as follows: 
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H1b Government ownership is positively associated with the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H1bi Government ownership is positively associated with the demand for the 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism. 
H1bii Government ownership is positively associated with the demand for 
internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
H1biii Government ownership is positively associated with the demand for 
external auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
 
3.3.1.3 Block-holders Ownership 
Two types of agency problems or conflicts that agency theory suggests are: 1) The 
one that addresses the conflicts between management and shareholders, which is 
known as type I agency problem. 2) The one that addresses the conflicts among the 
shareholders, like large shareholders and second-largest shareholders or other 
shareholders or majority and minority shareholders is called type II agency problem.  
A block-holder can fall either into the group of large or second-largest shareholders 
(Di Carlo, 2014; Lei, Lin, & Wei, 2013; Ho & Hutchinson, 2010).  Hence, this study 
considers the conflict between the block-holders and the manager and also among the 
block-holders and between the block-holders and minority shareholders. 
 
3.3.1.3.1 Individual Block-holders 
Individual block-holders are large shareholders other than the institutional block-
holders.  They may be family block-holders or other individuals but outside 
shareholders or even inside shareholders like management.  However, this study is 
considering the outside shareholders.  This is because other variables in the study 
relate to the inside shareholders, especially, the managerial ownership and 
compensation structure.  These individual block-holders like the institutional block-
holders also demand monitoring.  Their demand for monitoring may not be as strong 
as the institutional block-holders because they are less influential or powerful 
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compared to the institutional block-holders.  Also, their ability to analyse and source 
for information resources may not be as high as that of the institutional block-holders 
(Ali & Lesage, 2013; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2013; Habbash, 2012;  Connelly et 
al., 2010; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001). 
 
On the basis of the above discussion, the study asserts that individual block-holders 
though may not be as active as the institutional block-holders will also demand 
effective monitoring.  Their investments in the corporation are so significant that 
they will not give space to the expropriation of their interests.  Hence, individual 
block-holders will encourage agency alignment and reduce the level of agency costs. 
Therefore, this study considers related hypotheses as shown below:  
H1c Individual block ownership is positively associated with the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H1ci Individual block ownership is positively associated with the demand for 
the directorship as a monitoring mechanism. 
H1cii Individual block ownership is positively associated with the demand for 
internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
H1ciii Individual block ownership is positively associated with the demand for 
external auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
 
3.3.1.3.2 Principal-Principal Conflicts (Type II Agency Problem) 
Principal-principal conflicts describe the situation in which the interest of different 
classes of shareholders is at variance with one another.  The shareholders are equally 
mortal as the managers; hence, the selfish nature of man is prevalent in them also.  
Like the managers, they have more information and are more influential than the 
minority shareholders.  Consolidated Accounting even helps them further to treat 
minority as outside shareholders.  Therefore, the tendency for controlling or 
dominant shareholders to pursue their interest at the detriment of others, especially 
the minority shareholders is inevitable.  However, the conflict among large 
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shareholders helps to reduce the expropriation of minority shareholders.  There can 
be a conflict between the foreign and local shareholders as well, which can only be 
resolved through high-quality monitoring.  The high-quality monitoring resulting 
from such conflict, with an increase in the shares of the second-largest shareholder 
also helps to ensure the protection of foreign minority shareholders and that the 
company is professionally managed.  The increase in the shareholding of the second-
largest shareholder increases his voting right in decision making and more access to 
information for decision making (Azizan & Ameer, 2012; Oxelheim & Randoy 
2003; Hope et al., 2012; Ujunwa, 2012; Ali & Lesage, 2013; Armstrong et al., 2010; 
Goh & Li, 2013).  
 
The above discussion forms the basis by which the study asserts that an increment in 
the ownership of the second-largest shareholder reduces the power of the largest 
shareholder.  Also, such increase will help the monitoring of the largest shareholders 
by the second large shareholders.  It will also help to reduce the expropriation of 
minority shareholders.  Therefore, this study considers related hypotheses as shown 
below: 
H1d Block-holders are positively associated with the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external 
auditing) with an increase in the ownership of second-largest 
shareholders. 
H1di Block-holders are positively associated with the demand for the 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism with an increase in the 
ownership of second-largest shareholders. 
H1dii Block-holders are positively associated with the demand for 
internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism with an increase in 
the ownership of second-largest shareholders. 
H1diii Block-holders are positively associated with the demand for 
external auditing as a monitoring mechanism with an increase in 




3.3.2 Board of Director (Composition and Activities) 
Agency theory submits that the highest internal control mechanism is the board of 
directors and that it is responsible for monitoring of the top management.  The 
structure and activities (composition, size, meetings and committees) of the board 
determines how effective it could be in its monitoring responsibility.  However, the 
legal and regulatory frameworks of a country determine the duties and structure of 
the board of directors for the companies operating in the country.  In Nigeria for 
example, the board size should be within the range of five and fifteen (2011 SEC 
Code, Paragraph 4.2);  its composition should be a combination of the executive and 
non-executive (to form the majority) directors with a Chairman and a least of one 
independent director (Paragraph 4.3); and should be independent of management 
(Paragraph 4.5).  These may not be the same in other countries.  Board structure and 
activities significantly affect the performance and the state of corporate governance 
of a corporation (Wong & Bajuri, 2013).  The structure and activities of the board 
comprise features like the board size, board meetings, board independence, board 
composition, board expertise, CEO duality, audit committee and risk management 
committee discussed as follows: 
 
3.3.2.1 Board Size and Meetings 
Agency theory suggests that these two corporate governance mechanisms are 
instruments that can be used by the board of directors to oversee the affairs of a 
corporation.  Many codes of corporate governance have therefore given guidelines 




Board Size: Board size is concerned with whether a corporation is a large, medium 
or small entity.  Past literature reveal that the size of an organization can impact on 
its performance.  Hence, it is an attribute for consideration in corporate governance 
issues such as earnings management and timeliness of financial reports.  The size of 
the board of a corporation determines the spread of relevant expertise and knowledge 
needed to make reasonable decisions.  It also determines the timeliness of decisions 
taken by the board and decisions made by the board affect the performance of the 
corporation.  However, the findings in the existing literature are mixed.  Some found 
that small board size is better because of its ability to improve firm value (Amran & 
Che-Ahmad, 2009;  Veronica & Bachtiar, 2005). Others found that bigger size is 
better because it is likely to have more independent directors, expertise, and 
knowledge (Ali & Nasir, 2014; Velnampy, 2013; Uadiale, 2010).  Some others found 
that board size significantly relates to timeliness of financial report, board 
performance, block-shareholders, leverage, high-quality auditing, and firm size (Ali 
& Nasir, 2014; Zéghal, Chtourou & Sellami, 2011; Yasser et al., 2011; Akhtaruddin 
et al., 2009; Appah & Emeh, 2013; Kajola, 2008; Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007; 
Lennox and Pittman (2010).  Some found no relationship between board size and 
board performance (Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009). 
 
Base on the mixed findings in existing literature, this study asserts that board size is 
significantly related to demand monitoring mechanisms.  Therefore, this study will 
consider related hypotheses as shown below: 
H2a Board size is significantly associated with the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H2ai Board size is significantly associated with the demand for the 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2aii Board size is significantly associated with the demand for internal 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
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H2aiii Board size is significantly associated with the demand for external 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
 
Board Meetings: The organizational attribute is concerned with how often the board 
of directors meets in a period of time.  The number of times the board meets is a 
factor to determine the amount of information placed at its disposal for decision 
making.  Due to conflict of interests between the agents (management) and the 
shareholders that the board is representing, management is likely to fail in releasing 
information except when enforced by the board.  Meetings serve as an enforcement 
tool for the board to get the information needed from the management.  It can be 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of a board of directors.  Many prior literature have 
tested this organizational attribute in relation to corporate governance issues 
(Lishenga, 2011; Kajananthan, 2012; Lennox & Pittman, 2010; Armstrong et al., 
2010; Wu, 2012; Appah & Emeh, 2013; Brunzell & Peltomäki, 2015; Grove et al. 
(2011). 
 
Following the above arguments, this study asserts that the more the board meets the, 
more effective their monitoring role, the more the agency cost incurred and the more 
the demand for monitoring.  Therefore, this study considers related hypotheses as 
shown below: 
H2b Board meetings are positively associated with the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H2bi Board meetings are positively associated with the demand for the 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2bii Board meetings are positively associated with the demand for internal 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2biii Board meetings are positively associated with the demand for external 




3.3.2.2 CEO’s Tenure 
According to agency theory, the management (which the CEO represents and heads) 
has more information than anyone on the board of directors.  He can easily influence 
other members of the board to make decisions that suit his interest.  A CEO with a 
longer period of service whether serving as a separate leader or has a combined 
honour to occupy both the offices of the CEO and chairman will be too familiar with 
members of the board.  In Nigeria, CEO duality is not encouraged (2011 SEC Code, 
paragraphs 5.1(a and b).  Nonetheless, the CEO can still become very close to the 
independent directors, especially, those appointed as members of the board during 
his tenure.  He gets too familiar with members of the board of directors, which may 
not be healthy for the company as such relationship can create room for the 
expropriation of company's assets.  His interest in the company, strictness in staff 
supervision and compliance to standards and codes reduces as his service year 
increases (Gomez-mejia & Nunez-nickel, 2001; Carver, 2014; Miller & Breton-
miller 2006; Miller, 1991; Luo, Kanuri, & Andrews 2014; Sakawa et al., 2012; 
Sanda et al., 2011). 
 
Therefore, this study asserts that CEO’s tenure when lengthy will attract more 
agency costs because his interests in the activities of the company will reduce, 
likewise is his strictness to ensure compliance with standards and codes.  Therefore, 
the company will incur a loss, which in turn increases agency costs.  The longer he 
stays in office the more powerful he becomes.  Such accumulated power could be 
misused to satisfy his personal interests.  Hence, there will be a need for more 
monitoring.  Hence, the study considers related hypotheses as shown below: 
H2c CEO tenure is positively associated with the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
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H2ci CEO tenure is positively associated with the demand for the directorship 
as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2cii CEO tenure is positively associated with the demand for internal 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2ciii CEO tenure is positively associated with the demand for external 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
 
3.3.2.3 Risk Management Committee (RMC) 
As agency theory suggests, risk management committee (RMC) can also help to 
increase board monitoring specifically in risk associated issues.  The audit committee 
had the responsibility of overseeing issues of risks and internal control before the 
advent for this separate Committee for risk management.  Most codes of corporate 
governance specify that the board of directors should oversee issues of internal 
control and risk management.  The determination of the quality of financial reports 
rests on these two factors, internal control, and risk management.  Corporations need 
RMC as a separate committee to enable audit committee focus on internal control for 
greater and effective monitoring (Yatim, 2009; Subramaniam et al., 2009).  Hence, 
the settings of standards like ISO 31000 to provide guidance on how to manage risks 
in organizations.  Likewise is framework provided by the Committee of Sponsoring 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO) for effective internal control as related to 
operations, reporting and compliance to relevant standards, policies, principles, rules, 
and regulations. 
 
Following the above discussion, this study asserts that RMC will demand more 
monitoring and incur more agency costs to ensure adequate risk management.  
Records and procedures will be more scrutinized for easy discovery of anomalies and 
necessary actions to ensure compliance with relevant standards, policies, principles, 
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rules, and regulations.  Therefore, this study considers related hypotheses as shown 
below: 
H2d RMC is positively associated with the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H2di RMC is positively associated with the demand for the directorship as a 
monitoring mechanism.  
H2dii RMC is positively associated with the demand for internal auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
H2diii RMC is positively associated with the demand for external auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
 
3.3.2.4 Board Composition 
The calibre of people that constitutes the board of directors determines its 
independence level as agency theory suggests.  The rationale for this is that the 
independence of the board is vital to corporate governance.  Hence, it features in the 
codes of governance of different countries, past literatures on corporate governance, 
auditing, accounting, finance, and economics.  Board composition has proved to be 
an important factor necessary to ensure that board of directors are effective in their 
corporate governance roles.  Existing, prospective shareholders and other 
stakeholders are of diverse culture, skills, experience and gender.  Representation of 
such diversity on the board of directors can result in knowledge that can assist the 
board to easily mitigate agency conflicts (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Omri et al., 2014; 
Hashim & Devi, 2008; Latif et al., 2013; Lishenga, 2011; Malek & Che-Ahmad, 
2013; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Kibiya et al., 2016). 
 
Ownership and control should be separated one from the other as agency theory 
denotes.  The inclusion of non-executive directors on the board of directors helps to 
see to the execution of this suggestion.  Hence, they are independent of the 
management.  Their proportion on the board determines the independence of the 
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board.  They encourage more and intensive monitoring of management activities to 
ensure enhancement of shareholders’ value.  Their presence on the board of directors 
is an incentive for monitoring, putting control on the opportunistic attitudes of the 
management.  Thus, non-executive directors help to strengthen the monitoring role of 
the board (Mohamad et al., 2012; Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Wong & Bajuri, 
2013; Kelton & Yang 2008; Subramaniam, McManus & Zhang, 2009; Adeyemi & 
Fagbemi, 2010).  The majority of non-executive directors represent institutional 
block-holders or controlling shareholders on the board of directors, which this study 
tests under ownership structure. 
Following the above arguments, this study considers other board composition as 
follows: 
 
3.3.2.4.1 Independent Directors 
Agency, shareholders and signalling theories suggest that the presence of 
Independent directors on the board of directors helps to align the interests of the 
management and shareholders.  It helps to ensure that companies comply with 
relevant standards, policies, codes, and regulations. Independent directors, though 
non-executive directors are not block-holders, neither are they the controlling 
shareholders.  The share of an individual independent director is not expected to be 
above 0.1% in Nigeria [2011 SEC Code, 5.5(a)(i)].  Hence, they are representatives 
of the minority shareholders on the board of directors.  Independent directors and 
minority shareholders are therefore complements.  Independent directors signal 
strong and healthy board of directors and a healthy board of directors protects the 




This study asserts that independent directors will demand more monitoring to ensure 
that management, block-holders or controlling principals do not exploit the 
shareholders.  Therefore, this study considers related hypotheses as shown below: 
H2e Independent directors are positively associated with the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H2ei Independent directors are positively associated with the demand for the 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2eii Independent directors are positively associated with the demand for 
internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2eiii Independent directors are positively associated with the demand for 
external auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
 
3.3.2.4.2 Gender  
Signalling theory suggests that female directors will help to fortify the independence 
of the board of directors and strengthens the board to effectively discharge its 
supervisory responsibility.  Women are appraised as less corrupt and holding more 
strictly to standards in most of the existing literature.   Many of them are likely not to 
tolerate bribery.  They are averse to risks, hence, they fear losing their jobs and 
shame of being caught for corruption.  Female directors will frown at every form of 
breach of standards and code of corporate governance.  Hence, such directors will 
demand for more monitoring for protection of shareholders’ interests (Nawaz, 2010; 
Lenard et al., 2014; Remery, Matser, & Floren 2010; Lincoln & Adedoyin, 2012; 
Bear et al., 2010; Bøhren & Staubo, 2016; Horak, 2015; Kibiya et al., 2016). 
 
Therefore, this study asserts that female directors make positive contributions that 
will ensure transparency, accountability, and protection of the shareholders' interests.  
Female directors will demand more monitoring to ensure that management, block-
holders or controlling principals do not exploit minority shareholders. Therefore, this 
study considers related hypotheses as shown below: 
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H2f Female directors are positively associated with the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H2fi Female directors are positively associated with the demand for the 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2fii Female directors are positively associated with the demand for internal 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2fiii Female directors are positively associated with the demand for external 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
 
3.3.3 Compensation Structure 
Agency theory proposes that there is a wide spread of ownership with management 
having access to more information than the owners to possess outstanding rights of 
control by which they pursue more of self-interested activities at the expense of the 
owners of the corporations.  The theory, therefore, suggests that compensation 
structure can be used to control management to act in the interest of the shareholders.  
It also suggests alignment of the interests of the management with the interests of the 
investors through incentives of long-term contracts.  Thus, the theory expects 
managers and board members’ compensation to spur them to rightly take decisions 
and implement it for increment in the wealth of the shareholders or performance of 
the corporation (Armstrong et al., 2010; Lishenga, 2011; Babatunde & Olaniran, 
2009). 
 
This study, therefore, asserts that incentive compensation would reduce the 
opportunistic attitudes of the management and controlling shareholders of a listed 
company.  Thus, management interests will align with the shareholders’ interests and 
reduce agency costs.  Therefore, there will be less demand for monitoring.  This 
study, therefore, considers related hypothesis as follows: 
H3 Compensation structure is negatively associated with the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H3i Compensation structure is negatively associated with the demand for the 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism.  
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H3ii Compensation structure is negatively associated with the demand for 
internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
H3iii Compensation structure is negatively associated with the demand for 
external auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
 
3.3.4 Quality-differentiated Auditors (QDA) 
3.3.4.1 Effect of Organizational Attributes on Quality-differentiated Auditors 
Corporations that desire high-quality financial reports to protect the interests of the 
shareholders and other stakeholders of the company are likely to demand quality 
monitoring mechanisms.  Their demands for effective monitoring will make them 
look into the means of attaining this aim.  Hence, they have to decide on the auditor 
type to select.  For high-quality financial reports, such organizations through the 
influence of their attributes are likely to select quality-differentiated auditors 
(QDAs).  However, such high-quality reports attract higher price following general 
market practice.  Users of financial statements are aware of differences in audit 
quality in terms of audit assurance, expertise, industry specialization, and ability or 
willingness to give a going-concern report.  Existing literature find that the reputation 
of the auditors relates to audit service pricing and quality (Francis & Wilson, 1988;   
Becker et al., 1998; Che-Ahmad & Houghton, 1996; Francis, Reichelt & Wang, 
2005; Defond et al., 2000).  The corporations are prepared to pay the high price of 
engaging QDAs because of their investments in greater audit effort and higher 
expertise.  The difference in auditor type leads to differential pricing for which there 
exist two different audit markets (Sundgren & Svanström, 2011; Wang & Xin, 2011; 
Ferguson et al., 2013; Numan & Willekens, 2012; Kim, Kaye, & Wright, 2001; Che-




However, the need for high-quality financial reports provides the channel for the 
mediating role of the quality-differentiated auditors on the relationship between 
organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms in the bid to satisfy all 
stakeholders.  The achievement of this aim requires that the conflict of interests 
among the stakeholders (managers, shareholders, bondholders and others) should be 
controlled.  Otherwise, there may be no quality financial reports except with the 
presence of proper monitoring through the directorship, internal, and external 
auditing.  Hence, management is mindful of auditor type to recommend through the 
Audit Committee for the shareholders' approval at the AGM meetings.  The 
shareholders on the other hand desire high-quality, transparent and reliable financial 
report, hence, they are aspired to give approval for quality differentiated auditors 
(QDA) to realize their desire.  QDA is, therefore, a tool to specify the mechanisms 
through which the organization by its attributes can monitor the activities of the 
organization to ensure the protection of the interests of the shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  Some organizational attributes will affect the decision of the audit firm 
to be chosen as the decision on the type of auditor to engage is processed through the 
attributes.  Hence, it is likely that the demands for monitoring mechanisms by 
organizational attributes (ownership structure, board structure, leverage, among 
others) can affect audit quality differentiation (Che-Ahmad et al., 2006; Houqe, 
Monem, & Zijl, 2012;  Kim et al., 2001; Chow, 1982; Al-Rassas et al. (2016). 
 
In addition, the volume of transactions of most listed firms is large because of their 
size.  Hence, they are likely not to choose a one man audit firm with few or no 
qualified audit staff (small firms).  They are likely to choose the audit firm that has 
required technology to audit their financial statement, since most listed companies 
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process many of their transactions, financial and otherwise using information 
technology (Ferguson et al., 2013; Che-Ahmad et al., 2006; Rose-green et al., 2011; 
Numan & Willekens, 2012; Gray & Ratzinger, 2010). 
 
The influence of organizational attributes on auditor types is evidenced in the 
existing literature (Chow, 1982; Che-Ahmad et al., 2006).  Ownership types in a 
corporation have an influence on the audit pricing and audit type to be engaged.  
Che-Ahmad et al. (2006), however, predict that the influence of ownership structure 
on the choice of an audit firm is possible at a level of 50% and above ownership.  
Likewise, the board structure will influence the kind of audit firm to be chosen.  The 
directorship needs information for monitoring and decision making.   Management is 
the source of this information.  However, it does not perceive the information from 
the management as reliable because agency theory suggests opportunistic behaviour 
for management.  It, therefore, needs high-quality services to effectively carry out its 
mission; hence, it will depend on quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) for reliable 
audited financial statements to make the right decisions.  Subramaniam et al. (2009) 
find that risk management committee has no significant correlation with the type of 
external auditors engaged.  Saleh et al. (2009) find that quality-differentiated auditors 
(QDAs) and foreign shareholding are positively related.  Guedhami, Pittman, and 
Saffar (2009) find that government ownership has lower demand for a QDA. 
 
Others (Murase et al., 2011; Guedhami et al., 2009) found fund providers such as 
debenture holders, preference shareholders, banks and the like (leverage) are likely to 
be interested in the type of auditors engaged for the companies, whose projects they 
are financing.  Hence, Guedhami et al. (2009), find that entities with the complex 
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operation but less debt in capital structures have a preference for Big-4 auditors.  The 
study also claims that firms bonded by Stock exchange are likely to have demand for 
high-quality auditors.  The preference for QDAs will make it possible for them to 
attain greater transparency and corporate governance required of such bonds.  
Mısırlıoğlu et al. (2013) find that QDA is positively related to gearing.  The 
information system structure (ISS) of an entity will also influence the type of audit 
firm for the entity.  The service providers such as different providers of the internet 
(softcopies and hardcopies) install securities in the information technology (IT) 
involved in the ISS of an establishment.  Each of the securities installed in these 
facilities is for certain controls.  Further to this, some of the IT functions are 
outsourced in some organizations.  A corporation considers the nature of these 
securities to determine whether to centralize or decentralize or federalize its ISS.  
The auditor has the duty to examine the effectiveness of internal control of which 
includes the securities installed by the service providers.  Bachlechner, Thalmann 
and Manhart (2014) documents that some of the information that the auditor needs to 
check the internal control of his client are held by some of these facilities.  Hence, 
the auditor needs to extract such information from the originating systems.  The 
study, therefore, claims that the size of such required information and how the client 
distributes its IT landscape poses a great challenge to the auditor.  Hence, it 
recommends acquisition of software support as an interface for the collection of such 
information.  Acquisition of IT is an important factor in structuring an audit firm 
differentiating a QDA from non-QDA.  Therefore, an organization with complex 
internal control resulting from such IT securities is likely to demand and have a 
preference for a QDA.  Likewise, the compensation structure for the directors and 
executives or top management will affect the type of audit firm to be chosen.  Most 
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codes of corporate governance expect that executive compensation should be a 
function of the performance measures.  Also, the principals cannot have direct 
information on all the activities of the management and the board of directors.  The 
principals, therefore seek to identify measures of performance to determine 
incentives for the agent.  Hence, the board of directors uses the identified 
performance measures to align the executive compensation with the interest of the 
shareholders (Armstrong et al., 2010).  These measures are related to audited 
financial information.  The manager may wish to manipulate such information for the 
principal to approve a high compensation for him.  To do this, the manager may need 
to influence the external auditor's decision.  His opportunistic action may be an 
oversight of the auditor where less or none QDA is engaged.  Hence, management 
will be mindful of the type of audit firm to recommend for the shareholders' approval 
with the awareness that it may be very difficult to influence a QDA not to pass a 
going-concern report.  This can easily be done in firms with CEO duality.  The 
demand of the clients (represented by the organizational attributes) for high-quality 
audit service due to changes in their size and complexity among others contributes to 
the competition that birth QDAs (Ferguson et al., 2013). 
 
This study, therefore, asserts that organizational attributes, independent variables 
(managerial ownership, government ownership, individual block-holders, type II 
agency conflicts, board size, board meeting, CEO tenure, risk management 
committee, board independence, board gender, compensation structure), and control 
variables (company size, inherent risks, industry, growth and complexity) would 
affect the choice of auditor type to ensure quality financial reports.  The positive 
influence of organizational attributes on the choice of auditor type will help to 
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prevent management and the controlling shareholder of a listed company from 
pursuing their personal interests at the detriment of the shareholders.  More cost will 
be incurred as quality-differentiated auditors imply more audit fees.  Therefore, this 
study considers related hypotheses as shown below: 
H41a Managerial ownership is negatively associated with quality-
differentiated auditors 
H41b Governmental ownership is positively associated with quality-
differentiated auditors 
H41c Individual block-holders are positively associated with quality-
differentiated auditors 
H41d Principal-principal conflicts are positively associated with quality-
differentiated auditors with an increase in the ownership of the second-
largest shareholders. 
H42a Board size is positively associated with quality-differentiated auditors. 
H42b Board meeting is positively associated with quality-differentiated 
auditors. 
H42c CEO tenure is positively associated with quality-differentiated 
auditors. 
H42d Risk management committee is positively associated with quality-
differentiated auditors. 
H42e Independent directors are positively associated with quality-
differentiated auditors. 
H42f Female directors are positively associated with quality-differentiated 
auditors. 
H43 Compensation structure is positively associated with quality-
differentiated auditors. 
 
3.3.4.2 Effect of Organizational Attributes on Monitoring Mechanisms 
The proposition by agency theory, which is basically concerned with the relationship 
between the principals and agents, is that the basic problem in the principal-agent 
relationship is moral-hazard.  This study uses the theory to explain the mediating 
effect of quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) on organization attributes and 
monitoring mechanisms because the problem of moral-hazard accounts for conflicts 
of interests between the parties.  The conflicts of interest results in agency costs and 
this gives rise to the need to align the interest of the parties in the nexus of contracts 
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of an establishment.  The alignment calls for monitoring, which should be evidenced 
in high-quality financial reports since it is the means of communication between the 
two parties.  A high-quality financial report is required because 1) It serves as a 
channel of accountability by the agent (management) to the owners (shareholders).  
2) The owners want proper accountability for their investments and therefore require 
high-quality financial reports.  3) It is also a process of evaluating the performance of 
the agent.  4) It guides the owners to make reasonable decisions on all facets of an 
organization.  Other users of financial reports or stakeholders of an organization such 
as creditors, debtors, suppliers, employees, auditors, government and even society at 
large also require high-quality financial reports.  Hence, stakeholder theory suggests 
consideration of such users.  The expectation, therefore, is that the management of a 
corporation aims at convincing the shareholders and other stakeholders that the 
financial report presented to them is of high quality.  Thus, there is a relationship 
between the organization attributes, independent variables, and monitoring 
mechanisms, dependent variables (Kim et al., 2001).  However, the relationship 
cannot be significant as it was before the consideration of the mediating factor.  This 
is because the focus is now more on the mediator to ensure the effectiveness of the 
monitoring mechanisms.  Hence, QDA is likely to mediate the relationship base on 
the above arguments.  
 
3.3.4.3 Effect of Quality-differentiated Auditors on Monitoring Mechanisms 
The quality-differentiation can also affect the monitoring mechanisms (directorship, 
internal, and external auditing). The audit firms may decide to differentiate its 
services from other audit firms to influence the demand for monitoring mechanisms.  
Hence, Kaplan et al. (1990), claim that some audit firms have differentiated 
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themselves in audit accounting services, non-audit accounting services, general 
management consulting services and information systems.  It may train its staff to 
become quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) to fall in line with certain factors in 
organizational attributes.  It may acquire more fixed capital items like information 
technology.  Thus, the aim of audit firms with QDAs is to enhance good corporate 
governance as a response to the demand of the clients (Craswell & Taylor, 1991).  
Therefore, this study seeks to investigate the mediating effect of QDAs on the 
relationship between organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms. 
 
An auditor is an instrument to connect the interests of the stakeholders which include 
auditor himself.  To be an effective tool in this order, the auditor has to aim at 
rendering a very high-quality audit to his clients.  Also, an auditor aims at having a 
big firm to enhance its income.  This is consistent with the stakeholders' theory 
which suggests that each stakeholder with his legitimate interests participates in the 
entity to obtain benefits.  It also suggests that no stakeholder's interest is superior to 
others.  Such auditors will, therefore, consider differentiating his audit service for 
high-quality auditing to assure the clients that it has the capability to deliver the kind 
of service they desire.  Thus, its structure and performance will place it in a position 
to influence the audit committee to convince the board of directors to recommend 
such firm for the approval of the shareholders at the AGM meeting. 
 
The auditor type as a QDA or non-QDA is likely to impact directorship decision on 
the choice of the audit firm to enhance its monitoring role.  The firm will, therefore, 
have to invest in human capital and fixed assets.  The audit firm will, therefore, set 
standards for personnel recruitment, work manual, necessary information technology 
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and field staff monitoring.  The firm will develop itself with the skills and practices 
that can differentiate its audit firm in the audit market.  For this reason, the QDAs 
dominate the audit market in countries with strong demand for high-quality earnings 
(Francis et al., 2013).  Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) claim that a QDA 
influences companies that have a high percentage of non-executive in their Audit 
Committees (ACs) and larger size ACs to produce greater forecast accuracy.  Thus, 
QDAs can be a substitute for ACs.   
 
The internal auditor of a listed company is expected to be a professional accountant, 
indicating that he must have received the same training as the external auditor.  Such 
personnel will not like to have his work condemned by a colleague, more so when he 
knows that a QDA will apply due process for his audit work.  2011 SEC Code, 
Paragraph 31.14 directs that external assessment of the effectiveness of internal audit 
function should be done at least every three years.  The performance of the internal 
audit functions definitely will reflect the quality of the management report of the 
external auditor aside from the qualified independent reviewers or team that may be 
engaged.  This is because the internal audit function is expected to ensure effective 
performance of control function, which the external auditor checks in its audit 
function.   Hence, Cohen and Sayag (2010), document that internal audit's 
effectiveness is preliminary to external audit function.  Thus, an adverse or qualified 
management report from the external auditor is an indicator of internal control 
weakness, which is a reflection of the ineffectiveness of the internal audit.  This can 
only emanate from quality audit.  Furthermore, the internal audit is expected to 
compliment the external audit function and thereby reduce the external audit efforts 
and fees.  The internal audit size for this purpose has to be larger, adequately staffed 
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to include expertise with audit plans and programs covering financial statement 
related activities.  The working papers from such activities should form part of 
documents and information accessible for external auditors' usage (Ho & 
Hutchinson, 2010; Botez, 2012; Mihret & Admassu, 2011).  These arguments signify 
that the effectiveness of the internal audit function may be dependent on the type of 
external auditor engaged by the organization.  Therefore, the audit firm type engaged 
can spur the internal auditor to be more efficient and effective in his audit function. 
Hence, the findings of Mihret & Admassu (2011), suggest that the performance of 
the internal audit is the most important of all the monitoring and governance 
mechanisms.  The study further suggests the corporations need to strengthen their 
internal audit and foster the relationship between the internal and external auditors.   
 
The audit type engaged for a corporation will definitely influence the external 
auditing since the essence of the differentiation is to enhance the quality of external 
auditing.  Past literature, therefore, document that providers of higher quality audits 
are the QDAs (Soliman & Ragab, 2014; Lennox & Pittman, 2010; Ferguson et al., 
2013; Fodio et al., 2013).  External auditors that are QDAs invest more on fixed 
costs like technology, staff development, and reputation than non-QDAs.  The 
investments help them to enhance higher quality audits than their counterparts.  
Clients whose external auditors are QDAs portray the image of quality firm's 
earnings.  The scrutiny of QDAs as external auditors is greater than non-QDAs, 
which is of great benefit to their clients.  Hence, corporations in financial needs, 
those with low sale turnover or those going public will likely engage QDAs as 
external auditors because of their reputation capital (Chen, Su & Wu, 2010).  Clients 
that engage QDAs with related industry specialization as external auditors enjoy the 
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benefits of increased effective audit (Krishnan, 2003).  Thus, such specialization is 
an additional element in audit quality (Chow, 1982). 
   
The above background and results of this study indicate that quality differentiating 
auditors (QDA) is a mediating variable which organizational attributes influence and 
in turn influences the monitoring mechanisms.  The influence of each organizational 
attribute on the demand for monitoring mechanisms varies as a function of changes 
in the quality-differentiated auditors.  It illustrates how the importance of QDA 
determines the relationship between organizational attributes (independent variables) 
and monitoring mechanisms (dependent variable).  It strengthens the relationship 
between the two variables ((Ramadan, Chen, Al-Khadash, & Atmeh, 2012). 
 
Just as introduction of a mediating variable is expected to render the path between 
the independent and dependent variable less significant (Baron & Kenny, 1986), 
many users of financial reports consider first the type of external auditor in use.  
They, especially the prospective shareholders consider the organizational attributes 
and the monitoring mechanisms after they have established the type of auditors used 
before making decision to buy shares in a company.  The justification for this is that 
engagement of a quality-differentiated auditor (QDA) signals high integrity of the 
financial reporting, and this builds the confidence of the shareholders in the company 
and its management.  It also signals intensive monitoring, which gives assurance of a 
credible financial report but at higher audit price.  The impact of the demise of 
Arthur Andersen audit firm that reduces the level of discrimination among the Big-4 
firms and opens opportunities to other Big-4s and non-Big-4s but large firms is a 
confirmation of reduction in the path between organizational attributes and external 
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auditing.  According to Abidin, Beattie, and Goodacre (2010), Deloitte captured 
about 70% of the clients of Arthur Andersen and total audit fees.  Chen & Zhou 
(2007) claim that 89% of the clients switched to Big-4s while the remaining 11% 
chose to switch to non-Big-4s.  Thus, in line with Baron and Kenny (1986), the audit 
type accounts for the relationship between the organizational attributes and external 
auditing. 
 
Further to this are existing literature suggesting that auditor type (QDA or non-QDA) 
can be a mediating variable.  An example is that the actual audit market 
concentration or competition like audit fee and quality is a product of relations 
between influencing factors of an entity which specific factors of an audit firm 
mediates (Abidin et al., 2010).  Inferences that could be deduced from this statement 
are: 1) The influencing factors of an entity regarding financial reports are the 
organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms. 2) Specific factors of an audit 
firm are its type, size, area of specialization, assets and technological expertise.   
 
Following the background discussed above, this research asserts that the 
organizational attributes (ownership structure, board of directors and compensation 
structure) would influence QDA significantly.  QDA is likely to also influence the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing) 
significantly.  Also, the organizational attributes will also affect the monitoring 
mechanisms significantly.  Hence, it will help to prevent management of a listed 
company from pursuing their personal interest at the detriment of the shareholders.  
Therefore, this study considers a related hypothesis as shown below: 
H5 QDA positively and significantly mediates the relationship between 
organizational attributes (ownership structure, board of directors, and 
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compensation structure) and the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
 
3.3.5 Code of Corporate Governance (CCG) 
Agency theory recognizes the existence of conflicts of interests between the principal 
and agents.  It, therefore, suggests mechanisms to align the interests of the two 
parties to enhance good corporate governance.  Stakeholders' theory recognized not 
only type I and II agency problems but the interest of the third party as well.  Code of 
corporate governance (CCG), can help to bring this into reality.  Hence, many 
countries had either reformed or introduced CCG.  It is quite imperative that 
countries with a bad image for corruption and incidences of bankruptcy and financial 
meltdown should adopt or adapt CCG from countries with the minimum occurrence 
of such evils.  Nigeria, being in the category of one of the countries with such bad 
image has therefore come up with 2011 SEC Code for this purpose.  Nigerian 
Securities and Exchange Commission reviewed 2003 SEC Code to address the: 1) 
weaknesses in 2003 SEC Code for independent directors, appointment of directors, 
critical board committees, whistle blowing procedures and sustainability issues 
among others. 2) Need for uniformity in the code of corporate governance for all 
corporations.  The oversight by SEC for amendment of 2003 SEC Code led to 
industry-specific codes of corporate governance like 2006 CBN Code, 2008 
PENCOM Code and 2009 NAICOM Code.  Each of these codes is at variance with 
one another in certain aspects, hence, the need for uniformity. 3) Need for 
enforcement of the codes among the listed companies through improved mechanism.  
The expectation is assurance of “highest standards of transparency, accountability 
and good corporate governance with no undue inhibiting enterprise and innovation.”  
The review was done in alignment with international best practices (2011 SEC 
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Code).  The new code gives freedom to corporations to transform their management 
practices with the hope for full enforcement.  Private companies are also encouraged 
to adopt the principles in the code, though they are not regulated by SEC.  Its 
alignment with the international best practices to strengthen the corporate 
governance will affect the monitoring mechanism, especially now that the directors 
and all stakeholders are aware of actions that may be taken against them if they 
breach the code.   Having done this, there is the need to find out the impact of the 
reviewed code on monitoring mechanisms. 
 
This study, on the basis of the above discussion, asserts that code of corporate 
governance (CCG) would gear corporations to have proper monitoring mechanisms 
that will help to protect the interests of the shareholders.  It will also protect the 
interests of other stake-holders aside the principal and agents.  CCG will also ensure 
the enforcement of the standards covered in the code.  It will likewise help to ensure 
that proper modalities are in place for necessary monitoring of the management and 
the board of directors.  Therefore, this study considers running the regression for 
years 2010 to 2012, testing data for pre-2011 SEC Code, the transition to the code 
and post the transition period.  The approach is adopted from  Abidin, et al. (2010).  
The study considers related hypotheses as shown below: 
H6 CCG is positively associated with the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
H6i CCG is positively associated with the demand for directorship as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
H6ii CCG is positively associated with the demand for internal auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 





3.4 Operational Definition 
The definitions of selected variables in this study are as follows:  
1. Corporate Governance:   This is the process of relationship between the 
corporations' managers and corporations' owners (Monks, 2002). Organizations 
design structure, processes and mechanisms to direct and manage their affairs to 
enhance long-term shareholder value, accountability and transparency on the part of 
the managers and improved organizational performance (Velnampy, 2013). It is the 
diligent way of legal, ethical and moral rewards by providers of corporate financial 
capital ( Nworji et al., 2011). 
2. Monitoring Mechanisms: These are the means by which shareholders 
monitor the management performance to ensure the protection of their interests 
(Azim, 2012).  There are three mechanisms mandatorily stipulated for public listed 
companies in Nigeria. They are specifically directorship, internal auditing and 
external auditing (used by Anderson et al., 1993 and Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011) 
as required by 2011 SEC Code and other codes of governance in Nigeria. 
3. Board Structure: This refers to the structuring of the body that represents 
the shareholders in decision making of a company.  According to 2011 SEC Code, it 
has a duty to oversee the affairs and performance of the company. 
4. Directorship: This is a monitoring mechanism in respect of the duties and 
functions of the CEO and board of directors for smooth running of an organization, 
development, and growth of an organization and proper leading representation in 
transactions with other stakeholders (2011 SEC Code).  
5. Internal Auditing: Internal auditing is a process through which an entity can 
obtain independent and objective assurance and professional consultation internally 
(IIA, 2014).  It is the process by which the internal control system is regularly, 
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independently monitored and evaluated for assurance on the organization's 
effectiveness and cost efficiency (IFAC, 2012). 
6. External Auditing: It is the statutory pillar that gives assurance on the 
quality of the annual financial reports of an entity; being one of the control 
mechanisms used to resolve agency problems in organizations (Fodio et al., 2013).  
7. Risks Management Committee:  This committee is to assist the board of 
directors to effect their responsibilities for risks management (2011 SEC Code). 
8. Organisational Attributes: These are the powers and qualities possessed by 
an organization to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in all its activities. 
9. Ownership Structure: This refers to holding of ownership interest. 
10. Managerial Ownership: This refers to people working as managers or 
executive staff of a company that also hold shares of the company (Ali & Lesage, 
2013). 
11. Block-holders: These are significant investors (individuals or institutions) 
that hold a significant stake in a company.  However, they are not linked to the 
organization's management (Zéghal et al., 2011; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011). 
Individual Block-holders are persons with concentrated ownership. 
Principal-principal Conflicts refer to type II agency problem among the 
shareholders. 
12. Compensation Structure: This refers to the remuneration of the top 
management of an organization. 
13. Quality-differentiated Auditor:  A quality-differentiated auditor is branded 





This study applies agency theory to explain the relationship between organizational 
attributes and monitoring costs and stakeholder and signalling theories to explain the 
mediating effect of a quality differentiating auditor on the relationship.  The study 
develops hypotheses tested to answer the research questions in line with research 
objectives.  The study examines the relationship between the three variables as 





RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The earlier chapter discussed theoretical framework and hypothesis development 
using agency theory, stakeholder theory, signalling theory and prior empirical 
literature.  This chapter deals with the procedures to develop and conduct the 
research using the models and hypothesis developed in the previous chapter.  Section 
4.2 deliberates research design.  Section 4.3 explains the population and sample of 
the study.  Section 4.4 describes the measurement of variables.  Section 4.5 discusses 
data collection while section 4.6 debates the procedure for data collection.  Section 
4.7 describes the techniques of data analysis and section 4.8 gives a summary of the 
chapter.  
 
4.1 Research Design 
The research design is concerned with the plan or framework a researcher needs to 
take into consideration in carrying out a research work (Williams, 2007; Yu & 
Cooper, 1983).  According to Raman (2012), it has to do with basic strategies that 
guide the researchers in developing accurate and understandable evidence. 
 
This research work, therefore, uses quantitative analysis to test the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter.  This statistical approach is adopted because of its 
ability to prove the validity and reliability of hypotheses developed base on 
established theories and empirical findings.  Likewise, it measures attitudes and rate 
of behaviours which are central to this research.  Monitoring mechanisms in this 
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study are considered as tools combating moral hazards or corruption, which is the 
foundation of assets expropriation, information asymmetry, opportunistic behaviour 
and conflict of interests between the management and shareholders.  All mentioned 
here are attitudes or behaviour and the essence of corporate governance, expressed 
by its cost (agency cost) to the organization.  In this study, it measures the agency 
cost by the contribution of each organizational attribute tested to the costs of 
directorship, internal and external auditing.  According to Creswell (2003), it is the 
best approach to identify factors that impact an outcome, discover the usefulness of a 
mediation or understand the best judges of outcomes.  It allows for objectivity in the 
collection of data as the researcher may not be able to influence the response to 
research questions (Creswell, 2003).  In this study, empirical examinations are done 
to identify the organizational factors that impact monitoring mechanisms and 
discover the usefulness of quality-differentiated auditors to understand the best 
judges of monitoring mechanisms. 
 
The research is structured to be investigative and also explanatory because these two 
factors are paramount to monitoring, which is a pivot to this study.  The research 
design helps to investigate and explain the relationship between variables.  Hence, 
the structuring is used for investigation, variable identification and relationship 
establishment of quality-differentiated auditors, organizational attributes, and 
monitoring mechanisms.  The method of statistical analysis used includes 
descriptive, regression analysis, and correlation.  It involves data collection, 




The research is a combination of cross-sectional and time series study as it involves 
companies from different sectors of Nigerian economy over three financial years. 
 
4.2 Population and Sample of the Study 
All companies listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange with the exception of those 
operating in the financial sector constitute the population of the study, which is 177 
as shown in Table 4.1.  Financial institutions were excluded due to their unique 
characteristics and the industry-specific regulations they are to observe.  Since the 
population is below 200 having excluded the financial sector, sampling is not 
required except for pilot test.  Both financial and non-financial information of the 
listed corporations was sourced from three years annual reports (2010-2012). The 
study selects years 2010-2012 to be consistent with the approval and implementation 
date of the reviewed code of corporate governance, which is the year 2011. Thus, 
data within the period of the year 2010 constitutes the pre-implementation period, 
while that 2011 is for the transition period and 2012 represents the post-
implementation period.  Examples of extant literature that use three years' data to 
examine the impact of one variable over the other are Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia (1999), Fan and Wong (2005), Moyer, Kolas and Busingye (2014), Hashim and 
Rahman (2011), Che-Ahmad et al. (2006), and Tomata, Suzuki, Kawado… and Tsuji 
et al. (2015), Bambang et al. (2013). 
 
4.3 Measurement of Variables 
The researcher collected a three-year data on the dependent variable (monitoring 
mechanisms – directorship, internal, and external auditing), mediating variable 
(quality-differentiated auditor), independent variables (ownership structure, board of 
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director, and compensation structure) and control variables (firm size, company 
performance, risks, industry, company’s growth, complexity and listing status).  The 
study runs panel data regression model as shown in 4.7.  Data was analysed using 
multivariate analysis because of its usefulness in allowing for comparison of multiple 
response and explanatory variables. 
 
Table 4.1                                                                                                          
Total Number of Non-financial Listed Companies in Nigeria 
Industry Number 
Agriculture 6 
Apparel and Footwear 1 
Automotives 5 
Beverages 8 
Building and Construction 1 
Building Materials 9 
Chemicals 8 
Computers and Technology 9 
Conglomerates and Holding 7 
Engineering Construction 5 
Food 18 
Health Care 14 
Holding 1 
Home Builders 1 
Hotels, Casinos, Resorts 3 
Manufacturing and Industrial 11 
Media and Broadcasting 2 
Meals and Minerals 4 
Natural Gas and Oil 16 
Printing and Publishing 6 











4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is concerned with the costs of monitoring mechanisms as 
contained in the 2003 SEC Code and subsequently 2011 SEC Code for corporations 
to monitor the wealth of the shareholders.  The monitoring mechanisms are 
directorship, internal, and external auditing.  The directorship includes executive and 
non-executive categories.  The executive directors are charged with the responsibility 
of the corporation management.  The non-executive directors have a duty to ensure 
the engagement of executive directors in activities that upholds the interests of the 
shareholders. The internal auditing helps to enhance the quality of financial reports.  
It also helps the audit committee to be effective in assisting the board of directors in 
its monitoring role.  It assists corporations to achieve their costs-saving objectives.  
Hence, it helps to reduce agency costs.  The external auditing helps to ensure quality 
financial reporting, thus, mitigating information asymmetry between the principals 
and agents. 
 
The study deduces the measurement for this variable from the annual reports since it 
is the medium through which corporations communicate the implementation of 
corporate governance to the shareholders and other stakeholders.  However, the 
researcher developed a questionnaire to solicit information in respect of the internal 
auditing.  Relevant information on internal auditing is not obtainable from financial 
statements.  The measurement of the dependent variable is informed by prior studies 
such as Anderson et al, 1993; Mustapha and Che-Ahmad, 2011; Al-Janadi et al., 
2013.  Thus, the study measures the dependent variable, monitoring mechanisms 
(MM) by the total monitoring costs (the summation of remunerations of non-
executive directors, costs of internal auditing, and external audit).  That is: 
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MM  =  NEDIR + IA + EA 








measures the non-executive directors’ remunerations in 
Nigerian currency, naira (N) 
 
measures the amount paid as to the internal auditors in Nigerian 
currency, naira (N) 
 
measures the fees paid to the external auditors in Nigerian 
currency, naira (N) 
 
The shareholdings of the executive directors (Chief Executive Officer and top 
management) are not included in the calculation of the monitoring cost.  The 
rationale for this is concerned with separation of power from control.  The codes of 
corporate governance assign different responsibilities to the two different categories 
of directors.  While the executive directors are expected to manage the affairs of a 
company, the non-executive directors are expected to ensure that the company is 
suitably managed.  The non-executive directors are to function as checks and 
balances to management activities to ensure maximization of shareholders’ value. 
 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables that this study tested are ownership structure, the board of 
directors, and compensation structure of organizations or corporations. 
 
4.3.2.1 Ownership structure measurement 
Ownership structure measurement employs following existing literature (Mustapha 
& Che-Ahmad, 2011; Stoughton & Zechner, 1998; Kusnadi, 2011; Amran & Che-
Ahmad, 2009; Omri et al., 2014; Jusoh & Che-Ahmad, 2014).  The ownership 
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structure in this study includes managerial ownership, government ownership, 
individual block-holders ownership, and an increase in second-largest shareholder.  
The measurement is the proportion of shares held by each type of ownership to the 
total equity.  Table 4.2 presents the details of the measurement. 
 
4.3.2.2 Board of Directors (Composition and Activities) 
The measurement of the composition and activities of the board of directors is 
informed by prior literature such as Amran and Che-Ahmad, 2010;  Omri et al., 
2014; Mohamad et al., 2012; Hashim and Devi, 2008; Appah and Emeh, 2013; 
Subramaniam et al., 2009; Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010.  The study measures the 
board of directors as detailed in Table 4.2 for 1) board size. 2) board meetings. 3) 
independent directors. 4) female directors. 5) CEO tenure. 6) risk management 
committee (RMC). 
 
4.3.2.3 Compensation Structure 
Another organizational attribute considered is compensation structure.  The 
measurement of compensation structure is informed by prior literature such as 
Sakawa et al. (2012), Guthrie et al. (2012), Armstrong et al. (2010).  Its measurement 
is detailed in Table 4.2. 
 
4.3.3 Mediating Variable 
Existing literature measure quality differentiated auditors (QDA) by size or brand 
name (Francis & Wilson, 1988; Defond et al., 2000; DeAngelo, 1981; Becker et al., 
1998; Lai, 2013; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Jusoh & Che-Ahmad, 2014; Hess et al., 
2014).  Hence, this study measures QDA by scoring 1 for Big-4 audit firms and 0 for    
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Table 4.2:                                                                                                                   
The measurement of the dependent and hypothesized variables 
Variable Explanation Measurement 
Expected  
Sign 
MM Total costs of 
monitoring 
Summation of the costs of non-executive 







Measures the non-executive directors’ 







Measures the amount paid to the internal 
auditors in Nigerian currency, naira (N) 
 
 
EA External Auditing Measures the fees paid to the external 
auditors in Nigerian currency, naira (N) 
 
MO Managerial ownership Percentage shares of the executive directors - 
GO Government ownership Percentage equities owned by the 
government (Federal or State or Local 















Bz Board Size Number of directors on the board  ± 
BM Board Meetings Number of meeting the board of directors 
held in a year 
 
+ 
CEOT CEO Tenure Years of CEO in the organization + 
RMC Risk Management 
Committee 
1 for firms with the committee; 0 for firms 
with no such committee 
 
+ 
BI Board structure 1 Proportion of independent directors (IDIR) 
and non-independent directors (NIDIR) 
 
+ 




CS Compensation Structure 1 for firms with CS in place for the top 
management (TM) and 0 for those without 
CS for TM. 
 
- 
CCG Code of Corporate 
Governance 




non-Big-4 audit firms.  The study tests to see how the QDA as a mediating variable 
affects the directions of the relationship between the organizational attributes 
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(ownership structure, board of directors, and compensation structure) and monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing) following Baron and 
Kenny, (1986) and Zhao, Lynch Jr., and Chen (2010).   The study adopts binary-
mediation model and runs the tests through Stata to explain if organizational 
attributes (OAs) are significant variables to explain the capability of QDA as a 
mediating variable.  Thus, the test reveals how QDA helps to expose the relationship 
between OAs and monitoring mechanisms.  The research uses panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSEs) regression analysis to establish whether or not each OA 
affects MM separately and in aggregate through the QDA. 
 
4.3.3.1 Mediator Regression on Independent Variable: 
The study regresses quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) on each organizational 
attribute (OAs) - Equation 4.3.  The test establishes if each OA significantly affects 
QDA. 
 
4.3.3.2 Dependent Variable Regression on Independent Variable: 
In this case, this study regresses the monitoring mechanisms (MM) on the 
organizational attributes (OAs) - Equation 4.1.  The test establishes if the variations 
in quality-differentiated auditors account significantly for variations in MM. 
 
4.3.3.3 Dependent Variable Regression on the Independent and Mediating 
Variables 
The last equation regresses the monitoring mechanisms on both organizational 
attributes (OAs) and quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) (Equation 4.2).  The test 
establishes if effective control of both the OAs and QDAs renders the prior 




Furthermore, it is expected that if the result of 4.4.3.3 is zero, then the only 
mediating variable for the firm is quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs).  Otherwise, 
there may be one or more other mediating variables in the relationship.  Table 4.3 
presents the measurement for QDAs. 
 
Table 4.3:                                                                                                                   
The measurement of the quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) 
Variable Explanation Measurement 
QDAs Quality-differentiated 
Auditors 
1 for Big-4 audit firms, 0 for non-Big-4 
audit firms  
 
4.3.4 Control Variables 
Control Variables (CV) are other characteristics of an establishment that affect 
monitoring costs but are not within the focus of this study.  They are chosen base on 
related prior studies.  They are: 
 
4.3.4.1 Firm’s size   
The size of a company (Cz) is a major determinant of compensation for the directors 
and top management (Wahab & Pak, 2011).  This is contrary to the provision in the 
codes of corporate governance (2011 SEC Code; CAMA, 1990; 2009 NAICOM 
Code) which stress that the compensation should be a function of the corporation 
performance.  Agency conflicts are likely to increase as the corporation grows 
(Nasser et al., 2006).  Al-Janadi et al. (2013) argue that Cz is significantly and 
positively related to voluntary disclosure.  Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010) find that Cz 
is related to auditing quality for listed companies in Nigeria.  This study controls for 
Cz considering the effect of economies of scale opened to larger firms, increase 
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conflicts resulting from growth in size and higher audit fees payable by such firm 
due to higher risks of the growth in its size.  It, therefore, tests the effect of Cz using 
total assets as the yardstick of measurement following Mustapha (2009); Swastika 
(2013); Alzharani, Che-Ahmad, and Aljaaidi (2011); and Ho, Wu and Xu (2011) 
among others. 
 
4.3.4.2 Performance   
Prior studies measure firms’ performance (FP) using Returns on Assets (ROA) 
[Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2009; Alzaharani, Che-Ahmad, & Aljaaidi, 2011; 2012; 
Jusoh & Che-Ahmad, 2014; Jiang et al., 1971; Pozzoli & Venuti, 2014; Ibrahim & 
Samad, 2011; Jamil & Nelson, 2011; Semenova & Hassel, 2013; Verriest et al., 
2008; Reddy & Sharma, 2014; Stoughton & Zechner, 1998;], Returns on Equity 
(ROE) [Alzaharani, Che-Ahmad, & Aljaaidi, 2011; 2012; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 
2013;].  The outcome of these research shows that the FP influences company’s 
decisions on matters like compensation.  Hence, 2011 SEC Code stipulates that the 
remuneration of executive members and board members should have a link with FP.  
It implies that FP can influence the costs of monitoring the organization.  For this 
reason, therefore, this study controls for FP to test its relationship with monitoring 
mechanisms (MM) and auditors’ type.  It applies ROA to measure FP before 
establishing the relationship between FP and MM, following Mustapha, 2009; 
Mishra and Suar, 2010; Ho et al., 2011; Chiu and Lee, 2013.  The measurement for 




4.3.4.3 Loss   
Agency theory suggests that shareholders require high returns on their investment 
commensurate with the risks embedded in investing in the company.  Debt-holders 
(Preference shareholders, debenture holders, and banks) always enjoy priority in time 
of bankruptcy and economic meltdown.  Hence, the principal, ordinary shareholders 
require appropriate returns guaranteed only by transparency in financial reports 
considering the risk of losing all to debt-holders.  Also, there are risks embedded in 
every activity and transaction of an entity.  Taking the issue of information 
technology, for example, corporations are exposed to wider risks of e-fraud.  Hence, 
UNCTAD (2006), advises that issues like valuation and revaluation of assets should 
be properly monitored to ensure that management does not use it to satisfy its own 
interest.  It further advises that corporations should ensure compliance with relevant 
financial reporting standards. Therefore, to satisfy investors' demand for 
transparency, 2011 SEC Code direct the board of directors to oversee and give a 
report at AGM on significant risks identifiable across a corporation's activities and 
transactions.  It also directs that the board should ensure that such risks are 
adequately prevented, detected and reported.  Therefore, the inclusion of financial 
literates on the board of directors is important to equip the board to moderate risks 
embedded in decision making (Mouna & Jaboui, 2013).  This study controls for the 
effect of the risk because of the probable effect of its changes on decision making of 
the board, audit fees, returns on investments of the shareholders and internal control 
in particular.  It was measured by scoring the firm with a loss as 1 and 0 if otherwise, 





This study tests the impact of the differences in characteristics of industries on 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing).  Some prior 
literature also indicate that industries differ from one another to explain why certain 
industries, especially the financial institution (banks and insurance) are regarded as 
peculiar considering the manner of their operations (Zéghal et al., 2011; Callao, 
Jarne, & Laínez, 2007).  Coles et al. (2001) claim that the degree of opportunities in 
the industry restrains the performance of organizations.  Dickens and Katz (1986) 
suggest differences in industry characteristics and remuneration accounts for 
differences in efficiency, control functions, personnel practices.  This is consistent 
with the claim of Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings (1986).   The study claims that 
differences in firms and industries associate with outcomes in the labour market, 
employment practices, control systems, organizational efficiency, and rationality.  
Pizzini, Lin, Vargus, and Ziegenfuss (2011) claim that the external auditors’ decision 
to rely on or consider any of the internal auditors’ working paper is a function of the 
differences in the standards and complexity of the industry.  The International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), in its handbook of the code of ethics for 
professional accountants, paragraph 210.7 directs among others that a professional 
accountant should acquire knowledge in respect of the industry of his clients. The 
differences are recognized in some countries, hence, the presence of industry-specific 
codes of governance.  In Nigeria, for example, aside 2011 SEC Code and CAMA, 
2004 (as Amended) we have industry-specific codes of governance for insurance 
(2009 NAICOM Code), banks (2006 CBN Code), and pension (2008 Pension Code).  
The growth in such complexity can result in information asymmetry.  Necessary 
disclosures in the annual report will help to overcome the information irregularity 
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that may arise from such complexity (Al-Janadi et al., 2013).  This study tests the 
effect of industry on the monitoring mechanisms by industry type.  The industries are 
scored 1 those in manufacturing and construction and 0 for firms dealing with 
consumable items and those that are service providers. 
 
4.3.4.5 Growth 
Agency theory suggests lower debt ratio and agency costs for firms privileged to 
grow.  The suggestion is consistent with findings in the prior literature, especially as 
relates to family and block-holders ownership organizations.  Since the manager is a 
member of the family, the business runs with great assurance for growth with little or 
no agency costs.  The retained profits are utilized for more profitable investments 
with avoidance of debts in the capital structure of the establishment in such 
organizations.  The management avoids such debts to guide against the expropriation 
of the companies wealth by debt-holders (Ramadan et al., 2012).  The study also 
claims that the management of such organizations will rather go for bank loans as 
banks are also delighted in lending to such organizations.  The theory also suggests 
that the management gains more power as the organization grows.  Other 
shareholders are encouraged since the management can maximize their wealth.  It is 
an opportunity for an increase in the executive's compensation as the shareholder will 
not deny such management the approval for higher incentives to encourage them to 
put in more efforts.  The greater the growth, the greater is the agency problems.  
Hence, the greater the need to demand higher is the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms.  Growth is the evidence that an establishment realizes the main 
objective of its business to maximize profit.  Hence, Akinbuli and Kelilume (2013), 
claim that it is the major success index for an organization and that it contributes to 
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the national economy.  This study controls for growth because of its importance to 
capital structure, compensation, and national economy.  It, therefore, tests the impact 
of firms’ growth as related to organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms 
using Tobin’s Q, following Mustapha, 2009. 
  
4.3.4.6 Complexity 
Monitoring can be complex in organizations spread over a country or even across 
nations compared to an establishment operating within one to three different 
locations.  The situation is the same with organizations whose nature of business is 
diversified dealing in a large number of services or products.  This is consistent with 
the findings of Gray and Ratzinger (2010), whose study finds that large organizations 
with complex and/or multinational status need the service of big-4 audits.  The 
argument is based on the fact that the QDAs possess adequate resources that the 
required service needs (DeAngelo, 1981).  Choi and Lee (2014) claim that the 
investors of diversified companies have difficulty in monitoring expropriation 
attitude of the management.  Mohamed (2006) claims that agency problems are 
magnified as a corporation increases in size, the number of operational locations, and 
density of its structure.  It is one of the forces influencing the demand for monitoring 
financial reporting process (Engel et al., 2010).  Basioudis and Fifi (2004) documents 
that complexity of a firm affects the demand for auditing, audit fees and litigation 
costs that may arise from inherent risks.  The complexity can be in the business 
operation or the composition of its assets.  IESBA, in its handbook of the code of 
ethics for professional accountants, paragraph 210.7 directs among others that a 
professional accountant should acquire proper understanding of the complexity of the 
operations of his clients (IESBA, 2013).  This study, therefore, controls to see the 
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effect of diversification on business spread following Mustapha (2009), using the 
number of the subsidiaries added to the headquarters for complexity in operations 
. 
Table 4.4:                                                                                                                   
The measurement of the control variables 
Variable Explanation Measurement 
Cz Company size Total Assets 
LO Loss Score = 1 firms with loss and 0 for firms with profit 
IND Industry Industry type = INDS = 0 for those in consumable and 
services; INDM = 1 for those in manufacturing and 
construction 
GR Company’s growth Tobin’s Q  = Ratio of the market-value of company to its 
total assets 
CC Operations Number of subsidiaries, head-office inclusive 
 
4.4 Data Collection 
Data was collected using primary (questionnaires) and secondary (three years annual 
reports) data of Nigerian non-financial listed companies.  These form the basis of 
scientific methods of generating accurate and objective data for the research 
(Zickmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffi, 2012).  The information on internal auditing and is 
not obtainable from the financial statements.  Hence, the study had to obtain 
information using primary data in addition to the annual reports.  Both 2003 and 
2011 Codes of Corporate Governance demand that the board of directors should 
include in the annual report, the effectiveness of their internal control.  However, 
none of the two codes require companies to state the cost of their internal control in 
the financial statement.  Anderson et al., (1993) and Mustapha (2009), employed this 




Other existing literature use other techniques such as interview and observation 
(Aldamen et al., 2012; Deaconu, Nistor & Filip, 2011; Cohen & Sayag, 2010; Reddy 
& Sharma, 2014; Iwasaki, 2011; Chen et al., 2010; Omri et al., 2014).  The 
quantitative approach is more suitable for investigations relating to behavioural 
aspect of governance.  However, it is more appropriate to use survey method since, 
the study focus on the actual demand for monitoring mechanisms and not behaviour.  
Likewise, it is possible to adopt interview technique; however, very few CEOs may 
be available for the interview, and the cost may be too expensive to embark on.  
Also, many of the listed companies may not be reached, and this may give 
generalization problem. 
 
The collection commenced with a letter of introduction from the School of 
Accountancy, Universiti Utara, Malaysia.  Copies of this letter were taken to the 
Nigerian companies investigated and regulators like the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria, Securities Exchange Commission, and Nigerian Stock 
Exchange.  The researcher personally distributed and collected back the 
questionnaires engaging her with two research assistant personnel. 
 
4.5 Data Collection Procedures 
The survey questionnaires were circulated to 166 of 177 Nigerian non-financial listed 
companies as some of the companies had closed down in the course of data 
collection due to the outcomes of financial recession in Nigeria.  The researcher 
solicited assistance from the Institute of Chartered Accountants, Nigerian Security 
and Exchange Commission and Nigeria Stock Exchange for both primary and 
secondary data collection.  The study considers the efforts already taken by other 
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researchers to solve similar problems, the benefits derivable and derived from actions 
taken by them, which may be of assistance in future plans and decision makings.   
 
The primary source is the direct information collected through questionnaires on 
internal auditing among companies listed on Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE).  
Question 17 collects the data for internal audit costs while other questions address 
information about the internal audit structure.  Questions in section A of the 
questionnaire were adapted as follows: questions 1, 4, 13 and 14 from Mustapha 
(2009); and Loh and Venkatraman (1992); questions 2, 3 and 8 from Ho and 
Hutchinson (2010); questions 5,6, 10 and 11 from Cohen and Sayag (2010); question 
7 from Abbott et al. (2010); and questions 9 and 12 from Wright and Charles, (2012).  
The second section is on the information about the respondents.  The questionnaire is 
attached as Appendix A. 
 
The study thereafter scrutinized the companies’ annual reports for necessary data on 
other variables.  The test was by panel data analysis so as to control for unobservable 
variables to produce more robust results with accounts for individual heterogeneity 
following Mustapha, 2009 and Anderson et al., 1993.  Panel data is designed to 
handle cross sectional and time series, which are the features of this study.  Hence, 
the study chose to run the test using panel data analysis. 
 
Copies of the drafted questionnaire were circulated to some researchers in tertiary 
institutions to help verify the content validity of the questionnaires.  The essence of 
this is to determine the intelligibility of each question in the questionnaire.  The 
researcher effected necessary adjustments after the content validity of the 
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questionnaire.  Thereafter, the questionnaire was further administered to a sample of 
internal auditors, financial officers and company secretaries from the sampled 
population as a pilot test.  A pilot study is essential to justify the credibility of data 
used and establish that the survey questionnaires are appropriately worded and free 
of ambiguity (Nkundanbanyaga et al., 2013).  Thus, it helps to establish validity and 
reliability of the survey questionnaires.  The study reviewed the instrument based on 
the feedback received from the first circulation. 
 
4.6 Techniques of Data Analysis 
Data from the primary and secondary source were inputted using the Statistical 
Package for Social Science (SPSS 22) and analysed using Stata 12.  The unit of 
analysis is organization.  The data was cleaned and screened for missing data and 
outliers followed by confirmatory factor analysis.  The study runs descriptive 
analysis for the variables using Stata summary and descriptive statistics.  In line with 
Baron and Kenny (1986), monitoring mechanisms was regressed on the 
organizational attributes using Stata panel-corrected standard errors tests; quality-
differentiated auditors was regressed on the organizational attributes using Stata 
logistic regression analysis due to the dichotomous nature of quality-differentiated 
auditors; and the monitoring mechanisms was regressed both on the organizational 
attributes and the mediator using binary-mediation analysis, also due to the nature of 
quality-differentiated auditors. 
 
4.6.1 Research Equation 
The study checks the data for outliers and normality to achieve the stated objectives, 
ensure that the scales are good, the coding is rightly done, and the data are correctly 
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entered into the computer packages used.  The study also performs tests to establish 
that the information system’s dimension of the questionnaire is valid and reliable.  
To achieve this, the study runs descriptive analysis, factor analysis, tests of 
differences, correlation analysis, and multiple regression analysis.  The study runs 
four panel data models as follows:  
 
Panel A applies the dependent variable as discussed in paragraph 4.4.1 to test the 
following hypothesis as done by Reddy and Sharma (2014), Fauzi, Mahoney, and 
Rahman (2007) using multivariate analysis :  H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d, H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, H2e, 
H2f, and H3.  Thus, the dependent variable is the total monitoring cost in Naira 
(Nigerian currency) while the independent variables are the organization attributes.  
Regression lines X, Y are the best fits where Y, stands for dependent variable and X, 
the independent variables.  Error term µit and εit are introduced in applying the 
general equation shown in 4.7.1 above since the study is to use panel data for the 
tests.   Thus, the relationship between Y and X is:  
Yit ꞊ αit+βXit + µit + εit in which case 
Y is the value predicts for the dependent variable and 
X stands for the value predicts for the independent variable 
α signifies the value of the Y intercept 
β represents the regression coefficient defined by the gradient 
µ is the combination of error terms for components of time series and conception 
ε is the error term for cross-section testing 
 
Multiple regressions are used to describe the relationship between the dependent 
variable, Y and several independent variables, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, … Xn.  n here 
signifies the independent variables that the study examines.  The study uses multiple 
independent variables simultaneously to predict the demand for the dependent 




Yit = αit +β1Xit + β2Xit + β3Xit + β4Xit + β5Xit + β6Xit+ … ++ βnXit + µit + εit 
 
Thus, Panel A, therefore, regresses the monitoring mechanisms on organizational 
attributes as follows: 
MMit = αit + β1MOit + β2GOit + β3IBit + β4PPCit + β5Bzit + β6BMit + β7CEOTit + 
β8RMCit + β9BIit +β10BGit  + β11CSit + β12Czit + β13IRit + β14INDit + 
β15GRit + β16CCit + µit + εit 
 (Equation 4.1) 
4.6.1.1 Direct Relationship for Equation 4.2 Panel B 
This study regresses quality-differentiated auditors on organizational attributes as 
follows:   
QDAit  (M) = αit + β1MOit + β2GOit + β3IBit + β4PPCit + β5Bzit + β6BMit + β7CEOTit 
+ β8RMCit + β9BIit +β10BGit  + β11CSit + β12Czit + β13IRit + β14INDit + 





























Monitoring Costs (MM) 
Quality-differentiated Auditors (M) 
Managerial Ownership  
Government Ownership  
Block-holders Ownership, Individual  
Increase in second-largest shareholder, signifying 
principal-principal conflicts  
Board Size  
Board Meeting  
Chief Executive Officer Tenure 
Risk Management Committee  
Proportion of independent to non-independent Directors 

















Proportion of female to male directors  
Compensation Structure  
Company Size  
Risks  
Industry  
Company’s growth  
Complexity in operation   
 
Equation 4.1 was repeated to test for individual monitoring mechanism with Y value 
changing to NEDIR, IA and EA instead of MM in the equation.  However, these 
equations are not shown in this study because they are not part of the major tests 
required for this study. 
 
4.6.1.2 Indirect Relationship for Equation 4.3 Panel C 
The study regresses monitoring mechanisms on both organizational attributes and 
quality-differentiated auditors as follows:  
MMit  (ϒ) = αit + β1MOit + β2GOit + β3IBit + β4PPCit + β5Bzit + β6BMit + β7CEOTit + 
β8RMCit + β9BIit +β10BGit  + β11CSit + β12Czit + β13IRit + β14INDit + 
β15GRit + β16CCit + β17QDAit + µit + εit 
 (Equation 4.3) 
 
Panel C tests the mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors on the attributes 
of organization and monitoring mechanisms, following Ramadan et al. (2012).  Their 
study tested the mediating role of debt level on capital structure and performance of 
an entity. This study tests H5 as shown in equation 4.3 above. 
 
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), it is expected that the tests must prove that the 
relationship between 1) organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms (c) are 
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significant. 2) organizational attributes and quality-differentiated auditors are 
significant. 3) quality-differentiated auditors and monitoring mechanisms is 
significant. 4) organizational structures and monitoring mechanisms for quality-
differentiated auditors (
1
c') is not significant.  If all these requirements are met, then 
the effect is full mediation.  However, if 
1
c' is less than c, the effect is partial 
mediation.  The study used binary-mediation bootstrap to determine the significance 
for condition 4 and followed Zhao et al. (2010) to determine the typology of the 
mediation. 
 
4.6.2 Code of Corporate Governance (CCG) 
This study tests the impact of the revised code of governance following Zellner 
(1962, 1963); Wang (2014); Craswell, Francis, and Taylor (1996).  The study runs 
regression analysis for years 2010 to 2012, testing data for pre-2011 SEC Code, the 
transition to the code and post implementation period.  The data collected for the 
year 2010 were prepared base on 2003 SEC Code, which 2011 SEC Code repealed.  
2003 SEC Code became inadequate for corporate governance following globally 
numerous changes in corporate governance, financial crisis, replication of code of 
governance, which are at variance on certain corporate governance aspects and 
weaknesses in 2003 SEC code.  The revoked code was silent on punishment for 
breach of any part of the code, but 2011 code has taken care of this in paragraphs 
1.3(c) and (d).  2003 code is with no provision for risk management and committee 
to handle risk management for a corporation.  2011 code made appropriate provision 
for this in paragraph 29.  Except for audit committee, 2003 code did not enumerate 
the duties of governance mechanisms as done in 2011 code (paragraph 3 for the 
board of directors, 5.1 for the chairman, 5.2(d) for the CEO/MD, 8.4 for company 
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secretary, 10.2 for risk management committee, 11.2 for the 
governance/remuneration committee, 30.4 for audit committee and 31.7 for the 
internal audit).  Even though the responsibilities of the external auditor are not listed 
as others, the disclosures to accomplish the audited financial reports are listed in 
34.10 and 34.11.  Furthermore, details in 2011 code are clearer with specifics not 
found in 2003 Code concerning the appointment, committee membership, 
disengagement and professionalism of all governance mechanisms in the code.  2011 
code specifically defines the applicability of the corporate governance in paragraph 
1.  While 2003 Code recognizes separate leadership as an ideal philosophy, 2011 
Code give a mandate that the positions of the CEO and Chairman of the board of 
directors should be manned by different individuals.  The criteria for corporations to 
determine an independent director is specifically stated in 2011 Code while 2003 
Code has no specification for it.  Absent in 2003 Code but present in 2011 Code is 7 
days' notice by which corporations are mandated for service of notice for annual 
general meetings.  The revised code is more flexible than the formal as it is approved 
as the minimum standard.  Other items in 2011 Code not in 2003 Code are: multiple 
directorships, family and interlocking directorship, performance evaluation of the 
board, conflict of interest, insider trading, orientation and training of directors, tenure 
and re-election of directors, terms and conditions of service for board members, 
protection of shareholder rights, role of shareholder associations, sustainability 
issues, whistle-blowing policy, rotation of external auditors, communication policy 
and code of ethics.  Beside the omissions in 2003 Code, it seeks for voluntary 
compliance and the basis of sanction for breaches is a subject of interpretation 
(Egwuatu, 2010).  The difference between the two codes shows a lot of 
improvements with principles to ensure the effectiveness of the three monitoring 
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mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing).  This study investigates to 
see the impact of the new code on governance of public companies.   
 
This study, therefore, regresses the reviewed CCG on monitoring mechanisms for the 
difference in pre and post transition to the reviewed CCG following the concept of 
seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) model of Zellner (1962, 1963) 
shown below: 
ϒµ = Xµβµt + µµ 
Where: 
y ≡ [y′1y′2 . . . y′M]′, 
β ≡ [β′1β′2 . . . β′M]′, 
µ ≡ [µ′1µ′2 . . . µ′M]′, 
X = the block-diagonal matrix 
The equation is solved using iterated feasible general least square – FGLS (Cushing 
& Ahlawat, 1996; Heij, Boer, Franses, Kloek, & Van Dijik, 2004). 
In this case to be represented thus: 
ϒ1 = X1β1 + µ1 + ε1…………………………………………..for the pre-transition period 
ϒ2 = X2β2 + µ2 + ε2…………………….…………………..for the post-transition period 
The multiple regressions in this case is: 
ϒ1 = X1β1 + X11β11 + X12β12 + X13β13 + X14β14 … Xnβn + µ + ε 
ϒ2 = X2β2 + X21β21 + X22β22 + X23β23 + X24β24 … Xnβn + µ + ε 
Thus, Panel D is therefore as follows: 
MM1it = α1it + β11MO1it + β12GO1it + β13IB1it + β14PPC1it + β15BS1zit + β16BM1it + 
β17CEOT1it + β18RMC1it + β19BI1it +β110BG1it  + β111CS1it + β112Cz1it + 
β113IR1it + β114IND1it + β115GR1it + β116CC1it + β117QDA1it + µ1it + ε1it 
(Equation 4.4a) 
MM2it = α2it + β21MO2it + β22GO2it + β23IB2it + β24PPC2it + β25BS2zit + β26BM2it + 
β27CEOT2it + β28RMC2it + β29BI2it +β210BG2it  + β211CS2it + β212Cz2it + 




MM3it =  α3it + β31MO3it + β32GO3it + β33IB3it + β34PPC3it + β35BSz3it + β36BM3it + 
β37CEOT3it + β38RMC3it + β39BI3it +β310BG3it  + β311CS3it + β312Cz3it + 
β313IR3it + β314IND3it + β315GR3it + β316CC3it + β317QDA3it + µ3it + ε3it 
(Equation 4.4c) 
Where: 
MM1 is the monitoring cost for year 2010 
MM2 is the monitoring cost for year 2011 and 
MM3 is the monitoring cost for year 2012 
1, 2,  3 are respectively added to the codes of other variables to indicate the years 
(2010, 2011 and 2012) of the variables used to compute the monitoring cost for each 
year. 
 
The study obtains the variance-covariance matrix and thereafter fit the equations 
simultaneously and compares the monitoring costs for each of the years using the 
same variables and companies. 
 
4.7 Summary 
This study considers the proposed research design, population, sample, measurement, 
data collection, techniques and analysis in this chapter.  The study uses both primary 
and secondary data to examine the mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors 
on the organizational attributes, the monitoring costs and the demand for the 
monitoring mechanisms.  The organizational attributes in the study are ownership 









The earlier chapter discussed research methods and design with hypotheses 
development.  This chapter presents the data analysis and empirical evidence for the 
study, the mediating effects of the quality-differentiated auditors on the relationship 
between organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms.  Section 5.1 
introduces the chapter.  Section 5.2 details response rate.  5.3 discuss the overview 
and preliminaries of the data analysis.  Section 5.4 presents the descriptive analysis 
for both primary and secondary data.  Section 5.5 details the results of Panels A, B, C 
and D.  Section 5.6 compares the outcome with the proposed hypotheses.  Section 
5.7 provides chapter summary. 
 
5.1 Response Rate 
Information from the annual reports is exclusive of the costs of internal auditors; 
hence, the study collected information on it using questionnaires.  Table 5.1.1 
presents questionnaires sent and the response received from the companies.  117 
companies responded out of 166 companies given questionnaires.  However, there 
were no annual reports for six of the companies, hence, 111 questionnaires were used 
for the empirical tests.  Two questionnaires were administered in each company, one 
to the internal auditor and one to either the head of accounts or the company 
secretary.  The objective is to ensure receipt of at a response from each company as 
the study needs only one from each company; considering the possible difficulty in 
getting a response from a company.  The basis of choosing these three officers is that 
they are the custodians of relevant records needed for the information.  Hence, a total 
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of 332 (166 x 2) questionnaires were distributed as shown in table 5.1.1  The same 
questionnaire was sent by e-mail to the listed companies and resent three times after 
the first reminder.  However, the e-mailed copies are not included in table 5.1.1  
Reminders were also sent severally through phone calls and visitations to conform 
with the suggestion of the study of Shih and Fan (2008) that follow-up reminders is 
likely to increase response rates.  Achieving a higher response rate will give larger 
data, guarantees statistical power and smaller confidence intervals that produce 
credible empirical results (Baruch & Holtom, 2008). 
 
The sample for this study is 117, which is 35.24% of questionnaires distributed and 
constitute 66% (117/177) of the total population of non-financial listed companies in 
Nigeria.  The response is a good coverage of manufacturing and service sectors of 
non-financial listed companies in Nigeria.  It’s high enough to ensure less potential 
non-response bias (Shih & Fan, 2008).  Hence, the sample size is adequate for the 
study.  The result of descriptive analysis ran using IBM SPSS 22 indicates that 
89.2% of the data is from the manufacturing sectors while the remaining 10.8% are 
from the service sectors. 
 
Table 5.1.1                                                                                                    
Questionnaire Distribution 
Item Frequency 
Percentage % to Distributed 
Questionnaires 
 332 100 
Distributed Questionnaires 
Completed Questionnaires 117 35.24 
Unusable Questionnaires 6 1.8 




5.1.1 Validity of Questionnaire 
Copies of the questionnaire were sent to fifteen academicians in different Nigerian 
universities and one non-academician (a senior research and technical personnel) for 
validation of the questionnaires.  The questionnaire was corrected following 
suggestions from six academicians and one non-academician that responded to the 
request.  The corrected questionnaires were distributed thereafter.  Furthermore, a 
pilot test was conducted to further validate the questionnaire. 
 
5.1.2 Non-Response Bias 
A total of 332 questionnaires were distributed with the letter of introduction from 
School of Accountancy (SOA), Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) to the Nigerian 
non-financial listed companies within 15 weeks from 06 April to 13 July 2015.  117 
questionnaires were eventually received and used for testing the hypotheses in this 
study.  6 questionnaires were unusable and rejected.  One was an outlier as there was 
no response to some questions in section A.  This same response and other 5 
responses were with no corresponding annual reports needed for the tests. 
 
Researchers have to make efforts to identify and correct non-response bias as it is 
always a concern in research surveys (Lambert & Harrington, 1990).  Failure to 
identify and correct non-response bias may threaten the generalizability of the 
findings of a study (Rogelberg & Stanton, 2015).  Hence, the need to follow the 
checklist provided by Baruch and Holtom (2008) to conduct and report the tests on 
the non-response bias.  The study of Shih and Fan (2008), shows that follow-up 





In this study, early responses are the questionnaires returned within the 15 weeks of 
the distribution, while those received thereafter are considered the late responses.  
The study of Baruch and Holtom (2008), suggests publicity, reminders, pre-
notification and survey feedback response facilitation approaches.  This study, 
therefore, used reminders through e-mails, phone calls, phone messages and follow-
up visitations.  Reminder methods have been used by existing literature such as 
reminder letters Mustapha, 2009); reminder cards (Udin, Idris, & Hanefah, 2012); 
telephone calls and/or emails/posts (Stent, 2011; Ismail, 2013; Bezes, 2013). 
 
Table 5.1.2 (descriptive statistics for early and late respondents) classifies 75 
respondents as early responses and 36 as late responses.  The study conducts 
descriptive statistics and Levene’s test for equality of variance.  The purpose of the 
tests is to identify any significant difference in the response between early and late 
responses regarding the internal audit costs.  The results in Table 5.1.3 (independent 
sample t-test) reveal that there is no significant difference in the mean scores of 
responses at 5% confidence level between the early and late responses.  The result, 
therefore, implies that the study is with no non-response bias. 
 
Table 5.1.2                                                                                                     
Descriptive Statistics for Early and Late Respondents 





Internal Audit Costs Early Response 75 1.467 0.572 0.066 
Late Response 36 1.463 0.634 0.106 
Internal Audit Structure Early Response 75 1.851 0.349 0.04 




Table 5.1.3                                                                                                    







t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 





Equal variances assumed 0.18 0.67 0.03 109 0.98 0 0.12 
Equal variances not 
assumed   
0.03 63.16 0.98 0 0.12 
IAS 
Equal variances assumed 0.59 0.44 0.03 109 0.98 0 0.07 
Equal variances not 
assumed   
0.03 73.48 0.98 0 0.07 
Variable definition: 
IAC = Internal Audit Costs; IAS = Internal Audit Structure 
 
5.1.3 Profile of Respondents 
Table 5.1.4 presents the respondents’ profile.  The company Internal Auditors 
answered 48.6% of the questionnaires; the company Accountants answered 38.7% 
while the company Secretaries answered the remaining 12.6%.  46.8% of the 
respondents have been with their companies for periods of 1 to 5 years.  36% have 
been with their companies for periods within 6 and 10 years.  Only one (0.9%) of the 
respondents has been with his company for more than 20 years while the remaining 
respondents’ experience with the company is within 11 and 20 years.  9% of the 
respondents are with more than 20 years working experience, 11.7% with 1 to 5, 
39.6% with 6 to 10, 25, 2% with 11 to 15, and 14.4% with 16 to 20 years of working 





Table 5.1.4                                                                                                               
Profile of the Respondents (No = 111 Companies) 
Background information Categories Frequency % 
Position 
Internal Auditor 54 48.6 
Accountant 43 38.7 
Company Secretary 14 12.6 
Years with the company 
1-5 years 52 46.8 
6-10 years 40 36 
11-15 years 9 8.1 
16-20 years 9 8.1 
20 years and above 1 0.9 
Years of working experience 
1-5 years 13 11.7 
6-10 years 44 39.6 
11-15 years 28 25.2 
16-20 years 16 14.4 
20 years and above 10 9 
Gender 
Male 89 80.2 
Female 22 19.8 
Nationality Nigerian 108 97.3 
  Others 3 2.7 
 
5.1.4 Respondent Companies 
Table 5.1.5 presents the profile of the 111 companies for the study.  These are 
companies in the Agriculture (3 or 2.7%), Automotive (2 or 1.8%), Beverages (5 or 
4.5%), Building and Construction (7 or 6.3%), Chemicals (10 or 9%), Computers and 
Technology (5 or 4.5%), Conglomerates and Holding (7 or 6.3%), Engineering 
Construction (3 or 2.7%), Food (16 or 14.4%), Health Care (9 or 8.1%), Holding (1 
or 0.9%), Home Builders (1 or 0.9%), Hotels, Casinos and Resorts (2 or 1.8%), 
Leisure (1 or 0.9%), Manufacturing and Industrial (6 or 5.4%), Media and 
Broadcasting (1 or 0.9%), Metals and Minerals (2 or 1.8%), Natural Gas and Oil (11 
or 9.9%), Printing and Publishing (2 or 1.8%), Real Estate (4 or 3.6%), Services (3 or 




The population for the study is adequately covered as all the sectors in the non-
financial industry are well represented as shown in Table 5.1.5.  These sectors were 
grouped into manufacturing and services for the purpose of investigation.  
Manufacturing industry comprises agriculture, conglomerates, construction and real 
estates, consumer goods, healthcare, ICT, industrial goods, natural resources and oil 
and gas.  Service industry covers transportation, printing press, media, hotels, courier 
services, telecommunication, tourist, and companies as classified in the annual 
reports from Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). 
 
Table 5.1.5               
Sectors of the Companies 
 Sectors Frequency Percent 
Agriculture 3 2.7 
Automotive 2 1.8 
Beverages 5 4.5 
Building and Construction 7 6.3 
Chemicals 10 9 
Computers and Technology 5 4.5 
Conglomerates 1 0.9 
Conglomerates and Holding 7 6.3 
Engineering Construction 3 2.7 
Food 16 14.4 
Health Care 9 8.1 
Holding 1 0.9 
Home Builders 1 0.9 
Hotels, Casinos, Resorts 2 1.8 
Leisure 1 0.9 
Manufacturing and Industrial 6 5.4 
Media and Broadcasting 1 0.9 
Metals and Minerals 2 1.8 
Natural Gas and Oil 11 9.9 
Printing and Publishing 2 1.8 
Real Estate 4 3.6 
Services 3 2.7 
Telecommunications 5 4.5 
Transportation 4 3.6 




Table 5.1.6 presents the study’s variables and their statistics separately for the 
continuous and categorical variables.  The continuous aspect of the presentation 
reveals that directorship is the largest of the components of monitoring mechanisms.  
Next to the director remuneration is the cost of internal audit followed by the 
external audit fee, which is the least of the three components of monitoring 
mechanisms. 
 
Table 5.1.6          
Descriptive Statistics for the Variables (Untransformed Data) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SN 56 32.1 1 111 
YEAR 2011 0.8 2010 2012 
Continuous Variables 
    Directorship (N’m) 23.03 54.49 0.00 496.50 
Directorship 2010 (N’m) 19.14 48.30 0.00 437.40 
Directorship 2011 (N’m) 23.22 59.25 0.00 496.50 
Directorship 2012 (N’m) 26.73 55.58 0.00 341.60 
Internal Auditing Costs  (N’m) 18.61 11.73 10.50 50.50 
Internal Auditing Costs 2010 (N’m) 17.35 10.62 10.50 50.50 
Internal Auditing Costs 2011 (N’m) 18.97 12.23 10.50 50.50 
Internal Auditing Costs 2012 (N’m) 19.51 12.28 10.50 50.50 
External Auditing Costs  (N’m) 16.50 25.12 0.35 174.40 
External Auditing Costs 2010  (N’m) 12.11 15.91 0.35 120.00 
External Auditing Costs 2011 (N’m) 17.19 25.57 0.35 165.00 
External Auditing Costs 2012 (N’m) 20.19 31.05 0.50 174.40 
Monitoring Mechanisms' Costs (N’m) 58.13 75.66 11.66 609.50 
Monitoring Mechanisms' Costs 2010 (N’m) 48.60 59.94 11.66 491.00 
Monitoring Mechanisms' Costs 2011 (N’m) 59.38 81.81 12.05 609.50 
Monitoring Mechanisms' Costs 2012 (N’m) 66.43 82.64 11.86 528.30 
Managerial Ownership 3.03 8.86 0.00 59.17 
Managerial Ownership 2010 3.25 9.15 0.00 55.63 
Managerial Ownership 2011 2.90 8.64 0.00 55.63 
Managerial Ownership 2012 2.94 8.85 0.00 59.17 
Government Ownership 0.82 2.88 0.00 16.87 
Government Ownership 2010 0.88 3.10 0.00 16.87 
Government Ownership 2011 0.82 2.83 0.00 14.41 




Table 5.1.6:  (Continued) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Individual Block-holders 8.44 15.80 0.00 87.00 
Individual Block-holders 2010 8.95 16.98 0.00 87.00 
Individual Block-holders 2011 8.14 15.23 0.00 75.00 
Individual Block-holders 2012 8.23 15.24 0.00 74.00 
Principal-principal Conflicts 0.11 1.10 -9.26 13.09 
Principal-principal Conflicts 2010 0.02 0.52 -3.28 2.09 
Principal-principal Conflicts 2011 0.15 1.64 -9.26 13.09 
Principal-principal Conflicts 2012 0.15 0.82 -2.29 5.63 
Board Size 8.33 2.07 4.00 14.00 
Board Size 2010 8.29 1.97 4.00 13.00 
Board Size 2011 8.37 2.08 4.00 13.00 
Board Size 2012 8.34 2.18 5.00 14.00 
Board Meetings 4.29 1.14 2.00 10.00 
Board Meetings 2010 3.98 1.21 2.00 8.00 
Board Meetings 2011 4.37 1.10 2.00 10.00 
Board Meetings 2012 4.53 1.05 2.00 9.00 
CEO Tenure 5.68 5.08 1.00 33.00 
CEO Tenure 2010 5.47 4.92 1.00 31.00 
CEO Tenure 2011 5.59 5.07 1.00 32.00 
CEO Tenure 2012 5.97 5.28 1.00 33.00 
Board Independence 0.44 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Board Independence 2010 0.44 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Board Independence 2011 0.44 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Board Independence 2012 0.44 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Board Gender 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.50 
Board Gender 2010 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.43 
Board Gender 2011 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.50 
Board Gender 2012 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.50 
Company Size (Total Assets in N’bn) 31.01 73.08 0.07 673.70 
Company Size 2010 (Total Assets in N’bn) 23.78 54.08 0.07 402.00 
Company Size 2011 (Total Assets in N’bn) 31.72 71.31 0.07 526.50 
Company Size 2012 (Total Assets in N’bn) 37.54 89.51 0.09 673.70 
Company Growth 0.52 2.17 -15.57 25.50 
Company Growth 2010 0.63 2.83 -14.81 25.50 
Company Growth 2011 0.45 1.76 -15.57 8.03 
Company Growth 2012 0.48 1.74 -12.30 12.67 
Company Complexity 3.54 3.96 1.00 31.00 
Company Complexity 2010 3.49 3.60 1.00 21.00 
Company Complexity 2011 3.55 4.13 1.00 31.00 





Table 5.1.6:  (Continued) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Categorical Variables 
    Quality-differentiated Auditors 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Quality-differentiated Auditors 2010 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Quality-differentiated Auditors 2011 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Quality-differentiated Auditors 2012 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Risk Management Committee 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Risk Management Committee 2010 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Risk Management Committee 2011 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Risk Management Committee 2012 0.42 0.50 0 1 
Compensation Structure 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Compensation Structure 2010 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Compensation Structure 2011 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Compensation Structure 2012 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Loss 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Loss 2010 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Loss 2011 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Loss 2012 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Industry 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Industry 2010 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Industry 2011 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Industry 2012 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Note –  Observations for each variable is 333 and 111 for annual (2010, 2011, 2012) observations. 
 All the amounts are in millions of naira (N’m) and billions of naira (N’bn). 
 
The mean for managerial ownership is 3% which is quite very low compared to 27% 
of the findings of Mustapha (2009) and 34% of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006).  These 
two studies were done in Malaysia where shareholding is not widely dispersed as 
companies are mostly family owned.  Government ownership is very low with the 
means of 0.82%.  The prevailing economy situation in the country demands a lot 
from the government and may be credited for the low level of government 
ownership.  The disclosure level of the financial statements of the companies may 
also contribute to the low level reported.  Except where the government is a block-




The mean for individual block-holders is 8%.  The Principal-principal Conflicts, 
changes in the shareholding of the second-largest shareholders has a mean of 0.11%.  
Further information is provided in table 5.1.7 on shareholding. 
 
The mean for the board size is 8.  All sampled companies have the board of directors 
within the range of 4 and 13 board members in years 2010 and 2011 and 5 and 14 in 
2012.  This is in compliance with the demand of the Nigerian code of corporate 
governance.   SEC, 2011, section 4.1 and 4.2 directs that the size should be within 
the range of 5 and 15 in relation to the scale and complexity of the operations of the 
companies.  All companies complied with the range of 5 to 15 in 2012. 
 
The average board meetings for the sampled companies are 4.  This is in compliance 
with the Nigerian code of corporate governance.  SEC, 2011 in section 12.1 directs 
that companies’ board of directors should meet at least once every quarter, 4 times a 
year. 
 
The mean for the tenure of the chief executive officer is 6 years.  There is no 
directive in respect of this in the SEC, 2011.  However, experience shows that the 
tenure of the chief executive officer can have an impact on the corporate governance 
of a company. 
 
The total assets of the sampled companies are averagely N31billion.  Further details 
on the total assets of the companies are provided in Table 5.3.4.  The company 




The company complexity measured by the number of subsidiaries has a means of 
3.53.  The descriptive statistics on complexity shows that the sample for the study is 
wide enough to cater for small, medium and large companies.  There are companies 
with only the head office but no subsidiaries (small), some with few subsidiaries 
(medium) and some with so many subsidiaries (large), all within a range of 1 and 31 
subsidiaries.  The mean for loss is 25.53%, and industry is 88.29%. 
 
Table 5.1.7 presents the details of the shareholdings of the companies.  51.3% of 
them have up to N600million share capital in 2010 and 2011 but dropped to 49.5% in 
2012.  16.2 % of the companies have between N600million and N1billion in 2010 
but dropped to 14.4% in 2011 and 2012.  16.2% between N1billion and N2billion in 
2010 and 2011 but increase to 18% in the year 2012.  16.2% are having between 
N2billion and above ordinary share capital. In 2010 and grew to 18% in 2011 and 
2012. 
 
Table 5.1.7          
Shareholdings of the Companies 
Naira (N,m) 
Year 2010 Year 2011 Year 2012 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
10 – 50 7 6.3 7 6.3 7 6.3 
50 – 100 6 5.4 6 5.4 6 5.4 
100 – 150 9 8.1 8 7.2 8 7.2 
150 - 300 15 13.5 16 14.4 16 14.4 
300 – 600 20 18.0 20 18.0 18 16.2 
600  – 1,000 18 16.2 16 14.4 16 14.4 
1,000 - 2,000 18 16.2 18 16.2 20 18.0 
2,000 and above 18 16.2 20 18.0 20 18.0 





Table 5.1.8 presents information about the year by year total assets of the companies.  
25.3%, 24.32% and 18.02% of the companies held below N2.5billion total assets 
respectively in years 2010, 2011 and 2012.  Likewise, 14.41%, 11.71%, and 18.92% 
held between N2.5billion and N5billion respectively in 2010, 2011 and 2012.  Also, 
10.81%, 11.71%, and 9.91% held between N5billion and N7.5billion respectively in 
2010, 2011 and 2012.  Similarly, 10.81%, 7.21% and 4.5% held between N7.5billion 
and N10billion, 11.71%, 15.32% and 14.41% held N10billion and N20billion.  
Likewise, 14.41%, 12.61%, and 17.12% held between N20billion and N50billion 
total assets, while 8.11%, 10.81% and 9.91% of the companies held between 
N50billion and N100billion and 4.5%, 6.31%, and 7.21% held more than 
N100billion total assets.  This reflects further, the complexity of the companies in 
terms of the composition of their assets giving a range of N68.934million and 
N673.3666billion. 
 
Table 5.1.8                  
Total Assets of the Companies 
Naira (N,tr) 
Year 2010 Year 2011 Year 2012 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
0 – 2.5 28 25.23 27 24.32 20 18.02 
2.5 - 5 16 14.41 13 11.71 21 18.92 
5 – 7.5 12 10.81 13 11.71 11 9.91 
7.5 - 10 12 10.81 8 7.21 5 4.5 
10 - 20 13 11.71 17 15.32 16 14.41 
20 - 50 16 14.41 14 12.61 19 17.12 
50 - 100 9 8.11 12 10.81 11 9.91 
100 and above 5 4.5 7 6.31 8 7.21 
Total 111 100 111 100 111 100 
 
 
Table 5.1.9 presents the information on the internal audit costs of the companies for 
years 2010, 2011 and 2012.  64% of the companies expensed N20million and below 
for the year 2010, while the internal audit costs incurred by 31.5% of the companies 
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ranged between N21million and N40million in 2010.  Only 4.5% of the companies 
spent between N41million and N60million on internal audit in 2010.  60.4% of the 
companies spent between N1million and N20million on internal audit in 2011.  The 
cost of the internal audit for 30.6% of the companies is within the range of 
N21million and N40million while the remaining 9% companies spent between 
N1million and N20million naira in 2011.  57.7% of the sampled companies spent 
between N1million and N20million on internal audit in 2012.  34.2% of the 
companies spent within the range of N21million and N40million and the remaining 
8.1% companies spent between N1million and N20million on internal audit in 2012. 
 
Table 5.1.9              
Internal Audit Costs of the Companies 
Internal Audit 
Costs 
Year 2010 Year 2011 Year 2012 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
(N'm) 1-20 71 64 67 60.4 64 57.7 
(N'm) 21-40 35 31.5 34 30.6 38 34.2 
(N'm) 41-60 5 4.5 10 9 9 8.1 
Total 111 100 111 100 111 100 
 
Table 5.1.10 presents the information in respect of the internal audit structure of the 
companies.  It also reveals that in the year 2010, 76% of the sampled companies had 
in-house internal auditing.  The companies with in-house internal auditing in 2011 
and 2012 are respectively 63.1%% and 72.1%.   Those that outsourced their internal 
auditing in 2010 were 17.1% and 15.3% in 2011 and 9% in 2012.  6.3% of the 
companies co-sourced their internal auditing while those that co-sourced in 2011 and 




Table 5.1.10              
Internal Audit Structure of the Companies 
Internal Audit Structure 
Year 2010 Year 2011 Year 2012 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
In-house 85 76.6 70 63.1 80 72.1 
Outsourcing 19 17.1 17 15.3 10 9 
Co-sourcing 7 6.3 24 21.6 21 18.9 
Total 111 100 111 100 111 100 
 
Table 5.1.11 presents the information about the professional qualifications of the 
head of the departments of the internal auditors of the sampled companies.  It reveals 
that all the listed companies' heads of internal audit departments are professional 
accountants with 80.1% from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria. 
Table 5.1.11             
Professional Qualification of the Head of Internal Audit Departments of the 
Companies 
  Professional Qualification Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
  Fellow Chartered Accountant 49 44.1 44.5 
Associate Chartered Accountant 40 36 36.4 
Fellow of the Institute of Internal 
Auditors 
6 5.4 5.5 
Associate of the Institute of Internal 
Auditors 
5 4.5 4.5 
Fellow of the Institute of National 
Accountant of Nigeria 
2 1.8 1.8 
Associate of the Institute of National 
Accountant of Nigeria 
3 2.7 2.7 
Members of other IFAC members. 5 4.5 4.5 
Total 110 99.1 100 
Missing System 1 0.9 
 Total 111 100   
 
 
5.2 Overview and Preliminaries of Data Analysis 
Following the collection of data for the study, the researcher prepared the data by 
setting up the structure of data file and entering data in Microsoft Excel.  The data 




5.2.1 Data Preparation 
The checking for unanswered questions was done at the point of collection for 
respondents to complete.  Corrective actions were taken by those that were available 
at the point of collection.  The technique helps to reduce the number of unanswered 
questions.  Questionnaires were arranged and numbered; variables were coded both 
for primary and secondary data in readiness for entries into the computer applications 
used. 
 
5.2.2 Data Cleaning 
The researcher checked for typographical errors after inputting data (primary and 
secondary) in Microsoft Excel before exporting to the IBM SPSS version 22.  The 
editing is meant to ensure that the researcher accurately and completely inputted the 
data into the computer.  The descriptive analysis in the IBM SPSS version 22 
application helps further cleaning of the data.  It helps to discover and correct 
missing data and outliers. 
 
5.2.2.1 Missing Data 
Data may be missing for several reasons.  Reasons for missing data include failure to 
answer because the respondent: 1) does not know the answer to the question. 2) is 
not comfortable answering the question. 3) perceives that the information required is 
confidential. 4) The questions are ambiguous or too many. 5) The missing data may 
be by design (Vriens & Melton, 2002).  Schlomer, Bauman, and Card (2010) argue 
that it is essential to report and manage missing data for the proper understanding of 
the results of a study.  The study claims that the report should include the nature and 
degree of the missing data as well as the method adopted to manage it in the process 
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of data analysis.  It also requires that researchers should justify why the method 
adopted is preferred to any other method applicable to manage missing data.  The 
study also recommends SPSS as one of the statistical software packages useful to 
handle missing data but discourages deletion methods of handling missing data.  This 
study used mean substitution, one of the non-stochastic imputation methods 
recommended by the study of Schlomer et al. (2010), to manage the missing data. 
 
A total of 26 (0.55%) missing data were found after correcting typographical errors.  
The researcher replaced each affected variable indicator with the mean for the 
indicator as provided by IBM SPSS version 22.  The frequency distribution of the 
data reveals the missing data while the descriptive mean statistics computes the mean 
used to transform the data replacing the missing data. 
 
5.2.2.2 Outliers  
The researcher screened for outliers after treating the missing data by running 
Mahalanobis distance in IBM SPSS version 22 linear regression and checking to the 
chi-square table.  The primary data is free of outliers. 
 
For secondary data, the study tests for outliers using a stem and leaf plot, avplot, and 
graph matrix in Stata 12 package.  The stem-and-leaf plot shows some residuals that 
stick out, -3.33, -3.23, -3.03, -3.98, -3.91, and 3.68.  These are possible outliers.   The 
coefficient, standard errors and t-value shown for each variable by avplots helps to 
identify the presence of outliers if any.    The graph matrix shows some data points 
that are far away from other data points.  These are evidence of outliers.  These 
results show that the secondary data is not free from outliers.  Outliers are not 
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unexpected of a panel data as outliers problems are more related to panel data 
settings (Bramati & Croux, 2007).  The study of Bramati and Croux (2007), 
attributes this problem to the size of variables always involved in panel data settings.  
The study claims further that this could be from typographical errors, recording 
errors, and computational errors.  The problems of outliers in panel data inform the 
development and recommendation of robust estimators for panel data.  However, 
most of these robust estimators are majorly for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  Examples of such robust estimators are: 1) Robust Generalized 
Method of Moments (Dell’Aquila, Ronchetti, & Trojani, 2001). 2) Symmetrically 
Normalized General Method of Moments (Alonso-Borrego & Arellano, 1999), 
Panel-corrected Standard Errors (Beck & Katz, 1995), Robust Fixed Effects, MS 
Estimator (Maronna & Yohai, 2000). 
 
Other reasons for the presence of outliers in panel data are unobserved country 
effects, model uncertainty and endogeneity (Naudé & Saayman, 2005).  Even though 
country is not a variable for this study, there could be unobserved industry effects 
and unobserved regulatory effects within the country that affects the data collected 
for the study.  Outliers are likely to be present also in data from a sample of listed 
companies with large variations across units (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  The claim of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) fit into the data used for this study.  Hence, the researcher 
did not delete any outlier in the secondary data.  Also, because robust techniques 
require no preliminary data cleaning to produce reasonable estimates (Bramati & 




5.2.3 Normality Test 
Normality test was done after testing for outliers to certify if the data is normally 
distributed and appropriate for multivariate analysis proposed for the tests.  It is 
expected that data for research should be from a normally distributed population 
(Abdi & Molin, 2007).  The results of the various tests of normality ran for this study 
certifies that the data is with no serious indication of non-normality.  Hence, the data 
is suitable for multivariate analysis. 
 
5.2.4 Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity is a situation wherein two or more variables highly correlate with 
one another (Hair Jr, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014; pages 115 and 123).  It results 
from usage of redundant indicators as an item to measure two or more constructs.  Its 
occurrence may be because the items in the model for regression share a common 
trend (Gujarati, 2004).  Hence, it is defined by Gujarati (2004) as “the existence of 
more than one exact linear relationship.”  Even though there is no perfect linear 
relationship, the occurrence of multicollinearity at a high level affects results of 
analyses (Gujarati, 2004).  It boosts standard errors, which makes it impossible for a 
researcher to establish the significant variation of estimated weights of the affected 
variable from zero (Hair Jr et al., 2014).  It can also cause an incorrect estimation of 
the weights of the affected variables and also reverse their signs (Hair Jr et al., 2014).  
It is, therefore, pertinent to have multicollinearity test as part of the preliminary tests 
for a research work. 
 
This study, therefore, checked to identify the presence of multicollinearity in the 
independent variables as suggested by Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, and Mena (2011).  
Tables 5.2.1 – 5.2.3 present Pearson Correlation for Panels A-C showing that the 
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variables are not highly correlated as all are below 0.90 suggested by (Hair, Black, 
Babin, and Anderson (2010).   
185 
 
Table 5.2.1                                                                                                                                                                                                          















































































































































































































Monitoring Mechanisms 1.00                                 
Managerial Ownership -0.09 1.00                               
Government Ownership -0.04 -0.06 1.00                             
Individual Block-holders -0.13 0.67 -0.09 1.00                           
Principal-principal Conflicts 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.01 1.00                         
Board Size 0.23 0.04 0.17 -0.13 0.03 1.00                       
Board Meeting 0.32 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.12 1.00                     
CEO Tenure 0.04 0.28 -0.09 0.22 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 1.00                   
Risk Management Committee 0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.19 -0.04 1.00                 
Board Independence 0.21 -0.09 0.15 -0.09 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.02 1.00               
Board Gender 0.16 0.03 -0.14 -0.09 0.05 0.11 0.11 -0.08 0.07 0.09 1.00             
Compensation Structure 0.03 0.23 -0.23 0.18 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.02 0.28 -0.15 0.15 1.00           
Company Size 0.64 -0.11 0.05 -0.18 0.12 0.25 0.25 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.07 -0.03 1.00         
Loss -0.20 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.16 -0.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.18 1.00       
Industry 0.09 -0.11 0.08 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 0.09 0.14 -0.01 0.12 0.04 1.00     
Growth 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 1.00   





Table 5.2.2                                                                                                                                                                                                          




















































































































































































































Quality-differentiated Auditors 1.00                                 
Managerial Ownership -0.04 1.00                               
Government Ownership 0.00 -0.06 1.00                             
Individual Block-holders -0.17 0.67 -0.09 1.00                           
Principal-principal Conflicts 0.14 0.01 0.01 -0.01 1.00                         
Board Size 0.07 0.04 0.17 -0.13 0.03 1.00                       
Board Meeting 0.17 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.12 1.00                     
CEO Tenure -0.15 0.28 -0.09 0.22 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 1.00                   
Risk Management Committee 0.22 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.19 -0.04 1.00                 
Board Independence 0.10 -0.09 0.15 -0.09 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.02 1.00               
Board Gender 0.09 0.03 -0.14 -0.09 0.05 0.11 0.11 -0.08 0.07 0.09 1.00             
Compensation Structure 0.23 0.23 -0.23 0.18 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.02 0.28 -0.15 0.15 1.00           
Company Size 0.27 -0.11 0.05 -0.18 0.12 0.25 0.25 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.07 -0.03 1.00         
Loss -0.17 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.16 -0.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.18 1.00       
Industry 0.09 -0.11 0.08 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 0.09 0.14 -0.01 0.12 0.04 1.00     
Growth 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 1.00   





Table 5.2.3                                                                                                                                                                                                          




































































































































































































































Monitoring Mechanisms 1.00                                   
Managerial Ownership -0.09 1.00                                 
Government Ownership -0.04 -0.06 1.00                               
Individual Block-holders -0.13 0.67 -0.09 1.00                             
Principal-principal 
Conflicts 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.01 1.00                           
Board Size 0.23 0.04 0.17 -0.13 0.03 1.00                         
Board Meeting 0.32 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.12 1.00                       
CEO Tenure 0.04 0.28 -0.09 0.22 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 1.00                     
Risk Management 
Committee 0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.19 -0.04 1.00                   
Board Independence 0.21 -0.09 0.15 -0.09 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.02 1.00                 
Board Gender 0.16 0.03 -0.14 -0.09 0.05 0.11 0.11 -0.08 0.07 0.09 1.00               
Compensation Structure 0.03 0.23 -0.23 0.18 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.02 0.28 -0.15 0.15 1.00             
Company Size 0.64 -0.11 0.05 -0.18 0.12 0.25 0.25 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.07 -0.03 1.00           
Loss -0.20 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.16 -0.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.18 1.00         
Industry 0.09 -0.11 0.08 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 0.09 0.14 -0.01 0.12 0.04 1.00       
Growth 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 1.00     
Complexity 0.64 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.13 0.21 0.22 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.53 -0.05 0.02 0.01 1.00   
Quality-differentiated 
Auditors 0.30 -0.04 0.00 -0.17 0.14 0.07 0.17 -0.15 0.22 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.27 -0.17 0.09 0.12 0.21 1.00 
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Table 5.2.4 presents the variance inflation factor (VIF).  VIF also confirms low 
multicollinearity as the VIF values for Panels A, B, and C are respectively 1.39, 1.39, 
and 1.42.   The VIF values are less than 5, and the tolerance are all greater than 20 as 
suggested by Hair et al. (2011). 
 
Table 5.2.4                                                                                                         
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
Variable 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
Managerial Ownership 2.08 0.482 2.08 0.482 2.11 0.473 
Government Ownership 2.05 0.488 2.05 0.488 2.13 0.469 
Individual Block-holders 1.69 0.592 1.69 0.592 1.71 0.583 
Principal-principal Conflicts 1.62 0.617 1.62 0.617 1.64 0.610 
Board Size 1.31 0.763 1.31 0.763 1.37 0.732 
Board Meeting 1.23 0.815 1.23 0.815 1.27 0.788 
CEO Tenure 1.20 0.835 1.20 0.835 1.20 0.831 
Risk Management Committee 1.18 0.850 1.18 0.850 1.18 0.848 
Board Independence 1.17 0.857 1.17 0.857 1.18 0.847 
Board Gender 1.16 0.866 1.16 0.866 1.16 0.866 
Compensation Structure 1.14 0.875 1.14 0.875 1.14 0.874 
Company Size 1.14 0.881 1.14 0.881 1.14 0.880 
Loss 1.11 0.902 1.11 0.902 1.12 0.890 
Industry 1.08 0.925 1.08 0.925 1.11 0.900 
Growth 1.07 0.937 1.07 0.937 1.08 0.928 
Complexity 1.04 0.963 1.04 0.963 1.06 0.947 
Quality-differentiated Auditors 
    
1.34 0.744 
Mean VIF 1.33   1.33   1.35   
 
5.2.5 Heteroscedasticity and Reason for using Panel-corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSEs). 
A heteroscedasticity problem has to do with the variations in the estimated slope 
parameters and their significance to determining the validity of the data for a 
research work (Koenker & Bassett Jr., 1982).  It can arise with the presence of 
outliers in a set of data, omission of important variables from the data model, 
skewness in regressor’s distribution in the model and incorrect data transformation 
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(Gujarati, 2004).  The presence of heteroscedasticity in investigation data results in 
biased estimated standard errors, thereby leading to invalid inferences (Breusch & 
Pagan, 1979). Researchers normally assess heteroscedasticity problem using White 
test or Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test for random effects.  
Either Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) or Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) helps to fix the heteroscedasticity problems (Yaffee, 2003; Gujarati, 
2004).  Other tools for correction of heteroscedasticity are Panel-corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSE) (Bailey & Katz, 2011), and fixed effects estimator with robust 
standard errors (Kristensen & Wawro, 2003).  The test of Breusch and Pagan LM 
reveals the presence of heteroscedasticity giving a significant result.  The researcher, 
therefore, chose to analyse the data using PCSE to fix the heteroscedasticity problem. 
 
5.2.6 Autocorrelations 
Autocorrelation refers to an instance whereby the outcomes of two variables relate to 
each other and may render results invalid.  Table 5.2.4 presents the summary of the 
results of the regression for Panel A indicating no autocorrelation among the 
variables in the model. 
 
Table 5.2.5                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Summary of Panel Results 
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) 
Group variable: SN Number of obs = 333 
Time variable: YEAR Number of groups = 111 
Panels: correlated (balanced) Obs per group: min = 3 
Autocorrelation: no autocorrelation avg = 3 
 
max = 3 
Estimated covariances = 6216 R-squared = 0.4179 
Estimated autocorrelations = 0 Wald chi2(8) = 281.32 
Estimated coefficients = 17 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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5.3 Demographic Information of the Respondents 
This section presents the general information about the respondents.  These are the 
designations of the respondents, their working experience, how long they have been 
with their current companies, their sex, and nationality.  The details are as follows: 
 
5.3.1 Respondents’ Position 
The targets for the study encompass the companies’ internal auditors, heads of 
account department and company secretaries.  Table 5.3.1 presents the information in 
respect of the position of the respondents. 
 
Table 5.3.1                                                                                                                 
The Designations of the Respondents 
 Designation Frequency Percent 
Internal Auditor 54 48.6 
Accountant 43 38.7 
Company Secretary 14 12.6 
Total 111 100 
  
 
5.3.2 Respondents’ Years with the Company 
Table 5.3.2 presents the results of the years the respondents had been with the 
companies.  The result indicates that 46.8% of the respondents have been with their 
companies for 1 to 5 years, 36% for 6-10 years, 8.1% each for 11 to 15 years and 16 
to 20 years.  Only 0.9% of the respondents have been working with their companies 




Table 5.3.2                                                                                                              
Years of the Respondents with the Company 
 Years with the Company Frequency Percent 
1-5 years 52 46.8 
6-10 years 40 36 
11-15 years 9 8.1 
16-20 years 9 8.1 
20 years and above 1 0.9 
Total 111 100 
 
5.3.3 Respondents’ Working Experience 
Table 5.3.3 shows the results of the working experience of the respondents.  The 
result shows that the total life working experience of 11.7% of the respondents 
ranges between 1 and 5 years, 6 and 10 years for 39.6%, 11 to 15 years for 25.2%, 
16-20 years for 14.4%.  Only 9% of the respondents have more than twenty years 
total life working experience. 
 
Table 5.3.3                                                                                                                 
The Working Experience of the Respondents 
 Working Experience Frequency Percent 
1-5 years 13 11.7 
6-10 years 44 39.6 
11-15 28 25.2 
16-20 16 14.4 
20 and above 10 9 
Total 111 100 
 
5.3.4 Respondents’ Gender 
Table 5.3.4 presents the information regarding the gender of the respondents. It 





Table 5.3.4                                                                                                                 
The Designations of the Respondents 
 Gender of the Respondents Frequency Percent 
Male 89 80.2 
Female 22 19.8 
Total 111 100 
 
5.3.5 Respondents’ Nationality 
Almost all the respondents are Nigerians with only 2.7% foreigners as shown in table 
5.3.5. 
 
Table 5.3.5                                                                                                                 
The Nationalities of the Respondents 
 Nationality Frequency Percent 
Nigerian 108 97.3 
Others 3 2.7 
Total 111 100 
 
5.4 Results 
The study ran pool, fixed effect, random effect and panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSEs) regressions for the multivariate tests of the hypotheses (Appendix D).  
However, PCSEs was chosen because of its robustness nature (Beck & Katz, 1995).  
PCSEs is characterized by the ability to correct for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation  (Bailey & Katz, 2011).  The PCSEs results show that the data for the 
study is with no autocorrelation problem.  The results using PCSEs regressions for 
Panel A as proposed in paragraph 4.7.1 of chapter four of this study are as follows: 
 
5.4.1 Results of Panel A:  Monitoring Mechanisms and Organizational 
Attributes (C-Path)  
Panel A hypothesized that managerial ownership, and compensation structure, each 
relates negatively to the demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, 
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and external auditing).  It also hypothesized that board size relates significantly to the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing).  It 
further hypothesized that government ownership, individual block ownership, and 
type II agency problem, each relates positively with the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing).  Likewise, it hypothesized 
that each of the following board composition and activities relates positively to the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing) – 
board meetings, CEO tenure, risk management committee, independent directors, 




 of the PCSEs regression for the direct relationship between organizational 
attributes (OAs) and monitoring mechanisms is 41.79%.  It is 30.41, 17.0 and 49.05 
respectively for the relationship between OAs and directorship, internal, and external 
auditing.  The F ratio is significant (p<0.0000) for all the relationship.  The results 
signify that the regression models for the relationship between organizational 
attributes and aggregate monitoring mechanisms as well as directorship, internal, and 
external auditing fit the data.  The results also indicate the existence of a linear 
relationship in each of the models. 
 
Table 5.4.1 presents the results from the PCSEs regression for hypotheses 1 to 3.  
The results of the direct relationship between organizational attributes and 
monitoring mechanisms support hypotheses H1a, H1c, H2a, H2b, H2e, H2f, and H3.  The 
result shows that hypothesis H1b is significant but in the opposite direction.  It also 
reveals that hypotheses H1d, H2c, and H2d are in the right direction.  It also provides 
evidence in support of hypotheses H1ai, H1ci, H2ai, H2bi, H2ci, H2ei, H2fi, and H3i in the 
relationship of organizational attributes and directorship as a monitoring mechanism.  
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It also shows that hypothesis H2di is in the right direction while H1di is in the opposite 
direction.  The result shows that hypothesis H1bi is significant but in the opposite 
direction.  The result is also in support of hypotheses H1dii, H2cii, H2dii, H2eii, H2fii, and 
H3ii.  It also reveals that hypothesis H2aii and H2bii are in the right direction.  The result 
shows that hypotheses H1aii H1bii H1cii are significant but in the opposite direction.  
Likewise, it supports hypotheses H1aiii, H1ciii, H1diii, H2biii, and H3iii.  It also shows that 
H2aiii and H2eiii are in the right direction.  Hypotheses H1biii, H2ciii, and H2fiii are 
significant but in the opposite direction. 
 
The study used beta coefficients for the relative importance of the independent 
variables in the equations.  Evaluation by beta helps to identify the contributions of 
each independent variable to the prediction of the dependent variable (monitoring 
mechanisms) in the model.  The strength of the contribution of a variable reflects the 
size of its contribution when the study controls for all the variables in the model.  
The results specify that the board gender has the highest contribution to the: 1) 
monitoring mechanisms with a beta of N55.751m (41.04%); 2) directorship with a 
beta of N60.511m (44.54%); 3) internal auditing with a beta of N12.665m (9.32%).  
However, board meeting contributes the highest to the external auditing with a beta 
of N2.424m (4.86%).  Furthermore, control variable, complexity contributes the 





Table 5.4.1                                                                                                            
PCSEs Regressing Monitoring Mechanisms (MM), and each of its dimensions, 
Directorship (NEDIR), Internal Auditing (IA) and External Auditing (EA) as well as 








Managerial Ownership -0.761*** -0.693*** 0.200*** -0.269*** 
 
(0.207) (0.183) (0.029) (0.025) 
Government Ownership -2.324*** -1.237*** -0.530*** -0.556*** 
 
(0.375) (0.166) (0.080) (0.219) 
Individual Block-holders 0.426*** 0.404*** -0.089*** 0.112*** 
 
(0.147) (0.135) (0.014) (0.017) 
Principal-principal 
Conflicts 
1.197 -1.535 0.611** 2.120* 
(1.838) (1.504) (0.270) (1.473) 
Board Size 1.100** 1.002*** -0.185 0.284 
 
(0.485) (0.325) (0.148) (0.203) 
Board Meetings 11.156** 8.357*** 0.375 2.424*** 
 
(4.579) (3.413) (0.486) (0.993) 
CEO Tenure 0.047 0.278* 0.182*** -0.412*** 
 
(0.185) (0.204) (0.070) (0.065) 
Risk Management 
Committee 3.734 0.699 3.861*** -0.826 
 
(3.082) (2.944) (0.654) (-0.765) 
Board Independence 39.568*** 33.688*** 5.522*** 0.360 
 
(9.072) (6.957) (2.096) (1.633) 
Board Gender 55.751*** 60.511*** 12.665*** -17.428*** 
 
(19.400) (14.837) (2.272) (5.366) 
Compensation Structure -11.386*** -4.936* -1.687*** -4.763*** 
 
(4.558) (3.391) (0.478) (1.682) 
Company Size 14.447*** 6.837*** 0.690** 6.920*** 
 
(1.821) (0.784) (0.353) (0.831) 
Loss -15.828*** -8.994*** -5.627*** -1.207* 
 
(3.679) (2.272) (1.286) (0.675) 
Industry 16.037*** 6.413*** 3.027*** 6.596*** 
 
(3.649) (2.411) (0.326) (1.289) 
Growth -2.557*** -1.772*** -0.281** -0.504*** 
 
(0.386) (0.283) (0.121) (0.158) 
Complexity 25.241*** 16.618*** -0.214 8.837*** 
 
(3.296) (2.299) (0.288) (1.928) 
Constant -375.142*** -213.122*** -2.489 -159.546*** 
 
(40.031) (15.574) (8.379) (18.578) 
     R-squared 0.418 0.304 0.170 0.491 
Note: *** significant at 1% level;     ** significant at 5% level;    * significant at 10% level 




5.4.1.1 Organizational Attributes and Monitoring Mechanisms 
Table 5.4.2 presents the details about aggregate monitoring mechanisms.  The test 
variables, Managerial Ownership (β=0.761, z=3.68), Individual block-holders 
(β=0.426, z=2.9), Board Size (β=1.100, z=2.27), Board Meetings (β=11.156, 
z=2.44), Board Independence (β=39.568, z=4.36), Board Gender (β=55.751, z=2.87), 
and  Compensation Structure (β=11.386, z=2.5) are significant in the right direction 
for the relationship.   Government Ownership (β=2.324, z=6.2) is significant but in 
the opposite direction.  Principal-principal conflicts (β=1.197, z=0.65), CEO tenure 
(β=0.047, z=0.26), and Risk Management Committee (β=3.734, z=1.21) are also in 
the right direction. 
 
Control variables, company size (β=14.447, z=7.93), industry (β=16.037, z=4.39), 
and complexity (β=25.241, z=7.66) have positive significant impacts, while loss 
(β=15.828 z=4.30), growth (β=2.557, z=6.62) have negative significant impacts on 
the construct, monitoring mechanisms.  Complexity contributes highest among 
control variables with a beta value of N25.241m (18.5%).  The findings on company 
size, loss, industry, growth, and complexity are consistent with agency theory and the 
results of Mustapha (2009), Swastika (2013), Alzharani et al. (2011) and Adeyemi 
and Fagbemi (2010).   
 
Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest that the independent variables must affect the 
dependent variables to establish mediation effect of a mediator.  Organizational 
attributes, managerial ownership, government ownership, individual block-holders, 
board size, board meeting, board independence, board gender, and compensation 
structure meet this condition.  Likewise, control variables – company size, loss, 
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industry, growth and complexity also meet the condition.  Hence, the results suggest 
possible mediation on the relationship between the organizational attributes and 
aggregate monitoring mechanisms.   
 
Table 5.4.2                                                                                                            
PCSEs Regression of Direct Relationship between the construct, Monitoring 
Mechanisms and Organizational Attributes (Independent and Control Variables) 
Monitoring Mechanisms Prediction Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Remark 
 
 
     
Managerial Ownership  -  -0.761 0.207 -3.68 0.000 Supported 
Government Ownership 
 +  
-2.324 0.375 -6.20 0.000 
Not 
Supported 
Individual Block-holders + 0.426 0.147 2.90 0.002 Supported 
Principal-principal Conflicts 
+ 
1.197 1.838 0.65 0.258 
Not 
Significant 
Board Size ± 1.100 0.485 2.27 0.023 Supported 
Board Meeting + 11.156 4.579 2.44 0.008 Supported 
CEO Tenure 
+ 
0.047 0.185 0.26 0.399 
Not 
Significant 
Risk Management Committee 
+ 
3.734 3.082 1.21 0.113 
Not 
Significant 
Board Independence + 39.568 9.072 4.36 0.000 Supported 
Board Gender + 55.751 19.400 2.87 0.002 Supported 
Compensation Structure - -11.386 4.558 -2.50 0.006 Supported 
Company Size 
 




















-375.142 40.031 -9.37 0.000 
 
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
 
5.4.1.2 Organizational Attributes and Directorship as a Monitoring Mechanism 
Table 5.4.3 presents the results from PCSEs regression for the relationship between 
organizational attributes and directorship as a monitoring mechanism.  The test 
variables, Individual Block-holders (β=0.404, z=2.98), Board Size (β=1.002, 
z=3.08), Board Meeting (β=8.357, z=2.45), CEO Tenure (β=0.278, z=1.37), Board 
Independence (β=33.688, z=4.84), and Board Gender (β=60.511, z=4.08) have 
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positive significant impacts; Managerial Ownership (β=0.693, z=3.79) and 
Compensation Structure (β=4.936, z=1.46) have negative significant impacts on 
directorship all in the right direction.   Government Ownership (β=1.237, z=7.45) is 
significant but in the opposite direction.  Risk Management Committee (β=0.699, 
z=0.24) is also in the right direction.  However, CEO tenure and Compensation 
Structure become significant with a two-tails test giving a p-value of 0.086 and 0.073 
respectively. 
 
Control variables, company size (β=6.837, z=8.72), industry (β=6.413, z=2.66), and 
complexity (β=16.618, z=7.23) have significant positive impacts on directorship.  
Loss (β=8.994, z=3.96) and growth (β=1.772, z=6.25) are with negative significance 
in their relationship with directorship.  Complexity contributes the highest among 
control variables with a beta value of N16.6m (12.23%).  The findings on company 
size, industry, and complexity are consistent with agency theory and the results of  
Mustapha (2009), Swastika (2013), Alzharani et al. (2011) and Adeyemi and 
Fagbemi (2010).   
 
Organizational attributes, managerial ownership, government ownership, individual 
block-holders, board size, board meetings, CEO tenure, board independence, board 
gender, and compensation structure meet the first condition of Baron and Kenny 
(1986).  Likewise, control variables – company size, loss, industry, growth and 
complexity meet the condition. Hence, the results suggest possible mediation on the 





Table 5.4.3                                                                                                            
PCSEs Regression of direct Relationship between Directorship (a dimension of 
construct monitoring mechanisms) and Organizational Attributes. 
Directorship Prediction Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Remark 
 
 
     
Managerial Ownership  -  -0.693 0.183 -3.79 0.000 Supported 
Government Ownership 
 +  
-1.237 0.166 -7.45 0.000 
Not 
Supported 
Individual Block-holders + 0.404 0.135 2.98 0.002 Supported 
Principal-principal Conflicts 
+ 
-1.535 1.504 -1.02 0.154 
Not 
Significant 
Board Size ± 1.002 0.325 3.08 0.002 Supported 
Board Meetings + 8.357 3.413 2.45 0.007 Supported 
CEO Tenure + 0.278 0.204 1.37 0.086 Supported 
Risk Management 
Committee + 
0.699 2.944 0.24 0.406 
Not 
Significant 
Board Independence + 33.688 6.957 4.84 0.000 Supported 
Board Gender + 60.511 14.837 4.08 0.000 Supported 
Compensation Structure - -4.936 3.391 -1.46 0.073 Supported 
Company Size 
 




















-213.122 15.574 -13.68 0.000 
 
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
 
5.4.1.3 Organizational Attributes and Internal Auditing as a Monitoring 
Mechanism 
Table 5.4.4 presents the results from PCSEs regression for the relationship between 
organizational attributes and internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism.  The test 
variables, Principal-principal Conflicts (β=0.611, z=2.26), CEO Tenure (β=0.182, 
z=2.59), Risk Management Committee (β=3.861, z=5.91), Board Independence 
(β=5.522, z=2.63), Board Gender (β=12.665, z=5.57), and Compensation Structure 
(β=1.687, z=3.53) are significant in the right direction for the relationship between 
organizational attributes and the construct’s dimension, internal auditing.  
Managerial Ownership (β=0.200, z=6.79), Government Ownership (β=0.530, 
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z=6.59), and Individual block-holders (β=0.089, z=6.44), are significant but in the 
opposite direction.  Board Size (β=0.185, z=1.25) and Board Meeting (β=0.375, 
z=0.77), are also in the right direction. 
 
Control variables, company size (β=0.690, z=1.96), and industry (β=3.027, z=9.27) 
have significant positive impact on the construct's dimension, internal auditing.  Loss 
(β=5.627, z=4.38), growth (β=0.281, z=2.33), and complexity (β=0.214, z=0.74) are 
with negative significance in the relationship with internal auditing.  Industry 
contributes the highest among control variables with a beta value of N3m.  The 
findings on company size and industry are consistent with agency theory and the 
results of  Mustapha (2009), Swastika (2013), Alzharani et al. (2011) and Adeyemi 
and Fagbemi (2010).   
 
Organizational attributes, managerial ownership, government ownership, individual 
block-holders, principal-principal conflicts, CEO tenure, risk management 
committee, board independence, board gender, and compensation structure meet the 
first condition of Baron and Kenny (1986).  Likewise, control variables – company 
size, loss, industry, and growth meet the condition.  Hence, the results suggest 
possible mediation on the relationship between the organizational attributes and 





Table 5.4.4                                                                                                            
PCSEs Regression of Direct Relationship between Internal Auditing (a dimension of 
construct monitoring mechanisms) and Organizational Attributes  
Internal Auditing Prediction Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Remark 
Managerial Ownership  -  0.200 0.029 6.79 0.000 
Not 
Supported 
Government Ownership  +  -0.530 0.080 -6.59 0.000 
Not 
Supported 
Individual Block-holders + -0.089 0.014 -6.44 0.000 
Not 
Supported 
Principal-principal Conflicts + 0.611 0.270 2.26 0.012 Supported 
Board Size ± -0.185 0.148 -1.25 0.210 
Not 
Significant 
Board Meetings + 0.375 0.486 0.77 0.220 
Not 
Significant 
CEO Tenure + 0.182 0.070 2.59 0.005 Supported 
Risk Management Committee + 3.861 0.654 5.91 0.000 Supported 
Board Independence + 5.522 2.096 2.63 0.004 Supported 
Board Gender + 12.665 2.272 5.57 0.000 Supported 
Compensation Structure - -1.687 0.478 -3.53 0.000 Supported 
Company Size 
 
0.690 0.353 1.96 0.026  
Loss 
 
-5.627 1.286 -4.38 0.000  
Industry 
 
3.027 0.326 9.27 0.000  
Growth 
 
-0.281 0.121 -2.33 0.010  
Complexity 
 
-0.214 0.288 -0.74 0.229  
_cons 
 
2.488 8.379 0.30 0.388  
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
 
5.4.1.4 Organizational Attributes and External Auditing as a Monitoring 
Mechanism 
Table 5.4.5 presents the results from PCSEs regression for the relationship between 
organizational attributes and external auditing.  The test variables, Managerial 
Ownership (β=0.269, z=10.63), Individual block-holders (β=0.112, z=6.7), Principal-
principal Conflicts (β=2.120, z=1.44), Board Meeting (β=2.424, z=2.44), and 
Compensation Structure (β=4.763, z=2.83) are significant in the right direction for 
the relationship between organizational attributes and the construct’s dimension, 
external auditing.  Government Ownership (β=0.556, z=2.54), CEO tenure (β=0.412, 
z=6.35), and Board Gender (β=17.428, z=3.25) are significant but in the opposite 
direction.  Board Size (β=0.284, z=1.40) and Board independence (β=0.360, z=0.22) 
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are in the right direction but with no statistical relevance.  Principal-principal 
Conflicts become significant with a two-tails test giving a p-value of 0.075 
 
Control variables, company size (β=6.920, z=8.32), industry (β=6.596, z=5.12), and 
complexity (β=8.837, z=4.58) have significant positive impact on the construct's 
dimension, external auditing.  Loss (β=1.207, z=1.79) and growth (β=0.504, z=3.19) 
are with negative significance in the relationship with external auditing.  Complexity 
contributes highest among control variables with a beta value of N8.8m.  The 
findings on company size, industry, and complexity are consistent with agency 
theory and the results of  Mustapha (2009), Swastika (2013), Alzharani et al. (2011) 
and Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010).   
 
Organizational attributes, managerial ownership, government ownership, individual 
block-holders, principal-principal conflicts, board meetings, CEO tenure, board 
gender, and compensation structure meet the first condition of Baron and Kenny 
(1986).  Likewise, control variables – company size, loss, industry, growth, and 
complexity meet the condition that independent variables must affect the dependent 
variables.  Hence, the results suggest the likelihood of mediation in the relationship 






Table 5.4.5                                                                                                            
PCSEs Regression of Direct Relationship between External Auditing (a dimension of 
construct monitoring mechanisms) and Organizational Attributes  
External Auditing Prediction Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Remark 
      
 
Managerial Ownership - -0.269 0.025 -10.63 0.000 Supported 
Government Ownership + -0.556 0.219 -2.54 0.006 
Not 
Supported 
Individual Block-holders + 0.112 0.017 6.70 0.000 Supported 
Principal-principal Conflicts + 2.120 1.473 1.44 0.075 Supported 
Board Size ± 0.284 0.203 1.40 0.162 
Not 
Significant 
Board Meetings + 2.424 0.993 2.44 0.008 Supported 
CEO Tenure + -0.412 0.065 -6.35 0.000 
Not 
Supported 
Risk Management Committee + -0.826 0.765 -1.08 0.140 
Not 
Significant 
Board Independence + 0.360 1.633 0.22 0.413 
Not 
Significant 
Board Gender + -17.428 5.366 -3.25 0.001 
Not 
Supported 
Compensation Structure - -4.763 1.682 -2.83 0.003 Supported 
Company Size 
 
6.920 0.831 8.32 0.000  
Loss 
 
-1.207 0.675 -1.79 0.037  
Industry 
 
6.596 1.289 5.12 0.000  
Growth 
 
-0.504 0.158 -3.19 0.001  
Complexity 
 
8.837 1.928 4.58 0.000  
_cons 
 
-159.546 18.578 -8.59 0.000  
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
 
It is worthy to note that the issue of significance may not affect the possibility of 
mediation in any of the above relationship.  The expectation by the studies of Baron 
and Kenny (1986) is that the direct relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables should be significant to establish mediation.  However, there 
have been studies thereafter, suggesting that significant relationship between 
independent and dependent variables may not be necessary to establish a mediation 
effect on the relationship between two variables (Zhao et al., 2010; Hayes, 2009).  
Hence, even though this study fails to establish an association between some of the 
organizational attributes and dependent variable construct, monitoring mechanisms 
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(MM) or any of its dimensions, directorship (NEDIR), internal auditing (IA) and 
external auditing (EA), mediation by quality-differentiated auditors may still exist.  
The basis for this is the extant literature in which such variables had tested 
significant.  Also, some of them tested significant with univariate regression analysis 
detailed in section 5.5.2.  The affected organizational attributes in the relationship 
with MM, in this case, are: independent variables, 1) principal-principal conflicts 
(PPC). 2) CEO tenure (CEOT). 3) risk management committee (RMC).  The affected 
variables in the relationship with NEDIR are PPC and RMC.  Those affected in the 
relationship with IA are board size (BS), and board meeting.  The affected variables 
in the relationship with the external auditing are BS, RMC, and BI. 
 
Except for the relationship between complexity and internal auditing, no control 
variable fall into this category in relationship with the dependent variable construct, 
monitoring mechanisms and construct's dimensions, directorship and external 
auditing.  All control variables except complexity <- internal auditing are significant 
in the four models in Panel A. 
 
All variables were therefore tested for mediation following Zhao et al. (2010) and 
Hayes, (2009), because of evidence of significant relationship with the construct 
and/or construct’s dimensions in extant literature and further tests carried out by this 
study. 
 
 5.4.2 Results of Panel B: Quality-differentiated Auditors and Organizational 
Attributes (A-Path) 
Panel B hypothesized that organizational attributes (ownership structure – 
government, individual shareholders and Principal-principal Conflicts), the board of 
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directors’ composition and activities (board size, board meeting, CEO tenure, risk 
management committee, board independence, board gender), and compensation 
structure significantly affect quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) positively.  Only 
managerial ownership is expected to significantly and negatively affects QDAs.  It 
also controls for the effects of company size, loss, industry, growth, and complexity 
on QDAs. 
 
Table 5.4.6, presents the results of the logistic regression of quality-differentiated 
auditors (QDA) as a dependent variable on organizational attributes (OAs).  The 
study uses logistic regression for the relationship between OAs and QDA because 
QDA is dichotomous and it is the dependent variable in these relationship.  It reports 
the logistic regression for hypotheses 41a to 43.  The results support hypotheses 41d, 
42a, 42d, 42e and 43.  The relationship of QDA and organizational attributes 
[managerial ownership (MO – β=3.5%, z=1.65), principal-principal conflicts (PPC – 
β=57.9%, z=2.0), Risk Management Committee (RMC – β-65.9%, z=2.14), board 
independence (BI – β=87.4%, z=1.42, p=0.078 and compensation structure (CS – 
β=115.6%, z=3.31)] are positively significant to QDA.  Organizational attributes, 
individual block-holders (IB – β=2.9%, z=2.19), board size (BS – β=21.1%, z=2.68), 
and CEO tenure (CEOT – β=7.2%, z=2.48) are negatively significant to QDA.  
Control variable, company size (β=69.9%, z=5.43)) also has a significant positive 
relationship with quality-differentiated auditors (QDA).  The results are consistent 
with the second condition expected following (Baron & Kenny, 1986) that 
independent variables must affect the mediator.  The log likelihood of the logistic 
regression is -160.07628 and the F ratio is significant (p<0.0000).  Therefore, the 
results suggest a likelihood of mediating effects of QDA on the relationship between 
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organizational attributes (MO, PPC, RMC, BI, CS, IB, BS, CEOT, and Cz) and 
dependent variable construct, monitoring mechanisms as well as construct’s 
dimensions (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
 
The results from beta coefficients specify that compensation structure contributes the 
highest to the quality-differentiated auditors (QDA).  Board independence is next to 
it, followed by risk management committee and principal-principal conflict.  
Company size is the only control variable that has a significant relationship with 
QDA.  It contributes highest among variables that have significant relationship with 
QDA with a beta value of 69.9%. 
 
Table 5.4.6                                                                                                           
Logistic regression of direct relationship between organizational attributes and 
quality-differentiated auditors 
 
Quality-differentiated Auditors Prediction Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Remark 
Managerial Ownership - 0.035 0.021 1.65 0.050 Not Supported 
Government Ownership + 0.002 0.048 0.03 0.488 
Not 
Significant 
Individual Block-holders + -0.029 0.013 -2.19 0.015 Not Supported 
Principal-principal Conflicts + 0.579 0.29 2.00 0.023 Supported 
Board Size + -0.211 0.079 -2.68 0.007 Not Supported 
Board Meetings + 0.057 0.137 0.41 0.340 
Not 
Significant 
CEO Tenure + -0.072 0.029 -2.48 0.007 Not Supported 
Risk Management Committee + 0.659 0.308 2.14 0.016 Supported 
Board Independence + 0.874 0.617 1.42 0.078 Supported 
Board Gender + -1.324 1.6 -0.83 0.204 
Not 
Significant 
Compensation Structure + 1.156 0.35 3.31 0.001 Supported 
Company Size 
 
















0.242 0.198 1.22 0.111 
 
_cons   -0.463 0.995 -0.47 0.321   




5.4.3 Results of Panel C – Organizational Attributes, Quality-differentiated 
Auditors, and Monitoring Mechanisms  
The study used Stata binary-mediation analysis (Ender, n.d) to test for the indirect 
effects for the model using standardized coefficients.  Furthermore, the study used 
bootstrap standard errors and confidence intervals as recommended by Ender (n.d) 
because a binary-mediation analysis does not provide statistical tests for coefficients.   
Hayes and Preacher (2014) claims that bootstrap makes statistical inference about 
indirect effects.  The study claims that bootstrap does not assume normality of 
sampling distribution, performs well in several simulation studies and its 
implementation is very easy using codes from the online supplement.  The study, 
therefore, used bootstrapping (500 replications) to produce bias corrected confidence 
intervals (CI).   
 
5.4.3.1 B-Path and Total Effect Using Binary-mediation Analysis and Bootstrap 
Panel C hypothesized that quality-differentiated auditors mediate between the 
organizational attributes, [ownership structure (managerial, government, individual 
shareholders and Principal-principal Conflicts); board of directors’ composition and 
activities (board size, board meeting, CEO tenure, risk management committee, 
board independence, board gender); and compensation structure] and the dependent 
variable, monitoring mechanisms (MM) and its dimensions, directorship, internal, 
and external auditing.  It, therefore, regresses monitoring mechanisms on the 
predictors, organizational attributes (OAs) and quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) 
using binary-mediation analysis because QDA is a categorical mediator.  It also 
regresses the dimensions of MM, directorship, internal auditing, and external 
auditing on the independent variables, OAs and mediating variable, QDA.  Table 
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5.4.7 presents the results of the regressions using binary-mediation analysis, with 
MM, NEDIR, IA and EA as dependent variables. 
 
Column 3, Table 5.4.7 reveals that quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) consistently 
demonstrate a positive significant relationship with aggregate monitoring 
mechanisms (MM) for all organizational attributes (OAs).  The result suggests QDA 
as a possible mediator between OAs and MM.  QDA’s status remains the same for 
internal auditing (IA) and external auditing (EA) in Model B, columns 3 and 5.  
Likewise, QDA consistently demonstrates a positive significant relationship with 
directorship on Model A, column 5, except in the relationship between Cz and 
directorship.  Following Baron & Kenny (1986) that the mediator must affect the 
dependent variables, the mediating variable, QDA affects the dependent variable, 





Table 5.4.7                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Binary-mediation Analysis on the Mediation Effect of Quality-differentiated Auditor 
on the relationship between Organizational Attributes and Total Monitoring 













    
Managerial Ownership -0.642* 45.678*** -0.365 23.313*** 
 
(0.447) (8.014) (0.330) (5.920) 
Government Ownership -1.089 46.124*** -0.767 23.570*** 
 
(1.376) (8.026) (1.015) (5.922) 
Individual Block-holders -0.392* 43.944*** -0.139 22.788*** 
 
(0.254) (8.126) (0.188) (6.012) 
Principal-principal Conflicts 1.717 45.577*** -1.010 23.856*** 
 
(3.638) (8.106) (2.685) (5.982) 
Board Size 7.771*** 43.735*** 4.659*** 22.134*** 
 
(1.873) (7.852) (1.394) (5.845) 
 
Board Meetings 18.198*** 38.875*** 12.728*** 18.499*** 
 
(3.376) (7.817) (2.502) (5.793) 
CEO Tenure 1.314** 48.128*** 1.009** 25.111*** 
 
(0.788) (8.092) (0.581) (5.968) 
Risk Management Committee 4.929 45.047*** 3.057 22.899*** 
 
(8.430) (8.228) (6.221) (6.072) 
Board Independence 59.144*** 43.364*** 43.865*** 21.524*** 
 
(17.101) (7.931) (12.615) (5.851) 
Board Gender 106.963* 44.196*** 85.553*** 22.030*** 
 
(41.220) (7.986) (30.359) (5.882 
Compensation Structure -6.966 47.594*** -1.227 2.38e+07*** 
 
(8.734) (8.242) (6.450) -6086952 
Company Size 21.595*** 11.218* 12.120*** 3.975 
 
(2.307) (8.055) (1.795) (6.267) 
Loss -26.836*** 42.041*** -15.8083** 21.161*** 
 
(9.112) (8.049) (6.755) (5.967) 
Industry 15.802 45.200*** 5.061 23.263*** 
 
(12.349) (8.044) (9.130) (5.947) 
Growth -0.405 46.309*** -0.353 23.736*** 
 
(1.846) (8.091) (1.362) (5.970) 
Complexity (Subsidiaries) 35.490*** 33.712*** 22.777*** 15.602*** 
 






























    
Managerial Ownership 
0.090 4.189*** -0.367** 18.178*** 
(0.072) (1.284) (0.144) (2.583) 
Government Ownership 
-0.384** 4.140*** 0.061 18.416*** 
(0.220) (1.281) (0.447) (2.607) 
Individual Block-holders 
-0.028 3.978*** -0.226*** 17.178*** 
(0.041) (1.305) (0.082) (2.617) 
Principal-principal Conflicts 
0.617 3.943*** 2.110** 17.778*** 
(0.582) (1.296) (1.175) (2.619) 
Board Size 
0.422 4.002*** 2.690*** 17.599*** 
(0.307) (1.286) (0.606) (2.539) 
Board Meeting 
0.834* 3.799*** 4.636*** 16.577*** 
(0.562) (1.302) (1.114) (2.579) 
CEO Tenure 
0.248* 4.513*** 0.057 18.505*** 
(0.126) (1.294) (0.257) (2.637) 
Risk Management Committee 
2.980** 3.495*** -1.108 18.653*** 
(1.341) (1.309) (2.736) (2.671) 
 
Board Independence 
5.278** 3.886*** 10.004** 17.955*** 
(2.773) (1.286) (5.622) (2.608) 
Board Gender 
19.216***  3.789*** 2.191 18.378*** 
(6.584) (1.276) (13.512) (2.618) 
Compensation Structure 
-0.183 4.170*** -5.557* 19.611*** 
(1.400) (1.321) (2.821) (2.662) 
Company Size 
1.197*** 2.197* 8.278*** 5.047** 
(0.410) (1.433) (0.708) (2.473) 
Loss 
-5.509*** 3.298** -5.519** 17.583*** 
(1.447) (1.278) (2.980) (2.632) 
Industry 
2.845* 3.969*** 7.896** 17.969*** 
(1.976) (1.287) (3.994) (2.601) 
Growth 
-0.018 4.140*** -0.034 18.435*** 
(0.296) (1.296) (0.599) (2.626) 
Complexity (Subsidiaries) 
0.595 3.923*** 12.118*** 14.188*** 
0(.773) (1.313) (1.419) (2.411) 
Note:     *** significant at 1% level;         ** significant at 5% level;        * significant at 10% level 
n=333;  SN=111 
 
Table 5.4.8 presents the result of the total effect and proportion mediated for each 
variable in the relationship with the construct, monitoring mechanisms and each of 
its dimensions (directorship, internal, and external auditing).  It shows the proportion 
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of total effects mediated for the relationship between organizational attributes and 
total monitoring mechanisms, directorship, internal auditing, and external auditing. 
  
The mediating effects are above 80% in the relationship between CEO tenure 
(CEOT) and monitoring mechanisms (MM); compensation structure (CS) and MM 
respectively by 1519% and 227% as well as the control variable, growth (GR) and 
MM by 120%.  Following Hair Jr et al. (2014), the result suggests that CEOT, CS, 
and GR are with full mediation in their relationship with MM.  The following are 
with partial mediation having variance accounted for (VAF) above 20% but below 
80% , individual block-holders (IB), principal-principal conflicts (PPC), risk 
management committee (RMC) respectively with VAF of 40%, 77.9%, and 70%.The 
VAF for others are within the range of 4% and 18% and following Hair Jr et al. 
(2014) are with no mediation.  Hence, the result of binary-mediation analysis for the 
relationship of the following independent variables with MM are with practical 
relevance but lack statistical relevance: (1) managerial ownership (MO – 14%), (2) 
government ownership (GO – 4%), (3) board size (BS – 10%), (4) board meetings 
(BM – 16%), and (5) board independence (BI – 15%).  In the relationship between 
independent variables and directorship (NEDIR): PPC (147%) and CS (125%) are 
with full mediation.  IB (50%), CEOT (69%), RMC (66%) are partially mediated.  
Others are with no mediation as their VAF are within the range of 3% and 12%.  
Likewise, the relationship between CS and internal auditing (120%) is fully 
mediated.  Those partially mediated in relationship with the internal auditing are IB 
(46%), PPC (46%), BM (29%), CEOT (43%), and RMC (23%).  It produces similar 
results in the relationship between the following independent variables and external 
auditing (EA): full mediation for CEOT (123%), RMC (131%), BG (82%), and CS 
(1198%).  Those with partial mediation are GO (20%), IB (31%), PPC (53%), BM 
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(24%), BI (30%).  Others are with no mediation with VAF within the range of 9% 
and 14% all below 20%. 
 
Table 5.4.8                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Proportion of Total Effect Mediated using Binary-Mediation Analysis 
Proportion of Total Effect Mediated (Variance Accounted For -VAF) 
Model A 
Variables 
Monitoring Mechanisms Directorship 
Total Effect 
Proportion 
mediated Total Effect 
Proportion 
mediated 
Managerial Ownership -0.087 0.137 -0.068 0.125 
Government Ownership -0.040 -0.036 -0.040 -0.026 
Individual Block-holders -0.137 0.403 -0.080 0.497 
Principal-principal 
Conflicts 0.113 0.779 0.043 1.470 
Board Size 0.236 0.099 0.194 0.085 
Board Meetings 0.327 0.158 0.302 0.113 
CEO Tenure 0.035 -1.519 0.056 -0.693 
Risk Management 
Committee 0.104 0.699 0.079 0.655 
Board Independence 0.211 0.151 0.207 0.107 
Board Gender 0.166 0.182 0.171 0.122 
Compensation Structure 0.034 2.271 0.043 1.245 
Company Size 0.533 0.076 0.404 0.050 
Loss -0.206 0.249 -0.162 0.220 
Industry 0.095 0.295 0.050 0.402 
Growth 0.057 1.203 0.035 1.402 




Internal Auditing External Auditing 
Total Effect 
Proportion 
mediated Total Effect 
Proportion 
mediated 
Managerial Ownership 0.061 -0.116 -0.144 0.100 
Government Ownership -0.093 -0.009 0.009 0.200 
Individual Block-holders -0.0694 0.464 -0.207 0.314 
Principal-principal 
Conflicts 0.107 0.459 0.196 0.527 
Board Size 0.088 0.156 0.250 0.113 
Board Meeting 0.114 0.286 0.278 0.239 
CEO Tenure 0.075 -0.428 0.050 1.228 
Risk Management 
Committee 0.159 0.229 0.070 1.306 
Board Independence 0.122 0.152 0.131 0.304 
Board Gender 0.174 0.096 0.046 0.819 
Compensation Structure 0.036 1.202 -0.008 -11.977 
Company Size 0.227 0.226 0.624 0.088 
Loss -0.231 0.112 -0.160 0.402 
Industry 0.094 0.170 0.135 0.250 
Growth 0.036 1.090 0.080 1.037 
Complexity 0.082 0.479 0.471 0.140 




The last condition required to conclude a mediation effect following Baron and 
Kenny (1986) is that the effect of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable (c’) must be insignificant and/or less than the effect in the direct relationship 
with no consideration for mediation (c).  Table 5.4.9 presents the results of the 
regression of the total monitoring mechanisms (MM) and its individual dimensions 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing) on the organizational attributes 
(independent and control variables) with (c’ path) and without consideration for 
mediation (c path). 
 
The results on Model A of Table 5.4.9, regressing the aggregate monitoring 
mechanisms (MM) on the organizational attributes (OAs) reveals that the c’ for the 
following OAs are significant 1) managerial ownership (MO), 2) individual block-
holders (IB), 3) board size (BS), 4) board meeting (BM), 5) CEO tenure (CEOT), 6) 
board independence (BI), and 7) board gender (BG).  
2
The implication of this 
following Baron and Kenny (1986) is that quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) 
cannot mediate between the relationship of OAs (MO, IB, BS, BM, CEOT, BI, and 
BG) and MM despite satisfying the first three conditions. QDA’s mediation is partial 
in the relationship between the following OAs and MM - government ownership, 
principal-principal conflicts, risk management committee, and compensation 
structure.  Also, it shows that QDA has partial mediation effect on the following 
control variables in relation with MM - industry and growth. 
 
Model B of Table 5.4.9 presents the results on regressing the monitoring 
mechanisms' dimension, directorship (NEDIR) on the organizational attributes 
                                                 
2
 However, this does not hold any longer following Hair Jr et al. (2014), Zhao et al. (2010) Preacher 
and Hayes (2008), and Hayes and Preacher (2014).   
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(OAs).  The results reveal that quality-differentiated auditors can fully mediate 
between OAs (managerial ownership, individual block-holders, and risk management 
committee) and the total monitoring mechanisms (MM).  The mediation is partial in 
the relationship with OAs (government ownership, principal-principal conflicts, and 
compensation structure) and NEDIR.  It has no mediating effect on others as their c' 
are significant. 
 
Model C of Table 5.4.9 presents the results on regressing the aggregate monitoring 
mechanisms’ dimension, internal auditing (IA) on the organizational attributes 
(OAs).  It reveals full mediation of quality-differentiated auditors for the relationship 
between OAs (managerial ownership and individual-block-holders) and IA.  It 
illustrates partial mediation in the relationship of principal-principal conflicts, board 
size and compensation structure with IA.  Others are with no mediation due to 
significant c’. 
 
Model D of Table 5.4.9 presents the results on regressing the aggregate monitoring 
mechanisms’ dimension, external auditing (EA) on the organizational attributes 
(OAs).  It reveals full mediation of quality-differentiated auditors in the relationship 
between CEO tenure and EA.  It shows partial mediation in the relationship of EA 
with government ownership, risk management committee and board gender.  Others 
are with no mediation because they are with no statistical relevance of c’. 
 
This study follows Zhao et al. (2010) and Hayes and Preacher (2014) to determine 
the mediation typology for this investigation considering the fact that c-c’ (Baron and 
Kenny) method in most situations suffers low statistical power (MacKinnon, 
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Lockwood, Hoffman, West & Sheets, 2002).  The significance of the mediation is 
further confirmed by binary-mediation bootstrap as it conducts inferential tests that 
are not affected by the shape of the sampling distribution (Preacher, Rucker, & 
Hayes, 2007; Hayes & Preacher, 2014).  The study bootstrapped to determine the 
significance of the indirect, total indirect, direct effect and total effect and draws the 
conclusion of the findings.   No bootstrap for any of the variables is with zero in the 
interval for indirect effect.  Tables 5.4.10, 5.4.12, 5.4.14, and 5.4.16 present details of 
the direct effect, indirect effect, and proportion of the total effect that quality-
differentiated auditors mediate, while Tables 5.4.11, 5.4.13, 5.4.15 and 5.4.17 present 
the details of the bootstrap analyses for each tested variable.  
 
Table 5.4.9                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Direct Relationship between Independent Variables and Dependent Variable with 
each of its dimensions with and without Mediating Variable, quality-differentiated 
auditors (QDA) [Dependent Variable, Total Monitoring Mechanisms and its 
dimension, Directorship, Internal External Auditing]using Binary-mediation 
Analysis (c and c’ paths) 
Variables Monitoring Mechanisms Difference Mediation 
Model A C c'     
Managerial Ownership -0.735* -0.642* -0.093 NA 
Government Ownership -1.056 -1.089 0.033 Partial 
Individual Block-holders -0.628*** -0.392* -0.236 NA 
Principal-principal Conflicts 4.497 1.717 2.780 Partial 
Board Size 8.527*** 7.771*** 0.756 NA 
Board Meetings 21.075*** 18.198*** 2.877 NA 
CEO Tenure 0.609 1.314** -0.705 NA 
Risk Management Committee 15.005** 4.929 10.076 Partial 
Board Independence 68.459*** 59.144*** 9.315 NA 
Board Gender 127.884*** 106.963*** 20.921 NA 
Compensation Structure 4.517 -6.967 11.484 Partial 
Company Size 23.081*** 21.595*** 1.486 NA 
Loss -34.981*** -26.836*** -8.145 NA 
Industry 21.846* 15.802 6.044 Partial 
Growth 0.859 -0.405 1.264 Partial 









Table 5.4.9  Continued 
Variables Directorship Difference Mediation 
Model B C c' 
  Managerial Ownership -0.413 -0.365 -0.048 Full 
Government Ownership -0.749 -0.767 0.018 Partial 
Individual Block-holders -0.261* -0.139 -0.122 Full 
Principal-principal Conflicts 0.445 -1.010 1.455 Partial 
Board Size 5.042*** 4.659*** 0.383 NA 
Board Meetings 14.097*** 12.728*** 1.369 NA 
CEO Tenure 0.642 1.009** -0.368 NA 
Risk Management Committee 8.179* 3.057 5.122 Full 
Board Independence 48.488*** 43.865*** 4.623 NA 
Board Gender 95.982*** 85.553*** 10.429 NA 
Compensation Structure 4.519 -1.227 5.746 Partial 
Company Size 12.647*** 12.120*** 0.527 NA 
Loss -19.908*** -15.808* -4.100 NA 
Industry 8.172 5.061 3.111 Partial 
Growth 0.295 -0.353 0.648 Partial 
Complexity 24.665*** 22.777*** 1.888 NA 
 
 
Variables Internal Auditing Difference Mediation 
Model C C c' 
  Managerial Ownership 0.818 0.090 -0.728 Full 
Government Ownership -0.381** -0.384** 0.003 NA 
Individual Block-holders -0.049 -0.028 0.021 Full 
Principal-principal Conflicts 0.857* 0.617 0.240 Partial 
Board Size 0.491 0.422 0.069 Partial 
Board Meetings 1.115** 0.834* 0.281 NA 
CEO Tenure 0.182* 0.248** -0.066 NA 
Risk Management Committee 3.762*** 2.980** 0.782 NA 
Board Independence 6.113** 5.278** 0.835 NA 
Board Gender 21.009*** 19.216*** 1.793 NA 
Compensation Structure 0.823 -0.183 1.006 Partial 
Company Size 1.488*** 1.197*** 0.291 NA 
Loss -6.148*** -5.509*** -0.639 NA 
Industry 3.375* 2.845* 0.531 NA 
Growth 0.095 -0.018 0.113 Partial 













Table 5.4.9  Continued 
Variables External Auditing 
 
Difference Mediation 
Model D C c' 
  
Managerial Ownership -0.404*** -0.367*** -0.037 NA 
Government Ownership 0.074 0.061 0.013 Partial 
Individual Block-holders -0.318*** -0.226*** -0.092 NA 
Principal-principal Conflicts 3.194*** 2.110** 1.084 NA 
Board Size 2.995*** 2.690*** 0.305 NA 
Board Meetings 5.863*** 4.636*** 1.227 NA 
CEO Tenure -0.215 0.057 -0.272 Full 
Risk Management Committee 3.064 -1.108 4.172 Partial 
Board Independence 13.861** 10.004** 3.857 NA 
Board Gender 10.891 2.191 8.700 Partial 
Compensation Structure -0.825 -5.557** 4.732 NA 
Company Size 8.947*** 8278*** 0.669 NA 
Loss -8.925*** -5.519** -3.406 NA 
Industry 10.298*** 7.896** 2.402 NA 
Growth 0.469 -0.034 0.503 Partial 
Complexity 13.835*** 12.118*** 1.717 NA 
Note: *** significant at 1% level;     ** significant at 5% level;    * significant at 10% level 
 
 
5.4.3.1.1 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.10 show that the direct effect is 
7.5% while the total effect is 8.7% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
13.7% in the relationship between managerial ownership (MO) and monitoring 
mechanisms (MM).  The direct and total effects are both negative, pointing towards 
the same direction.   The mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  
The mediating effects in the relationship between MO and directorship (NEDIR), 
between MO and internal auditing (IA), and MO and external auditing (EA) are also 
complementary.  The direct and total effects are both negative except in the 
relationship for MO and IA where both are positive, pointing towards the same 
direction.  The result displays direct effect of 5.94% and total effect of 6.79% with 
the proportion of 12.49% total effect mediated for NEDIR.  The result displays direct 
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effect of 6.82% and total effect of 6.11% with the proportion of 11.56% total effect 
mediated for IA.  It also displays direct effect of 12.95% and total effect of 14.38% 
with the proportion of 9.97% total effect mediated for EA.  The bootstrap analysis 
results on Table 5.4.11 demonstrate that the mediating relationship (indirect effect) is 
significant as the confidential interval includes no zero (Rivera, 2012) and in the 
right direction.  Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between MO and MM.   It also 
serves as a mediator in the relationship between MO and NEDIR, IA, and EA. 
 
5.4.3.1.2 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Government Ownership and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.10 indicate that the direct effect is 
4.2% while the total effect is 4% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 3.6% 
in the relationship between government ownership (GO) and monitoring mechanisms 
(MM).  The direct and total effects are both negative, pointing towards the same 
direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  The 
mediating effects in the relationship between GO and directorship (NEDIR), GO and 
internal auditing (IA) and GO and external auditing (EA) are also complementary. 
The direct and total effects are both negative except in the relationship for GO and 
EA where both are positive, pointing towards the same direction.  The result displays 
direct effect of 4.06% and total effect of 3.95% with the proportion of 2.6% total 
effect mediated for GO and NEDIR.  It displays direct effect of 9.43% and total 
effect of 9.35% with the proportion of 0.9% total effect mediated for GO and IA.  It 
also displays direct effect of 0.7% and total effect of 0.9% with the proportion of 
19.93% total effect mediated for GO and EA. The bootstrap analysis results on Table 
5.4.11 demonstrate that the mediating relationship (indirect effect) is significant as 
the confidential interval includes no zero but in the opposite direction.  Hence, QDA 
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serves as a mediator between GO and MM.   It also serves as a mediator in the 
relationship between GO and each dimension of MM, NEDIR, IA, and EA. 
 
5.4.3.1.3 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Individual Block-holders and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.10 show that the direct effect is 
8.18% while the total effect is 13.7% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
40.29% in the relationship between individual block-holders (IB) and monitoring 
mechanisms (MM).  It also presents the mediating effects in the relationship between 
IB and dimensions, directorship (NEDIR), internal auditing (IA), and external 
auditing (EA).   The direct and total effects are both negative, pointing towards the 
same direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  The 
mediating effects in the relationship between IB and NEDIR, IB and IA and IB and 
EA are also complementary.  The result displays direct effect of 4.02% and total 
effect of 8% with the proportion of 49.7% total effect mediated for IB and NEDIR.  
It displays direct effect of 3.72% and total effect of 6.95% with the proportion of 
46.4% total effect mediated for IB and IA.  It also displays direct effect of 14.18% 
and total effect of 20.68% with the proportion of 31.43% total effect mediated for IB 
and EA.  The bootstrap analysis results demonstrate that the mediating relationship 
(indirect effect) is significant as the confidential interval includes no zero and in the 
right direction.  Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between IB and MM.   It also 
reveals that QDA serves as a mediator in the relationship between IB and each 




5.4.3.1.4 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Principal-principal Conflicts and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.10 show that the direct effect is 
2.5% while the total effect is 11.28% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
77.86% in the relationship between principal-principal conflicts (PPC) and 
monitoring mechanisms (MM).  The direct and total effects are both positive, 
pointing towards the same direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary 
(Zhao et al., 2010).  The mediating effects in the relationship between PPC and 
internal auditing (IA) and PPC and external auditing (EA) are also complementary.  
The result displays direct effect of 5.79% and total effect of 10.69% with the 
proportion of 45.85% total effect mediated for PPC and IA.  It displays direct effect 
of 9.25% and total effect of 19.57% with the proportion of 52.74% total effect 
mediated for PPC and EA.  However, the mediating effects on the relationship 
between PPC and directorship (NEDIR) are competitive.  The direct effect is 
negative while the total effect is positive, pointing towards different directions.  The 
result displays direct effect of 2.04% and total effect of 4.34% with the proportion of 
147.01% total effect mediated in the relationship between PPC and NEDIR.  The 
bootstrap analysis result on Table 5.4.11 demonstrates that the mediating relationship 
(indirect effect) is significant as the confidential interval includes no zero and in the 
right direction.  Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between PPC and MM.   It also 
serves as a mediator in the relationship between PPC and each dimension of MM, 





Table 5.4.10                                                                                                                                  
Binary-mediation Analysis (Ownership Structure and Monitoring Mechanisms with 
its Dimensions, Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing). 












  Managerial 
Ownership 
Direct Effect 
-0.075 -0.059 0.068 -0.130 
Total Effect 
-0.087 -0.068 0.061 -0.144 
Proportion mediated 




-0.042 -0.041 -0.094 0.007 
Total Effect 
-0.040 -0.040 -0.094 0.009 
Proportion mediated 




-0.082 -0.040 -0.037 -0.142 
Total Effect 
-0.137 -0.080 -0.070 -0.207 
Proportion mediated 




0.025 -0.020 0.058 0.093 
Total Effect 
0.113 0.043 0.107 0.196 
Proportion mediated 
0.779 1.470 0.459 0.527 
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
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Table 5.4.11                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Binary-mediation Bootstrap Coefficients, Standard Errors, Indirect, Total Indirect, Direct and Total Effects (Ownership Structure, 
Monitoring Mechanisms, Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing). 
Bootstrap Results 
Monitoring Mechanisms Directorship Internal Auditing External Auditing 
B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] 
Managerial Ownership 
           Indirect -0.012 -0.051 0.027 -0.009 -0.034 0.019 -0.007 -0.031 0.016 -0.014 -0.057 0.044 
(0.020) -0.052 0.027 (0.013) -0.034 0.020 (0.012) -0.033 0.015 (0.045) -0.058 0.043 
Total Indirect -0.012 -0.051 0.027 -0.008 -0.034 0.019 -0.007 -0.031 0.016 -0.014 -0.057 0.044 
(0.020) -0.052 0.027 (0.013) -0.034 0.020 (0.012) -0.033 0.015 (0.025) -0.058 0.043 
Direct Effect -0.075*** -0.109 -0.043 -0.059*** -0.089 -0.024 0.068 -0.037 0.176 -0.129*** -0.180 -0.092 
(0.018) -0.105 -0.040 (0.017) -0.089 -0.023 (0.056) -0.050 0.171 (0.022) -0.173 -0.090 
Total Effect -0.087*** -0.124 -0.040 -0.068*** -0.096 -0.033 0.061 -0.052 0.190 -0.144*** -0.178 -0.117 
(0.022) -0.124 -0.037 (0.018) -0.095 -0.029 (0.061) -0.061 0.181 (0.015) -0.177 -0.115 
Government Ownership            
Indirect 0.001 -0.036 0.043 0.001 0.016 0.147 0.001 -0.021 0.024 0.002 -0.045 0.050 
(0.019) -0.038 0.042 (0.014) 0.020 0.156 (0.011) -0.020 0.026 (0.023) -0.046 0.048 
Total Indirect 0.001 -0.036 0.043 0.001 0.016 0.147 0.001 -0.021 0.024 0.002 -0.045 0.050 
(0.019) -0.038 0.042 (0.014) 0.020 0.156 (0.011) -0.020 0.026 (0.023) -0.046 0.048 
Direct Effect -0.042 -0.098 0.036 -0.041 -0.067 0.065 -0.094*** -0.158 -0.017 0.007 -0.044 0.088 
(0.034) -0.092 0.052 (0.037) -0.067 0.065 (0.036) -0.153 -0.014 (0.033) -0.042 0.090 
Total Effect -0.040 -0.097 0.045 -0.040 -0.032 0.158 -0.094*** -0.160 -0.015 0.009 -0.059 0.106 





Table 5.4.11 (Continued) 
Bootstrap Results 
Monitoring Mechanisms Directorship Internal Auditing External Auditing 
B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] 
Individual Block-holders            
Indirect -0.055*** -0.100 -0.017 -0.040* -0.075 -0.012 -0.032** -0.074 -0.009 -0.065*** -0.114 -0.025 
(0.021) -0.100 -0.017 (0.016) -0.077 -0.013 (0.017) -0.084 -0.010 (0.023) -0.114 -0.023 
Total Indirect -0.055*** -0.100 -0.017 -0.040* -0.075 -0.012 -0.032** -0.074 -0.009 -0.065*** -0.114 -0.025 
(0.021) -0.100 -0.017 (0.016) -0.076 -0.013 (0.017) -0.084 -0.010 (0.023) -0.114 -0.023 
Direct Effect -0.082* -0.163 0.001 -0.040 -0.114 0.040 -0.037 -0.118 0.074 -0.142*** -0.186 -0.100 
(0.041) -0.162 0.003 (0.040) -0.109 0.046 (0.048) -0.122 0.073 (0.0210) -0.184 -0.098 
Total Effect -0.137*** -0.214 -0.055 -0.080* -0.155 -0.002 -0.070 -0.147 0.039 -0.207*** -0.252 -0.169 
(0.042) -0.208 -0.052 (0.039) -0.150 0.005 (0.045) -0.143 0.042 (0.022) -0.249 -0.161 
Principal-principal Conflicts            
Indirect 0.088* 0.028 0.193 0.0640** 0.016 0.147 0.049** 0.010 0.127 0.103** 0.034 0.231 
(0.044) 0.030 0.205 (0.034) 0.020 0.156 (0.030) 0.015 0.162 (0.053) 0.031 0.224 
Total Indirect 0.088* 0.028 0.193 0.064** 0.016 0.147 0.049** 0.010 0.127 0.103** 0.034 0.231 
(0.044) 0.030 0.205 (0.034) 0.020 0.156 (0.030) 0.015 0.162 (0.053) 0.031 0.224 
Direct Effect 0.025 -0.045 0.134 -0.020 -0.067 0.065 0.058 -0.028 0.120 0.093 -0.026 0.267 
(0.045) -0.032 0.158 (0.037) -0.067 0.065 (0.039) -0.038 0.115 (0.070) -0.025 0.268 
Total Effect 0.113** 0.004 0.249 0.043 -0.032 0.158 0.107* 0.003 0.205 0.196* 0.047 0.402 
(0.064) 0.004 0.249 (0.049) -0.034 0.151 (0.052) -0.001 0.202 (0.084) 0.027 0.346 




5.4.3.1.5 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Board Size and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.12 show that the direct effect is 
21.29% while the total effect is 23.61% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
9.86% in the relationship between board size (BS) and monitoring mechanisms 
(MM).  The direct and total effects are both positive, pointing towards the same 
direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  The 
mediating effects in the relationship between BS and directorship (NEDIR), BS and 
internal auditing (IA) and BS and external auditing (EA) are also complementary.  
The result displays direct effect of 17.72% and total effect of 19.36% with the 
proportion of 8.45% total effect mediated for BS and NEDIR.  It displays direct 
effect of 7.45% and total effect of 8.82% with the proportion of 15.57% total effect 
mediated for BS and IA.  It also displays direct effect of 22.19% and total effect of 
25.01% with the proportion of 11.28% total effect mediated for BS and EA.  The 
bootstrap analysis result on Table 5.4.13 demonstrates that the mediating relationship 
(indirect effect) is significant as the confidential interval includes no zero.  It is a 
non-directional hypothesis as the findings of the extant literature on it is mixed, but 
positive in this study.  Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between BS and MM.   It 
also serves as a mediator in the relationship between BS and each dimension of MM, 
directorship, internal, and external auditing. 
 
5.4.3.1.6 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Board Meeting and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.12 show that the direct effect is 
27.54% while the total effect is 32.72% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
15.83% in the relationship between board meetings (BM) and monitoring 
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mechanisms (MM).  The direct and total effects are both positive, pointing towards 
the same direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  
The mediating effects in the relationship between BM and directorship (NEDIR), 
BM and internal auditing (IA) and BM and external auditing (EA) are also 
complementary.  The result displays direct effect of 26.74% and total effect of 
30.17% with the proportion of 11.35% total effect mediated for BM and NEDIR.  It 
displays direct effect of 8.14% and total effect of 11.41% with the proportion of 
28.62% total effect mediated for BM and IA.  It also displays direct effect of 21.13% 
and total effect of 27.78% with the proportion of 23.94% total effect mediated for 
BM and EA.  The bootstrap analysis result on Table 5.4.13 demonstrates that the 
mediating relationship (indirect effect) is significant as the confidential interval 
includes no zero and in the right direction.   Hence, QDA serves as a mediator 
between BM and MM.   It also serves as a mediator in the relationship between BM 
and each dimension of MM, directorship, internal, and external auditing. 
 
5.4.3.1.7 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between CEO Tenure and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.12 show that the direct effect is 
8.81% while the total effect is 3.5% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
151.89% in the relationship between CEO tenure (CEOT) and monitoring 
mechanisms (MM).  The direct and total effects are both positive, pointing towards 
the same direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  
The mediating effects in the relationship between CEOT and directorship (NEDIR) 
and CEOT and internal auditing (IA) are also complementary.  The result displays 
direct effect of 9.41% and total effect of 5.55% with the proportion of 69.35% total 
effect mediated.  It displays direct effect of 10.72% and total effect of 7.51% with the 
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proportion of 42.8% total effect mediated for CEOT and IA.  The mediation is 
competitive in the relationship between CEOT and external auditing (EA) as the 
direct and total effects are pointing towards different directions.  The result displays 
direct effect of 1.14% and total effect of -5.01% with the proportion of 122.8% total 
effect mediated for CEOT and EA.  The bootstrap analysis result on Table 5.4.13 
demonstrates that the mediating relationship (indirect effect) is significant as the 
confidential interval includes no zero but in the opposite direction.  Hence, QDA 
serves as a mediator between CEOT and MM.   It also serves as a mediator in the 
relationship between CEOT and each dimension of MM, directorship, internal, and 
external auditing. 
 
5.4.3.1.8 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Risk Management Committee and Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.12 indicate that the direct effect is 
3.14% while the total effect is 10.43% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
69.86% in the relationship between risk management committee (RMC) and 
monitoring mechanisms (MM).  The direct and total effects are both positive, 
pointing towards the same direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary 
(Zhao et al., 2010).  The mediating effects in the relationship between RMC and 
directorship (NEDIR), and RMC and internal auditing (IA) are also complementary.  
The result displays direct effect of 2.71% and total effect of 7.85% with the 
proportion of 65.51% total effect mediated.  It displays direct effect of 12.26% and 
total effect of 15.9% with the proportion of 22.93% total effect mediated for RMC 
and IA.  The mediation is competitive in the relationship between RMC and external 
auditing (EA).  The direct and total effects are towards different directions.  The 
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result displays direct effect of 2.13% and total effect of 6.96% with the proportion of 
130.61% total effect mediated for RMC and EA.  The bootstrap analysis result on 
Table 5.4.13 demonstrates that the mediating relationship (indirect effect) is 
significant as the confidential interval includes no zero but in the opposite direction.  
Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between RMC and MM.   It also serves as a 
mediator in the relationship between RMC and each dimension of MM, directorship, 
internal, and external auditing. 
 
5.4.3.1.9 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Board Independence and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.12 indicate that the direct effect is 
17.92% while the total effect is 21.12% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
15.13% in the relationship between board independence (BI) and monitoring 
mechanisms (MM).  The direct and total effects are both positive, pointing towards 
the same direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  
The mediating effects in the relationship between BI and directorship (NEDIR), BI 
and internal auditing (IA), and BI and external auditing (EA) is also complementary.  
The result displays direct effect of 18.46% and total effect of 20.66% with the 
proportion of 10.66% total effect mediated.  It displays direct effect of 10.31% and 
total effect of 12.16% with the proportion of 15.19% total effect mediated for BI and 
IA.  It also displays direct effect of 9.13% and total effect of 13.11% with the 
proportion of 30.39% total effect mediated for BI and EA.  The bootstrap analysis 
result on Table 5.4.13 demonstrates that the mediating relationship (indirect effect) is 
significant as the confidential interval includes no zero and in the right direction.  
Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between BI and MM.   It also serves as a mediator 
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in the relationship between BI and each dimension of MM, directorship, internal, and 
external auditing. 
  
5.4.3.1.10 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Board Gender and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.12 show that the direct effect is 
13.54% while the total effect is 16.56% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
18.25% in the relationship between board gender (BG) and monitoring mechanisms 
(MM).  The direct and total effects are both positive, pointing towards the same 
direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  The 
mediating effects in the relationship between BG and directorship (NEDIR), BG and 
internal auditing (IA), and BG and external auditing (EA) are also complementary.  
The result displays direct effect of 15.04% and total effect of 17.13% with the 
proportion of 12.21% total effect mediated for BG and NEDIR.  It displays direct 
effect of 15.69% and total effect of 17.36% with the proportion of 9.63% total effect 
mediated for BG and IA.  It also displays direct effect of 0.8% and total effect of 
4.62% with the proportion of 81.92% total effect mediated for BG and EA.  The 
bootstrap analysis result on Table 5.4.13 demonstrates that the mediating relationship 
(indirect effect) is significant as the confidential interval includes no zero but in the 
opposite direction.  Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between BG and MM.   It also 
serves as a mediator in the relationship between BG and each dimension of MM, 





Table 5.4.12                                                                                                                                   
Binary-mediation Analysis (Board of Directors and Monitoring Mechanisms with its 











Board Size Direct Effect 0.213 0.177 0.075 0.222 
Total Effect 0.236 0.194 0.088 0.250 
Proportion mediated 0.099 0.085 0.156 0.113 
Board Meetings Direct Effect 0.275 0.267 0.081 0.211 
Total Effect 0.327 0.302 0.114 0.278 
Proportion mediated 0.158 0.114 0.286 0.240 
Board Expertise Direct Effect 0.080 0.075 0.137 0.014 
Total Effect 0.137 0.115 0.168 0.083 
Proportion mediated 0.413 0.345 0.184 0.831 
CEO Tenure Direct Effect 0.088 0.094 0.107 0.011 
Total Effect 0.035 0.056 0.075 -0.050 
Proportion mediated -1.519 -0.694 -0.428 1.228 
Risk Management 
Committee 
Direct Effect 0.031 0.027 0.123 -0.021 
Total Effect 0.104 0.079 0.159 0.070 
Proportion mediated 0.699 0.655 0.229 1.306 
Board Independence Direct Effect 0.179 0.185 0.103 0.091 
Total Effect 0.211 0.207 0.122 0.131 
Proportion mediated 0.151 0.107 0.152 0.304 
Board Gender Direct Effect 0.135 0.150 0.157 0.008 
Total Effect 0.166 0.171 0.174 0.046 
Proportion mediated 0.183 0.122 0.096 0.819 
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
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Table 5.4.13                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Binary-mediation Bootstrap Coefficients, Standard Errors, Indirect, Total Indirect, Direct and Total Effects (Board of Directors, 
Monitoring Mechanisms, Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing). 
Bootstrap Results Monitoring Mechanisms Directorship Internal Auditing External Auditing 
  B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] 
Board Size 
            Indirect 0.023 -0.016 0.061 0.016 -0.008 0.042 0.014 -0.006 0.035 0.028 -0.009 0.067 
 (0.017) -0.008 0.063 (0.013) -0.010 0.039 (0.011) -0.004 0.041 (0.020) -0.006 0.068 
Total Indirect 0.023 -0.016 0.061 0.016 -0.008 0.042 0.014 -0.006 0.035 0.028 -0.009 0.067 
 (0.017) -0.008 0.063 (0.013) -0.010 0.039 (0.011) -0.004 0.041 (0.020) -0.006 0.068 
Direct Effect 0.213*** 0.157 0.283 0.177*** 0.124 0.234 0.075 -0.029 0.187 0.222*** 0.137 0.338 
 (0.031) 0.140 0.267 (0.028) 0.121 0.230 (0.056) -0.025 0.196 (0.052) 0.135 0.330 
Total Effect 0.236*** 0.173 0.303 0.194*** 0.142 0.245 0.088 -0.021 0.206 0.250*** 0.158 0.375 
 (0.031) 0.161 0.295 (0.026) 0.137 0.236 (0.056) -0.016 0.217 (0.056) 0.148 0.370 
Board Meetings             
Indirect 0.052*** 0.023 0.083 0.034*** 0.015 0.058 0.033* 0.009 0.064 0.067*** 0.031 0.109 
 (0.015) 0.021 0.082 (0.011) 0.015 0.056 (0.014) 0.011 0.069 (0.020) 0.032 0.111 
Total Indirect 0.052*** 0.023 0.083 0.034*** 0.015 0.058 0.033* 0.009 0.064 0.067*** 0.031 0.109 
 (0.015) 0.021 0.082 (0.011) 0.015 0.056 (0.014) 0.011 0.069 (0.020) 0.032 0.111 
Direct Effect 0.275*** 0.131 0.410 0.267*** 0.102 0.420 0.081 -0.030 0.190 0.211*** 0.108 0.307 
 (0.073) 0.126 0.398 (0.084) 0.082 0.410 (0.055) -0.043 0.181 (0.053) 0.104 0.305 
Total Effect 0.327*** 0.188 0.463 0.302*** 0.133 0.453 0.114* -0.001 0.217 0.278*** 0.173 0.378 
 (0.074) 0.184 0.453 (0.083) 0.116 0.446 (0.055) -0.012 0.210 (0.052) 0.168 0.375 
CEO Tenure             
Indirect -0.053* -0.098 -0.014 -0.039* -0.071 -0.011 -0.032* -0.073 -0.008 -0.062*** -0.105 -0.020 
 (0.022) -0.095 -0.013 (0.015) -0.072 -0.011 (0.016) -0.077 -0.009 (0.022) -0.108 -0.022 
Total Indirect -0.053* -0.098 -0.014 -0.039* -0.071 -0.011 -0.032* -0.073 -0.008 -0.062*** -0.105 -0.020 
 (0.022) -0.095 -0.013 (0.015) -0.072 -0.011 (0.016) -0.077 -0.009 (0.022) -0.108 -0.022 
Direct Effect 0.0882** 0.002 0.190 0.0941** -0.017 0.207 0.107 -0.054 0.262 0.011 -0.074 0.085 
 (0.051) -0.026 0.174 (0.055) -0.016 0.210 (0.080) -0.055 0.256 (0.042) -0.065 0.101 
Total Effect 0.035 -0.053 0.137 0.056 -0.051 0.178 0.075 -0.082 0.225 -0.050 -0.141 0.037 





Table 5.4.13 (Continued) 
Bootstrap Results 
Monitoring Mechanisms Directorship Internal Auditing External Auditing 
B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] 
Risk Management Committee            
Indirect 0.073*** 0.039 0.117 0.051*** 0.024 0.086 0.037* 0.007 0.074 0.091*** 0.045 0.139 
 (0.020) 0.034 0.110 (0.017) 0.023 0.084 (0.017) 0.008 0.079 (0.025) 0.042 0.136 
Total Indirect 0.073*** 0.039 0.117 0.051*** 0.024 0.086 0.037* 0.007 0.074 0.091*** 0.045 0.139 
 (0.020) 0.034 0.110 (0.017) 0.023 0.084 (0.017) 0.008 0.079 (0.025) 0.042 0.136 
Direct Effect 0.031 -0.087 0.142 0.027 -0.091 0.142 0.123* 0.013 0.230 -0.021 -0.131 0.091 
 (0.057) -0.089 0.141 (0.062) -0.090 0.145 (0.054) 0.012 0.229 (0.057) -0.128 0.092 
Total Effect 0.104** -0.007 0.214 0.079 -0.035 0.186 0.159*** 0.049 0.259 0.070 -0.032 0.184 
 (0.055) -0.011 0.212 (0.059) -0.033 0.191 (0.052) 0.059 0.264 (0.059) -0.030 0.187 
Board Independence            
Indirect 0.032** -0.001 0.066 0.022** 0.000 0.045 0.019** 0.000 0.042 0.040** -0.001 0.080 
 -0.017 -0.002 0.066 (0.011) -0.001 0.044 (0.011) 0.001 0.042 (0.021) 0.002 0.081 
Total Indirect 0.032** -0.001 0.066 0.022** 0.000 0.045 0.019** 0.000 0.042 0.040** -0.001 0.080 
 -0.017 -0.002 0.066 (0.011) -0.001 0.044 (0.011) 0.001 0.042 (0.021) 0.002 0.081 
Direct Effect 0.179*** 0.088 0.256 0.185*** 0.099 0.263 0.103** -0.012 0.216 0.091* 0.023 0.171 
 -0.046 0.085 0.251 (0.043) 0.102 0.269 (0.060) -0.011 0.216 (0.039) 0.006 0.159 
Total Effect 0.211*** 0.116 0.299 0.207*** 0.119 0.281 0.122* 0.003 0.230 0.131*** 0.058 0.201 
 -0.050 0.114 0.293 (0.046) 0.120 0.282 (0.061) 0.009 0.243 (0.038) 0.051 0.194 
Board Gender             
Indirect 0.030** -0.006 0.064 0.021** -0.005 0.047 0.017 -0.003 0.045 0.038 -0.006 0.089 
 -0.018 -0.002 0.069 (0.013) -0.007 0.045 (0.012) -0.001 0.049 (0.024) -0.007 0.086 
Total Indirect 0.030** -0.006 0.064 0.021** -0.005 0.047 0.017 -0.003 0.045 0.038 -0.006 0.089 
 -0.018 -0.002 0.069 (0.013) -0.007 0.045 (0.012) -0.001 0.049 (0.024) -0.007 0.086 
Direct Effect 0.135* -0.007 0.241 0.150* -0.010 0.262 0.157*** 0.041 0.258 0.008 -0.124 0.151 
 -0.068 0.005 0.260 (0.067) -0.006 0.264 (0.054) 0.041 0.258 (0.069) -0.117 0.159 
Total Effect 0.166* 0.021 0.280 0.171* 0.017 0.291 0.174*** 0.063 0.277 0.046 -0.085 0.182 
  -0.069 0.032 0.298 (0.069) 0.017 0.291 (0.054) 0.062 0.277 (0.070) -0.076 0.204 




5.4.3.1.11 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Compensation Structure and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.14 show that the direct effect is 
4.3% while the total effect is 3.38% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
227.11% in the relationship between compensation structure (CS) and monitoring 
mechanisms (MM).  The direct (-) and total effects (+) are in the opposite direction.  
The mediation is, therefore, competitive (Zhao et al., 2010).  The mediating effects in 
the relationship between CS and directorship (NEDIR) and CS and internal auditing 
(IA) are also competitive. The result displays direct effect of 1.05% and total effect 
of 4.2% with the proportion of 124.5% total effect mediated for CS and NEDIR.  It 
displays direct effect of 0.73% and total effect of 3.61% with the proportion of 
120.2% total effect mediated for CS and IA.  However, the mediating effect in the 
relationship between CS and external auditor (EA) is complementary.  Both the 
direct and total effects are negative pointing towards the same direction in the 
relationship between CS and EA.  The result displays direct effect of 10.32% and 
total effect of 0.8% with the proportion of 1196.41% total effect negatively mediated 
for CS and EA.  The bootstrap analysis result on Table 5.4.15 demonstrates that the 
mediating relationship (indirect effect) is significant as the confidential interval 
includes no zero and in the right direction.  Hence, QDA serves as a mediator 
between CS and MM.   It also serves as a mediator in the relationship between CS 





Table 5.4.14                                                                                                                                 
Binary-mediation Analysis (Compensation Structure and Monitoring Mechanisms 













Direct Effect -0.043 -0.011 -0.007 -0.103 
Total Effect 0.034 0.043 0.036 -0.008 
Proportion mediated 2.271 1.245 1.202 -11.964 
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
 
Table 5.4.15                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Binary-mediation Bootstrap Coefficients, Standard Errors, Indirect, Total Indirect, 
Direct and Total Effects (Compensation Structure and Monitoring Mechanisms with 
its dimensions, Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing). 
Bootstrap Results Monitoring Mechanisms Directorship 
 B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] 
Compensation Structure 
     Indirect 0.077*** 0.040 0.120 0.053*** 0.025 0.086 
 (0.020) 0.040 0.121 (0.017) 0.027 0.089 
Total Indirect 0.077*** 0.040 0.120 0.053*** 0.025 0.086 
 (0.020) 0.040 0.121 (0.017) 0.027 0.089 
Direct Effect -0.043 -0.158 0.048 -0.011 -0.115 0.074 
 (0.050) -0.154 0.049 (0.048) -0.110 0.082 
Total Effect 0.034 -0.079 0.120 0.043 -0.054 0.128 
  (0.051) -0.069 0.120 (0.046) -0.048 0.138 
       
Bootstrap Results Internal Auditing External Auditing 
 B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] 
Compensation Structure    
Indirect 0.043* 0.014 0.079 0.095*** 0.050 0.145 
 (0.017) 0.016 0.080 (0.024) 0.049 0.145 
Total Indirect 0.043* 0.014 0.079 0.095*** 0.050 0.145 
 (-0.017) 0.016 0.080 (0.024) 0.049 0.145 
Direct Effect -0.007 -0.114 0.106 -0.103** -0.210 0.011 
 (0.056) -0.115 0.101 (0.058) -0.210 0.011 
Total Effect 0.036 -0.075 0.140 -0.008 -0.120 0.115 
  (0.056) -0.075 0.140 (0.062) -0.125 0.110 
Note: *** significant at 1% level;     ** significant at 5% level;    * significant at 10% level 




5.4.3.2  B-Path Using Binary-mediation Analysis and Bootstrap 
Command (Control, Mediating and Dependent Variables) 
Table 5.4.16 presents the results on the mediation effects of quality-differentiated 
auditors (QDA) on the relationship between control variables [company size (Cz), 
loss (LO), industry (IND), growth (GR), and complexity (CC) using binary-
mediation analysis.  Table 5.4.17 presents the results of the mediation effects of the 
same set of variables using binary-mediation bootstrap.  Details are as follows: 
 
5.4.3.2.1 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Company Size and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.16 reveal that the direct effect is 
49.26% while the total effect is 53.33% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
7.63% in the relationship between company size (Cz) and monitoring mechanisms 
(MM).  The direct and total effects are both positive, pointing towards the same 
direction.  The mediation is complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  The mediating 
effects in the relationship between Cz and directorship (NEDIR), Cz and internal 
auditing (IA), and Cz and external auditing (EA) are also complementary.  The 
results display direct effect of 38.39% and total effect of 40.39% with the proportion 
of 4.96% total effect mediated for Cz and NEDIR.  The table also displays direct 
effect of 17.61% and total effect of 22.75% with the proportion of 22.58% total 
effect mediated for Cz and IA.  It also displays direct effect of 56.88% and total 
effect of 62.39% with the proportion of 8.84% total effect mediated for Cz and EA. 
 
The bootstrap analysis result on Table 5.4.17 demonstrates that the mediating 
relationship (indirect effect) is significant as the confidential interval includes no 
zero.  Also, it has a significant relationship with QDA in the logistic regression 
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model with a beta of 6.99 and z-statistics of 5.43 and p-value of 0.000.  Though, the 
indirect effect is insignificant as the confidential interval is with no zero, QDA is not 
significant in the relationship between Cz and directorship (NEDIR).  The mediation 
effect is inconclusive in the relationship of Cz with NEDIR (β=N3.9m, t=0.63, 
p=0.263) using a two-tailed test.  However, it serves as a mediator in the relationship 
between Cz and monitoring mechanisms (β=N11.2m, t=1.39, p=0.083) Cz and 
internal auditing (β=N2.2m, t=1.53, p=0.063), and Cz and external auditing (β=N5m, 
t=2.04, p=0.021). 
 
5.4.3.2.2 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Loss and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.16 show that the direct effect is 
15.49% while the total effect is 20.61% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
24.85% in the relationship between loss and monitoring mechanisms (MM).  The 
direct and total effects are both negative, pointing towards the same direction.  The 
mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  The mediating effects in 
the relationship between loss (LO) and directorships (NEDIR), LO and internal 
auditing (IA), and LO and external auditing (EA) are also complementary.  The 
result displays direct effect of 12.67% and total effect of 16.25% with the proportion 
of 22.03% total effect mediated.  It displays direct effect of 20.5% and total effect of 
23.09% with the proportion of 11.22% total effect mediated for LO and IA.  It also 
displays direct effect of 9.59% and total effect of 16.04% with the proportion of 
40.21% total effect mediated for loss and EA.  The bootstrap analysis result on Table 
5.4.17 demonstrates that the mediating relationship (indirect effect) is significant as 
the confidential interval includes no zero.  Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between 
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LO and MM.   It also serves as a mediator in the relationship between LO and each 
dimension of MM, directorship, internal, and external auditing. 
 
5.4.3.2.3 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Industry and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.16 show that the direct effect is 
6.73% while the total effect is 9.54% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
29.53% in the relationship between industry (IND) and monitoring mechanisms 
(MM).  The direct and total effects are both positive, pointing towards the same 
direction.  The mediation is, therefore, complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  The 
mediating effects in the relationship between IND and directorship (NEDIR), IND 
and internal auditing (IA), and IND and external auditing (EA) are also 
complementary.  The result displays direct effect of 2.99% and total effect of 5% 
with the proportion of 40.24% total effect mediated.  It displays direct effect of 
7.81% and total effect of 9.4% with the proportion of 16.97% total effect mediated 
for IND and IA.  It displays direct effect of 10.12% and total effect of 13.5% with the 
proportion of 25% total effect mediated for IND and EA.  The bootstrap analysis 
result on Table 5.4.17 demonstrates that the mediating relationship (indirect effect) is 
significant as the confidential interval includes no zero.  Hence, QDA serves as a 
mediator between IND and MM.   It also serves as a mediator in the relationship 





5.4.3.2.4 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Growth and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The binary-mediation analysis results on Table 5.4.16 show that the direct effect is 
1.16% while the total effect is 5.72% and the proportion of total effect mediated is 
120.27% in the relationship between growth (GR) and monitoring mechanisms 
(MM).  The direct (-) and total (+) effects are pointing towards different directions.  
The mediation is, therefore, competitive (Zhao et al., 2010).  The mediating effects in 
the relationship between GR and directorship (NEDIR), GR and internal auditing 
(IA), and GR and external auditing (EA) are also competitive. The result displays 
direct effect of -1.4% and total effect of 3.49% with the proportion of 140.22% total 
effect mediated for GR and NEDIR.  It displays direct effect of -0.33% and total 
effect of 3.64% with the proportion of 109% total effect mediated for GR and IA.  It 
also displays direct effect of -0.29% and total effect of 7.95% with the proportion of 
103.69% total effect mediated for GR and EA.  The result on Table 5.4.17 
demonstrates that the mediating relationship (indirect effect) is significant as the 
confidential interval includes no zero.  Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between 
GR and MM.   It also serves as a mediator in the relationship between GR and each 
dimension of MM, directorship, internal, and external auditing. 
 
5.4.3.2.5 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Complexity and Monitoring Mechanisms 
Table 5.4.16 shows that the direct effect is 60.01% while the total effect is 65.56% 
and the proportion of total effect mediated is 8.47% in the relationship between 
complexity (CC) and monitoring mechanisms (MM).  The direct and total effects are 
both positive, pointing towards the same direction.  The mediation is, therefore, 
complementary (Zhao et al., 2010).  The mediating effects in the relationship 
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between CC and directorship (NEDIR), CC and internal auditing (IA), and CC and 
external auditing (EA) are also complementary.  The results display direct effect of 
56.37% and total effect of 59.41% with the proportion of 5.13% total effect mediated 
for CC and NEDIR.  The study displays direct effect of 7.03% and total effect of 
12.03% with the proportion of 41.51% total effect mediated for CC and IA.  It also 
displays direct effect of 55.19% and total effect of 62.97% with the proportion of 
12.35% total effect mediated for CC and EA.  The result on Table 5.4.17 
demonstrates that the mediating relationship (indirect effect) is significant as the 
confidential interval includes no zero.  Hence, QDA serves as a mediator between 
CC and MM.   It also serves as a mediator in the relationship between CC and each 
dimension of MM, directorship, internal, and external auditing. 
 
Table 5.4.16                                                                                                                                 
Binary-mediation Analysis (Control Variables, Monitoring Mechanisms, 













     
Company Size Direct Effect 0.493 0.384 0.176 0.569 
Total Effect 0.533 0.404 0.228 0.624 
Proportion mediated 0.076 0.050 0.226 0.088 
Loss Direct Effect -0.155 -0.127 -0.205 -0.096 
Total Effect -0.206 -0.163 -0.231 -0.160 
Proportion mediated 0.249 0.220 0.112 0.402 
Industry Direct Effect 0.067 0.030 0.078 0.101 
Total Effect 0.095 0.050 0.094 0.135 
Proportion mediated 0.295 0.402 0.170 0.250 
Growth Direct Effect -0.012 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003 
Total Effect 0.057 0.035 0.036 0.080 
Proportion mediated 1.203 1.402 1.090 1.037 
Company 
Complexity 
Direct Effect 0.600 0.564 0.070 0.552 
Total Effect 0.656 0.594 0.120 0.630 
Proportion mediated 0.085 0.051 0.415 0.124 
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
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Table 5.4.17                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Binary-mediation Bootstrap Coefficients, Standard Errors, Indirect, Total Indirect, Direct and Total Effects (Control Variables, 
Monitoring Mechanisms, Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing). 
Bootstrap Results Monitoring Mechanisms Directorship Internal Auditing External Auditing 
B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] 
Company Size 
            Indirect 0.041* 0.000 0.078 0.020 -0.020 0.059 0.051 -0.012 0.121 0.055*** 0.026 0.087 
 (0.018) 0.000 0.077 (0.019) -0.022 0.056 (0.034) -0.016 0.117 (0.016) 0.025 0.085 
Total Indirect 0.041* 0.000 0.078 0.020 -0.020 0.059 0.051 -0.012 0.121 0.055*** 0.026 0.087 
 (0.018) 0.000 0.077 (0.019) -0.022 0.056 (0.034) -0.016 0.117 (-0.016) 0.025 0.085 
Direct Effect 0.493*** 0.416 0.570 0.384*** 0.299 0.476 0.176*** 0.052 0.295 0.569*** 0.498 0.632 
 (0.039) 0.410 0.566 (0.045) 0.285 0.467 (0.062) 0.045 0.291 (0.032) 0.493 0.628 
Total Effect 0.533*** 0.467 0.598 0.404*** 0.335 0.484 0.227*** 0.117 0.331 0.624*** 0.575 0.670 
 (0.032) 0.467 0.597 (0.038) 0.332 0.476 (0.054) 0.109 0.321 (0.024) 0.571 0.667 
Loss             
Indirect -0.051*** -0.086 -0.021 -0.036*** -0.064 -0.013 -0.026** -0.056 -0.006 -0.065*** -0.110 -0.021 
 (0.016) -0.088 -0.024 (0.014) -0.070 -0.016 (0.013) -0.062 -0.007 (0.021) -0.110 -0.021 
Total Indirect -0.051*** -0.086 -0.021 -0.036*** -0.064 -0.013 -0.026** -0.056 -0.006 -0.065*** -0.110 -0.021 
 (0.016) -0.088 -0.024 (0.014) -0.070 -0.016 (0.013) -0.062 -0.007 (0.021) -0.110 -0.021 
Direct Effect -0.155*** -0.200 -0.112 -0.127*** -0.169 -0.090 -0.205*** -0.287 -0.110 -0.096*** -0.147 -0.039 
 (0.023) -0.197 -0.108 (0.020) -0.165 -0.076 (0.045) -0.290 -0.119 (0.028) -0.145 -0.035 
Total Effect -0.206*** -0.252 -0.162 -0.162*** -0.202 -0.128 -0.231*** -0.311 -0.141 -0.160*** -0.216 -0.103 





Table 5.4.17 (Continued) 
Bootstrap Results Monitoring Mechanisms Directorship Internal Auditing External Auditing 
B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] B [95% Conf. Interval] 
Industry             
Indirect 0.028 -0.011 0.068 0.020 -0.006 0.050 0.016 -0.003 0.046 0.034 -0.005 0.080 
 (0.018) -0.012 0.065 (0.014) -0.006 0.050 (0.012) -0.002 0.047 (0.022) -0.008 0.078 
Total Indirect 0.028 -0.011 0.068 0.020) -0.006 0.050 0.016 -0.003 0.046 0.034 -0.005 0.080 
 (0.018) -0.012 0.065 (0.014) -0.006 0.050 (0.012) -0.002 0.047 (0.022) -0.008 0.078 
Direct Effect 0.067*** 0.030 0.104 0.030 -0.021 0.070 0.078** -0.005 0.148 0.101*** 0.060 0.140 
 (0.019) 0.030 0.104 (0.022) -0.026 0.069 (0.040) -0.003 0.148 (0.020) 0.060 0.140 
Total Effect 0.095*** 0.049 0.137 0.050* -0.003 0.096 0.094* 0.009 0.171 0.135*** 0.098 0.179 
 (0.022) 0.047 0.134 (0.024) -0.008 0.089 (0.043) 0.005 0.171 (0.020) 0.091 0.170 
Growth             
Indirect 0.069* 0.012 0.144 0.049* 0.013 0.097 0.040* 0.006 0.082 0.082* 0.021 0.165 
 (0.031) 0.012 0.144 (0.022) 0.016 0.099 (0.019) 0.008 0.091 (0.036) 0.021 0.156 
Total Indirect 0.069* 0.012 0.144 0.049* 0.013 0.097 0.040* 0.006 0.082 0.082* 0.021 0.165 
 (0.031) 0.012 0.144 (0.022) 0.016 0.099 (0.019) 0.008 0.091 (0.036) 0.021 0.156 
Direct Effect -0.012 -0.044 0.037 -0.014 -0.058 0.041 -0.003 -0.115 0.119 -0.003 -0.034 0.040 
 (0.019) -0.046 0.031 (0.026) -0.059 0.041 (0.057) -0.120 0.115 (0.017) -0.037 0.031 
Total Effect 0.057* 0.007 0.125 0.035 -0.016 0.099 0.036 -0.073 0.155 0.080* 0.015 0.161 
 (0.028) 0.002 0.120 (0.029) -0.021 0.090 (0.058) -0.081 0.150 (0.038) 0.012 0.154 
Company Complexity           
Indirect 0.052*** 0.030 0.078 0.034*** 0.016 0.055 0.039* 0.011 0.080 0.066*** 0.039 0.092 
 (0.013) 0.025 0.075 (0.010) 0.016 0.057 (0.018) 0.011 0.080 (0.013) 0.038 0.091 
Total Indirect 0.052*** 0.030 0.078 0.034*** 0.016 0.055 0.039* 0.011 0.080 0.066*** 0.039 0.092 
 (0.013) 0.025 0.075 (0.010) 0.016 0.057 (0.018) 0.011 0.080 (0.013) 0.038 0.091 
Direct Effect 0.394*** 0.278 0.497 0.351*** 0.203 0.451 0.043 -0.078 0.163 0.405*** 0.298 0.493 
 (0.060) 0.284 0.500 (0.063) 0.195 0.449 (0.063) -0.078 0.163 (0.050) 0.301 0.496 
Total Effect 0.446*** 0.335 0.544 0.384*** 0.245 0.488 0.082 -0.030 0.193 0.471*** 0.370 0.563 
 (0.060) 0.335 0.544 (0.061) 0.245 0.488 (0.058) -0.028 0.194 (0.051) 0.371 0.565 




5.4.4 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results for Code of Corporate 
Governance 
Panel D hypothesized to know the impact of the revised code of corporate 
governance on monitoring mechanisms.  Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) is 
adopted following Zellner (1962, 1963).  Table 5.5.18 presents the result of SUR for 
comparison between the year 2010 under SEC 2003 and years 2011 and 2012 under 
SEC, 2011 (H7).  The results support the hypothesis that Nigerian code of corporate 
governance (SEC, 2011) positively relates to the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
in total (directorship, internal, and external auditing).  The R
2
 under SEC, 2003 was 
55.21% in 2010, but it rose to 61.44% in 2012 under SEC, 2011.  Furthermore, the 





Table 5.4.18                                                                                                     







2010 Monitoring Mechanisms 0.5521 410.54 0.000 
2011 Monitoring Mechanisms 0.5016 335.18 0.000 
2012 Monitoring Mechanisms 0.6144 530.56 0.000 
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
 
Table 5.5.19 presents the result of SUR for comparison between the year 2010 under 
SEC 2003 and years 2011 and 2012 under SEC, 2011 (H7i, and H7ii).  The results 
support the hypothesis that Nigerian code of corporate governance (SEC, 2011) 
positively relates to the demand for each dimension of monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing).  The R
2
 under SEC, 2003 for 
directorship in 2010 was 34.78% and rose to 43.46% in 2012 under SEC, 2011.  It 




2012 under SEC 2011.  It was 55.5% for external auditing under SEC, 2003 in 2010 
and rose to 59.08% in 2012 under SEC 2011. The models in equations for years 
2010, 2011 and 2012 for the directorship, internal, and external auditing were 




Table 5.4.19                                                                                                     
Seemingly Unrelated Regression for Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance on 







2010 Directorship 0.3478 177.54 0.000 
2011 Directorship 0.3237 159.37 0.000 
2012 Directorship 0.4346 255.93 0.000 
    
2010 Internal Auditing 0.6919 747.93 0.000 
2011 Internal Auditing 0.7062 800.45 0.000 
2012 Internal Auditing 0.6981 769.93 0.000 
    
2010 External Auditing 0.5505 407.83 0.000 
2011 External Auditing 0.5188 359.02 0.000 
2012 External Auditing 0.5908 480.73 0.000 
NOTE: n=333; SN=111 
 
5.5 Further Tests 
5.5.1 Structural Equation Model and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
The study runs structural equation model (SEM) and seemingly unrelated regressions 
(Sureg) to validate its findings.  Table 5.5.1 (columns 3 and 5) presents the 
multivariate results from SEM and Sureg.  Relating the result to the findings in Panel 
A, either or both tests for further tests validates the findings for hypotheses, H1a, H1b, 
H1c, H1d, H2a, H2b, H2c, H2e, H2d, H2f, and H3.   Managerial ownership and Individual 




only in Sureg but in the right direction both in SEM and Sureg.  Government 
ownership and compensation structure significantly and negatively relate to MM 
both using SEM and Sureg.  Principal-principal conflicts relate to MM in the right 
direction both in SEM and Sureg.  Board size significantly relates to the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (MM) only in SEM, but it is in the right direction both in 
SEM and Sureg.  Board meeting, Board independence, gender, and RMC relate 
significantly and positively to MM both in SEM and Sureg.  CEO tenure relates 
positively with MM in Sureg but negatively in SEM. 
 
The results on Table 5.5.1 (columns 2 and 4) validates the results from the main tests 
for Panel B for hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d, H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, H2e, H2f, and H3 in 
both or either of SEM and Sureg.  Managerial ownership and board independence 
relate positively to Quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) both in SEM and Sureg, 
but it is significant only in SEM.  Government ownership, board meetings, and board 
independence relate positively to QDA both in SEM and Sureg.  Individual block-
holders, Board size, and CEO tenure relate negatively and significantly to QDA both 
in SEM and Sureg.  Principal-principal conflicts, risk management committee, and 
compensation structure relate positively and significantly to QDA both in SEM and 






Table   5.5.1                                                                                                      
Hypotheses Tests with Structural Equation Model and Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression 
 
Structural Equation Model 
 






































































































































   
0.404 57.500 
R2 
   
0.332 0.422 
F-stat 
   
0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -23230.059 
   Note:    *** significant at 1% level;        ** significant at 5% level;       * significant at 10% level 





5.5.2 Univariate Tests 
Table 5.6.2 presents the results from univariate tests for each tested independent 
variable that has insignificant results in the multivariate tests.  Principal-principal 
conflict significantly relates only to the internal auditing (IA) and external auditing 
(EA) in the multivariate test (MT) in the right direction.  However, it significantly 
relates to the aggregate monitoring mechanisms (MM), thus being practically 
relevant.  In univariate tests (UT), it significantly relates to MM in the right direction. 
It is practically but not statistically related to directorship (NEDIR) in the right 
direction in (UT).  CEOT significantly and positively relates to NEDIR, IA, and EA 
in the MT.  However, UT reveals that it significantly relates to MM and in the right 
direction.  The MT shows that risk management committee significantly and 
positively relates only to the IA.  However, the UT shows that it relates significantly 
and positively to the MM, NEDIR, and EA as well.  MT displays significant 
relationship between board size and MM and NEDIR only.  UT shows that it relates 
significantly also to IA and EA.  MT demonstrates significantly positive relationship 
between board meetings (BM) and MM, BM and NEDIR, and BM and EA.  UT 
shows that it also relates to IA in the right direction.  MT reveals that board 
independence relates significantly to MM and dimensions except EA in the right 
direction.  UT shows that it also relates to EA in the right direction.  MT reveals that 
complexity relates significantly and positively to MM, NEDIR, and EA.  UT reveals 
that it is likewise related to IA significantly and positively.  
 
Table 5.5.2 presents the univariate test (UT) on the relationship between board 
meeting (BM) and the demand for quality-differentiated auditors (QDA), and also 




tests (MT) but the UT reveals that it is positively significant at 1% level of 
confidence.  The result implies the more the board meets the more the demand for 
high-quality auditing.  BG is both practically and statistically irrelevant in MT but 
significantly related to QDA in the right direction in UT. 
 
Table   5.5.2                                                                                                      
Hypotheses Tests by Univariate Regressions (Panels A and B) 
Variables 






















  (0.209) 
 





























Board Independence    
13.900*** 
 
   
(3.985) 
 
Board Gender     
1.993** 
    
(1.197) 
Government Ownership 
    0.003 
    (0.039) 
Note: *** significant at 1% level;     ** significant at 5% level;    * significant at 10% level 
n=333;  SN=111 
  
5.6 Summary Results of Hypotheses Tests for Monitoring Mechanisms 
The study tested hypotheses H1 to H4 using Stata multivariate analysis, Panel-
corrected Standard Errors and Logistic Regression; H5 using Binary-mediation 
analysis and bootstrap; and H6 using Seemingly Unrelated Regression.  The summary 





Table   5.6                                                                                                             








Direct effect on monitoring mechanisms 
H1a Managerial ownership is negatively associated 
with the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
 -  - Supported 
H1b Government ownership  is positively 
associated with demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and 
external auditing) 
 +  - 
Not 
Supported 
H1c Individual block ownership is positively 
associated with the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and 
external auditing). 
+ + Supported 
H1d Block-holders are positively associated with 
the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing) 





H2a Board size is significantly associated with the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
± + Supported 
H2b Board meetings are positively associated with 
the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
+ + Supported 
H2c CEO tenure is positively associated with the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms 




H2d Risk Management Committee is positively 
associated with the demand for monitoring 





H2e Independent directors are positively associated 
with the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
+ + Supported 
H2f Female directors are positively associated with 
the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
+ + Supported 
H3 Compensation structure is negatively 
associated with the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and 
external auditing). 
- - Supported 
H41a Managerial ownership is negatively associated 




H41b Government ownership is positively associated 
with quality-differentiated auditors. + + 
Not 
Significant 
H41c Individual block ownership is positively 








Table   5.6 (Continued) 
Direct effect on quality-differentiated auditors 
H41d Block-holders are positively associated with 
quality-differentiated auditors with an increase 
in the ownership of second-largest 
shareholders. 
+ + Supported 
H42a Board size is positively associated with 
quality-differentiated auditors. 
± - Supported 










H42d Risk Management Committee is positively 
associated with quality-differentiated auditors. 
+ + Supported 
H42e Independent directors are positively associated 
with quality-differentiated auditors. 
+ + Supported 





H43 Compensation structure is negatively 
associated with quality-differentiated auditors. 
+ + Supported 
 
Mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors 
H51a QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Managerial ownership and the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms 




H51b QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Government ownership and the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms 





H51c QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Individual block ownership and the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms 




H51d QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between principal-principal block-holders with 
an increase in the ownership of second-largest 
shareholders and the demand for monitoring 






H52a QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Board size and the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, 





H52b QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Board meetings and the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, 





H52c QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between CEO tenure and the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, 









Table   5.6 (Continued) 
Mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors 
H52e QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Independent directors and the demand 
for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, 





H52f QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Female directors and the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, 





H53 QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Compensation structure and the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms 





H6 Code of Corporate Governance (CCG) relates 
positively to the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal, and 
external auditing). 
+ + Supported 
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter presents the results of the tests on hypotheses developed in Chapter 4.  
It provides empirical evidence that managerial ownership (MO), government 
ownership (GO), and compensation structure (CS) negatively and significantly affect 
total monitoring mechanisms.  Individual block-holders (IB), board size (BS), board 
meetings (BM), board independence (BI), and board gender (BG) positively and 
significantly affect monitoring mechanisms.  For the relationship between 
organizational attributes and directorship, all variables significant in the relationship 
to aggregate monitoring mechanisms remain significant relating to directorship. CEO 
tenure is also positively significant relating to directorship and the significance of 
principal-principal conflicts (PPC) is in the opposite direction.  GO, IB, and CS are 
negatively significant while MO, PPC, CEOT, RMC, BI, and BG are positively 
significant in relation to internal auditing.  MO, GO, CEOT, BG, and CS are 
negatively significant while IB, PPC, BS and BM are positively significant in 





It also provides empirical evidence of the mediating effects of the quality-
differentiated auditors (QDA) on the relationship between organizational attributes 
and monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing).  QDA 
significantly mediates between organizational attributes (managerial ownership, 
government ownership, individual block-holders, principal-principal conflicts, board 
size, board meetings, CEO tenure, risk management committee, board independence, 






DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.0 Introduction 
The earlier chapter discusses research analysis and empirical evidence for the study.  
This chapter discusses the results of data analysis presented in Chapter 5 in the 
context of the research questions, literature review, underpinning theories and 
hypotheses discussed in Chapters 1 to 4 of this study.  The chapter is into seven 
sections.  Section 6.1 recapitulates the entire study.  Section 6.2 discusses the four 
main panels in the study as related to research questions, hypotheses, theories and 
literature review.  Section 6.3 discusses the implication of the study, while Section 
6.4 is on the limitations of the study with suggestions for future research discussed in 
Section 6.5.  Section 6.6 discusses the conclusion of the study, while Section 6.7 
summarizes the chapter. 
 
6.1 Study Recapitulation 
This study used panel-corrected standard errors regression analysis to answer 
research question one and logistic regression analysis to answer question two.  The 
study determines the results of these analyses in relation to the objectives one and 
two and thereafter, applied binary-mediation analysis and bootstrap to address 
research question three and examine objective three.  The study addresses question 
four using seemingly unrelated regression analysis (SUR) and examines objective 
four. This section summarizes the findings viz-a-viz the research objectives and 
research questions in chapter one.  The bases of the findings are the responses of 111 




annual reports for years 2010, 2011 and 2012.  The summary of the major findings is 
as shown below: 
Objective One: To examine the relationship between organizational attributes 
(ownership structure, the board of directors, and compensation structure) and the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
 
The study answered research question one to determine the objective using panel-
corrected standard errors regression analysis.  There are extant literature that used 
this statistic method for their studies (de Haas & van Lelyveld, 2006; Barako, 2007; 
Shafer & Moeller, 2012; Hallerberg & Wolff, 2008; Quinn & Toyoda, 2008).  The 
present outlook of the non-financial listed companies in Nigeria reveals a concern for 
adequate monitoring of company activities to ensure the protection of the interests of 
the minority shareholders.   
 
The results show that ownership structure (managerial ownership, government 
ownership, individual block-holders and principal-principal conflicts) influence the 
construct, monitoring mechanisms and construct's dimensions, directorship, internal, 
and external auditing in the non-financial listed companies in Nigeria.  Hence, 
ownership structure significantly impacts on the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976;  Omri et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2010; Oxelheim & 
Randoy 2003;).  Many of the companies are encouraging managerial ownership as an 
incentive to curb expropriation of company’s assets.  However, they attempt to check 
on the negative impact of managerial ownership through the separation of leadership 





The results also indicate that the composition and activities of the board of directors 
(board size, board meeting, CEO tenure, risk management committee, independent 
directors, and board gender) positively influence the construct, monitoring 
mechanisms (MM).  Also, it positively affects construct's dimensions, directorship, 
internal, and external auditing in the non-financial listed companies in Nigeria.  
Board of directors’ composition and activities, therefore, impact on the demand for 
MM ( Zéghal et al., 2011; Lishenga, 2011; Miller, 1991; Yatim, 2009; Malek & Che-
Ahmad, 2013; Lincoln & Adedoyin, 2012).  It is evidenced that many of the 
companies are trying to improve on the composition and activities of the board of 
director to ensure adequate monitoring.  The result shows that the composition and 
activities of the board of directors significantly influence MM. 
 
Likewise, compensation structure (CS) influences the monitoring mechanisms in the 
non-financial listed companies in Nigeria.  CS is an incentive for management, 
members of the board and its committees. CS helps to align the interests of the 
management and shareholders.  The demand for monitoring mechanisms will be less 
because the incentive helps the audit committee and the board to enhance the 
alignment of the interests of the management and the shareholders (Sakawa et al., 
2012; Sarens & Abdolmohammadi, 2011). 
 
Objective Two: To examine the relationship between organizational attributes 






The study answers research question two using logistic regression analysis to 
determine the objective because quality-differentiated auditor is dichotomous.  Many 
extant literature used logistic regression analysis for their studies (Moseson et al., 
2014; Yatim, 2009; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Hope et al., 2012; Fuerman & 
Kraten, 2009).  The logistic regression shows that ownership structure (managerial 
ownership, government ownership, individual block-holders and principal-principal 
conflicts) influence the construct, quality-differentiated auditors in the non-financial 
listed companies in Nigeria.  Therefore, ownership structure impacts on quality-
differentiated auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Henry, 2010; Hope, 2013). 
 
The results also prove that board of directors' composition and activities also 
influence quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) in the non-financial listed companies 
in Nigeria.  The composition and activities of the board of directors impact on QDA.  
The right composition of the board of directors and its activities is likely to demand 
high-quality financial reports for the protection of shareholders' interests.  The board 
is likely to demand quality-differentiated auditors to obtain quality financial reports 
(Ali & Nasir, 2014; Sanda et al., 2011; Yatim, 2009). 
 
Likewise, where compensation structure serves as an incentive to the management 
and members of the board and board committees, both the management and the 
board of directors are likely to be interested in aligning their interests with the 
interests of the shareholders.  Thus, quality financial reports may be desired, and 
quality-differentiated auditors may be engaged to enhance high-quality financial 





Objective Three: To examine how quality-differentiated auditors impact 
organizational attributes (ownership structure, the board of directors, and 
compensation structure) and monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and 
external auditing).  
 
The study ran the binary-mediation analysis and bootstrap to answer question three 
and determine this objective.  The regression reveals that quality-differentiated 
auditors mediate the relationship between organizational attributes and monitoring 
mechanisms.  It, therefore, validates the mediation effect of quality-differentiated 
auditors in the relationship between organizational attributes and monitoring 
mechanisms. Many extant literature used binary-mediation analysis (Rivera, 2012; 
Russell, Ford, Rosenberg & Kelly, 2013; El-Amin, Kinnunen, Ollila, Helminen, 
Alves, Lindfors, & Rimpela, 2015; Voisin, Hotton, & Neilands, 2014). 
 
Ownership structure significantly relates to monitoring mechanisms and significantly 
relates to quality-differentiated auditors (QDA). QDA also relates significantly to 
monitoring mechanisms (MM).  The mediation is significant in the relationship of 
ownership structure with the MM, directorship, internal auditing, and external 
auditing (Iwasaki, 2011; Sirois, et al., 2011).  Thus, QDA mediates between 
ownership structure and monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Board of directors’ composition and activities also relates significantly to quality-
differentiated auditors (QDA).  QDA also relates significantly to monitoring 
mechanisms (MM).  The mediation is significant in the relationship between the 




auditing, and external auditing (Iwasaki, 2011; Desender et al., 2013).  Thus, QDA 
mediates between composition and activities of the board of directors and monitoring 
mechanisms. 
 
Compensation structure also relates significantly to quality-differentiated auditors 
(QDA).  QDA also relates significantly to monitoring mechanisms (MM) in this 
relationship.  The mediation is significant in the relationship of compensation 
structure with the MM, directorship, internal auditing, and external auditing (Boone 
et al, 2010; Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010).  Thus, QDA mediates between 
compensation structure and monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Objective Four: To examine how 2011 SEC Code impact the monitoring 
mechanisms in Nigerian public listed companies. 
 
The study answers question four and determine this objective using seemingly 
related regression analysis (SUR).  The regression reveals that 2011 SEC code 
impacts the monitoring mechanisms in the non-financial listed companies in Nigeria 
showing improvement in monitoring comparing monitoring before and after the 
implementation of the new code of corporate governance.  It reveals that companies 
are pursuing high-quality financial reports to safeguard the interests of the 
shareholders.  Information asymmetry problem can be resolved with the adoption 
and full enforcement of the code of corporate governance and a continuous review of 





Presently, information on internal audit costs, information system structure, 
proportional shareholding per class of shareholders (family, government) is missing 
in the financial reports.  Likewise, non-executive directors’ remuneration needs to be 
clearly separated from executive directors’ remuneration. 
 
6.2 Discussion of the Study 
This study examines the mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors on the 
relationship between organizational attributes (managerial ownership, government 
ownership, individual block-holders, principal-principal conflicts, board size, board 
meetings, CEO tenure, risk management committee, board independence, board 
gender, and compensation structure) and monitoring mechanisms (directorship, 
internal, and external auditing combined). 34 hypotheses representing the constructs 
relationship were developed.  23 hypotheses were developed for each of the 
constructs’ dimension relationship.  The results empirically support 26 of the 34 
constructs’ relationship of the organizational attributes with the aggregate monitoring 
mechanisms.  The results empirically support 16 of the 23 constructs’ dimension 
relationship of the organizational attributes with directorship; 17 of the 23 
relationship with internal auditing; and 15 of the 23 relationship with the external 
auditing. 
 
The result provides empirical evidence that all the five control variables are 
significant.  Company size (Cz), industry (IND), and complexity (CC) are positive 
and significant while loss (LO), and growth (GR) are negatively significant in the 
relationship with the construct, aggregate monitoring mechanisms.  Cz, IND, CC are 
positive and significant also relating to constructs' dimensions, directorship 




relationship between CC and IA.  LO and GR are negatively and significantly related 
to NEDIR, IA, and EA. 
 
6.2.1 Monitoring Mechanisms and Organizational Attributes (C-Path)  
The results of the multiple regression analysis testing the hypothesized variables for 
the direct relationship between the organizational attributes suggest that the model is 
statistically significant (p<0.000) and a good predictive model of monitoring 
mechanisms for Nigerian data.  The R
2
 of the model is 0.4179, a little lower than the 
model in Anderson et al. (1993) of a similar study in Australia with R
2
 of 0.423.  It is 
quite low compared to that of  Mustapha (2009) in Malaysia with R
2 
of 0.7767.  
Thus, it explains about 40% of the variation in the monitoring mechanisms in 
Nigerian non-financial listed companies. 
 
The study suggests that the following hypothesized variables are significant in the 
right direction: 1) managerial ownership, 2) individual block-holders, 3) board size, 
4) board meetings, 5) board independence, 6) board gender, and 7) compensation 
structure.  However, government ownership is significant in the opposite direction.  
In addition, it also finds that all the control variables are significant.  It also finds that 
principal-principal conflicts, CEO tenure, and risk management committee are with 
practical but no statistical relevance. 
 
6.2.1.1 Ownership Structure 
6.2.1.1.1 Direct Effect of Managerial Ownership on Monitoring 
Mechanisms (Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing) 
Agency theory suggests that managerial ownership (MO) has a negative relationship 




theory as it suggests a significant negative relationship with the construct, MM.  
Hence, the results support hypotheses H1a, H1ai, and H1aiii.  The finding is consistent 
with the extant literature (Brunzell & Peltomäki, 2015; Jusoh & Che-Ahmad, 2014; 
Reddy & Sharma, 2014; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Eng & Mak, 2003; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) but with exception to internal auditing, which is significant but in 
the opposite direction.  The findings imply that the more the managerial ownership 
increases, the less the demand for MM, directorship, and external auditing but the 
more the demand for internal auditing.  
 
The findings are consistent with the ownership model of Jusoh and Che-Ahmad 
(2014), which suggests that 1) managerial ownership (MO) is likely to align the 
principal-manager interests. 2) lower MO helps to resolve shareholders-managers 
conflicts. 3) MO significantly and negatively relates to the performance of the 
company.  Likewise, it is consistent with the findings of Mustapha and Che-Ahmad 
(2011), which suggests that MO results in less information asymmetry and 
hierarchical organizational structure.  It conforms also to the findings of Saleh et al. 
(2009), that MO should minimize agency problem.  It is also consistent with the 
findings of Jensen (1998) that MO is an incentive to eliminate agency problems in 
respect of the opportunistic attitudes of the managers.  Hence, monitoring costs 
should reduce.  Likewise, it follows the claim of Amran and Che-Ahmad (2013) that 
1) there is more demand for monitoring mechanism when MO is low. 2) performance 
of the company reduces with increase in shareholdings of the managers. 
 
The managerial shareholder does not need to monitor the management as the owner 




needed to run and monitor the activities of the company.  Also, maximizing the 
company's wealth is maximizing managerial shareholder’s wealth.  Hence, he will be 
more productive to ensure the achievement of the corporate goals.  Managerial 
ownership, therefore, enhances the alignment of the management and shareholders' 
interests.  Thereby, it helps to reduce agency costs. 
 
The rationale for more demand for the internal auditing could be because of the 
control that the management has on the internal auditors, which affects their 
independence and prestige.  This conforms to the findings of Wright and Charles, 
(2012) that many internal auditors lack audit independence for receiving little or no 
support from one or more senior executives.  It is also consistent with Sarens and 
Abdolmohammadi (2011), that managerial ownership affects the decision and 
support of the board of directors for larger internal audit functions that allows for 
close monitoring of management performance.  Thus, shareholding by managers 
through voting rights escalates their influence on the board of directors and impact 
board decisions and policies in general.   Furthermore, the study provides evidence 
through the primary data that only 1.8% of the internal auditors report to the board of 
directors, 26.1% report to the audit committee 11.7% report to the Chief Financial 
Officers and the remaining 60.4% report to the CEO.  The results, therefore, provide 
evidence that executive directors have an influence on internal audit's independence 
and performance in Nigerian non-financial listed companies.  It is, therefore, difficult 
for internal audit to really monitor management on behalf of other shareholders.  
Hence, a large manager-owner is likely to expropriate minority shareholders' 





The study carried out further tests segmenting the companies into companies with 
managerial ownership (MO) and companies with no MO, re-estimating Panel A 
using the alternatives.  The result from this test shows that companies with MO are 
with negative significance at p<0.000 with other variables remaining unchanged.  
The independent t-test carried out following the regression shows that the two classes 
of companies (with and without MO) differ significantly.  Surprisingly, however, 
companies with MO (β = N0.757m, z = 3.56) are with average monitoring costs of 
N3.029m while companies without MO (β = 19m, z = 1.89) are with lesser average 
monitoring costs of N0.648m giving a difference of N2.381m.  This is the reverse of 
the findings of Mustapha (2009) where companies with MO have lesser monitoring 
costs.  The study conducted a further test comparing the monitoring costs of 
companies with more than 5% MO (β = N0.744, z = 4.04) to those with lesser MO (β 
= N0.192, z = 0.15).  The average monitoring costs for companies with 5% and 
above MO is N2.649 while that of companies with less than 5% MO is N0.380 
giving a difference of N2.269.  It reveals that those with more than 5% MO demand 
more monitoring.  This is due to the fact that the MO in the Nigerian non-financial 
companies that are above 5% threshold is about 42%.  It is consistent with the 
findings of Saleh, et al. (2009), Jusoh and Che-Ahmad (2014) that: 1) MO could be 
detrimental if a certain threshold is exceeded. 2) higher MO promotes expropriation 
of minority interests; hence, it can result in grave agency conflicts.  More monitoring 






6.2.1.1.2 Direct Effect of Government Ownership on Monitoring 
Mechanisms (Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing) 
Government ownership (GO) in Panel A is with a significant negative relationship 
with the construct, aggregate monitoring mechanisms (MM) as well as construct’s 
dimensions – directorship (NEDIR), internal auditing (IA) and external auditing 
(EA).  This is the opposite direction of the hypothesis H1b.  Hence, the results do not 
support hypotheses H1b, H1bi, H1bii, and H1biii.  Findings of extant literature on the 
relationship between government ownership (GO) and MM are mixed.  Findings 
consistent with agency theory are with positive significant results for GO and MM.  
This class of thought suggests that GO improves the quality of corporate governance; 
positively affects MM in common law countries; positively relates to independent 
directors, quality disclosure, voluntary disclosure, low managerial ownership, 
management’s innovative ideas and more demand for MM  (Mustapha & Che-
Ahmad, 2013; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Iwasaki, 2011; Eng & Mak, 2003).  On the 
other hand, other extant literature find that political interventions arise with the 
presence of GO; GO has negative impact on voluntary disclosure, firm performance, 
firm growth, governance quality, more agency conflicts (Omri et al., 2014; Borisova 
et al., 2012; Saleh, et al., 2009; Vasilescu, 2008). 
 
The result is, therefore, consistent with the findings of Borisova et al. (2012) 
suggesting that government ownership (GO) is with negative governance quality.  It 
is negative because Nigeria is a civil law country.  It also conforms with the findings 
of Vasilescu (2008) that there is a conflict of interest between management and 





Further tests were made.  It was tested alone with the monitoring mechanisms (MM) 
and it tested positive only for construct’s dimension, external auditing (β=74470.25, 
z=0.28, p=0.781).  Its failure to test positive with directorship and internal auditing 
could be attributed to the fact that the internal audit is part of management and will 
not willingly agree with any force that works against its opportunistic attitudes.  For 
the directors, it may be that the shares of the companies are concentrated and not 
widely spread or they are family owners.  Individual block-holders are very few in 
Nigeria and may lack appropriate votes to control the activities of the management or 
the board of directors. 
 
6.2.1.1.3 Direct Effect of Individual Block-holders on Monitoring 
Mechanisms (Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing) 
The result on Panel A reveals that individual block-holders (IB) have positive 
significant relationship with the construct, monitoring mechanisms and construct's 
dimensions, directorship and external auditing.  Thus, it is consistent with agency 
theory and supports hypotheses H1c, H1ci, and H1ciii.  The result is consistent with the 
extant literature (Habbash, 2012; Ali & Lesage, 2013).  As outside block 
shareholders, though not as strong as institutional block-holders, IB demands more 
monitoring.  The result provides evidence that IB helps to reduce agency conflicts 
following the study of Yaacob and Che-Ahmad (2012a), which treated IB as 
independent directors with 5% and above shareholdings.  It is also consistent with 
the findings of Lishenga (2011), who treated IB as outside directors, that outside 
directors positively relates to firms’ performance.  Its ability to address the conflicts 
between shareholders and management will help in improving the performance of the 
company and demand for more monitoring to ensure the alignment of the interests of 




that IB applies more operational corporate governance.  The result is consistent with 
the finding of Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2013), which provides evidence that non-
institutional block-holders demand more monitoring with an increase in their 
shareholdings. 
 
However, it has a negative significant relationship with the internal auditing (IA).  
Hence, the result does not support hypothesis H1cii that expect a positive significant 
relationship between individual block-holders (IB) and IA.  The result provides 
evidence that IA is more or less part of management whose activities is to be 
monitored.  Hence, IB is likely to demand other dimensions of monitoring than IA 
considering the influence of management on the independence of internal audit.  This 
is consistent with the findings of Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011) that a block-
holder is likely to invest less in internal audit function. 
 
6.2.1.2 Board of Directors (Composition and Activities) 
6.2.1.2.1 Direct Effect of Board Size on Monitoring Mechanisms 
(Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing) 
The results for Panel A show positive significant relationship between board size 
(BS) and the construct, monitoring mechanisms (MM), as well as construct’s 
dimension, directorship (NEDIR).  Thus, it is consistent with stakeholders’ theory 
and supports hypothesis H2a and H2ai that board size relates significantly to the 
demand for MM and NEDIR.  It reveals that a unit increase in BS results in an 
increase in the demand for MM and NEDIR.  This is consistent with the results from 
the studies of Zéghal et al. (2011).  It is also consistent with the findings of Zhang et 




consistent with the study of Kajola (2008), that find a positive significant relationship 
between BS and returns on equity.   
 
The result fails to support hypotheses H2aii and H2aiii that board size relates 
significantly to internal and external auditing as monitoring mechanisms as it shows 
no significant relationship between board size and neither internal nor external 
auditing.  However, it shows that, though not statistically relevant, it is practically 
relevant to external auditing.   The finding is consistent with the study of Babatunde 
and Olaniran (2009). 
 
Further tests were carried out reclassifying the companies to companies with smaller 
board size (BS) and companies with larger BS.  The result from re-estimating Panel 
A using these alternatives shows that companies with smaller BS are with negative 
significance at p<0.000 while those with larger BS are with positive significance at 
p<0.000.  It shows that companies with smaller BS and those with larger BS differ 
significantly.  The average monitoring costs for companies with smaller BS is 
N0.351m while the average monitoring costs for those with larger BS is N8.054m 
giving a difference of N7.703m.  It implies that companies with larger BS have more 
demand for monitoring mechanisms than companies with smaller BS.  Larger BS 
helps to scrutinize information from the management.  This is consistent with the 
findings of (Ali & Nasir, 2014; Velnampy, 2013; Uadiale, 2010).  Larger BS is 
characterized with more independent directors, and financial expertise on board, 
hence, it helps to align the interests of management and shareholders effectively.  




board size.  The study provides evidence that more than 78% of the respondent 
companies are with 7 to 14 board members. 
 
6.2.1.2.2 Direct Effect of Board Meetings on Monitoring Mechanisms 
(Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing)  
The results for Panel A show significant positive relationship between board 
meetings (BM) and the construct, monitoring mechanisms (MM), as well as 
construct’s dimensions, directorship (NEDIR) and external auditing (EA).  Thus, it is 
consistent with agency theory and supports hypothesis H2b, H2bi, and H2biii that BM 
relates significantly to the demand for MM, NEDIR, and EA.  It reveals that a unit 
increase in BM results in an increase in the demand for MM as well as NEDIR and 
EA.  This is consistent with the results from the studies of Lishenga (2011); 
Kajananthan (2012).  The study, therefore, provides evidence that BM enhances 
more demand for monitoring, especially through NEDIR and EA.  The finding is 
consistent with the study of Appah and Emeh (2013) that larger boards add to the 
monitoring capacity of the board through diverse expertise.  It is evidence that 
regular meetings of the board enhance alignment of the interests of the management 
and shareholders and ensure more demand for monitoring through NEDIR and EA.  
The demand for internal auditing is not so high because of the possible interference 
of the top management. 
 
Further tests were carried out reclassifying the companies to companies with more 
board meetings (BM) and companies with lesser BM.  The result from re-estimating 
Panel A using these alternatives shows that companies with lesser BM are with 
negative significance at p<0.000 while those with more BM are with positive 




more BM differ significantly.  The average monitoring costs for companies with 
lesser BM is N0.084m while those with more BM is N4.252m giving a difference of 
N4.168.  It implies that companies with more BM have more demand for monitoring 
mechanisms than companies with lesser BM.  This is consistent with the findings of 
Kajananthan (2012). More BM connotes more access to more information through 
which board aligns the interests of management and shareholders effectively.  The 
study provides evidence that about 83% of the sampled Nigerian non-financial 
companies met between 4 and 10 times in a year.  
 
6.2.1.2.3 Direct Effect of Board Independence on Monitoring Mechanisms 
(Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing) 
The results for Panel A show significant positive relationship between board 
independence (BI) and the construct, monitoring mechanisms (MM).  BI also relates 
positively and significantly to construct’s dimensions, directorship (NEDIR) and 
internal auditing (IA).  Thus, it supports hypotheses H2e, H2ei, and H2eii that 
independent directors relate positively to the demand for MM as well as NEDIR and 
IA.  It reveals that a unit increase in BI results in an increase in the demand for MM 
as well as NEDIR and IA.  This is consistent with agency and signalling theories and 
the results of the studies of Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010), 
Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010).  The study, therefore, provides evidence that board 
independence enhances more demand for monitoring especially through directorship 
and internal auditing.  The result shows that the relationship between BI and external 
auditing is in the right direction.   
 
This study, therefore, provides evidence that a company with independent directors 




shareholders' interests.  The presence of independent directors on the board of 
directors helps to align the interests of the management with those of the 
shareholders.  This is consistent with the findings of Anderson and Reeb (2004) and 
Latif, Kamardin, Nisham, Mohd, and Adam (2013).  The study provides evidence 
that almost all the non-financial listed companies in Nigeria (about 98%) have 
independent directors on the board of directors. 
 
6.2.1.2.4 Direct Effect of Board Gender on Monitoring Mechanisms 
(Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing).  
The results for Panel A show significant positive relationship between board gender 
(BG) and the construct, monitoring mechanisms (MM), as well as construct’s 
dimensions, directorship (NEDIR) and internal auditing (IA).  Thus, it supports 
hypothesis H2f, H2fi, and H2fii that BG relates positively to the demand for MM, 
NEDIR, and IA.  It reveals that a unit increase in BG results in an increase in the 
demand for MM as a construct as well as NEDIR and IA as units of the construct.  
This is consistent with the agency, stakeholders, and signalling theories and the 
results of the studies of Jonty and Mokoteli (2015), Lenard et al. (2014), Remery et 
al. (2010), Lincoln and Adedoyin (2012).  The study, therefore, provides evidence 
that BG enhances more demand for monitoring, especially through NEDIR and IAC.  
It provides the template for effective governance, better company performance, risk 
management and firm value through the availability of a wider pool of talents.  It is 
consistent with agency theory, suggesting that gender balance enhances board 
independence.  The result shows that the relationship between BG and EA is 
significant but in the opposite direction.  The finding is consistent with the study of 




external auditing is mandatory and has nothing doing with whether or not there is 
gender inequality in the composition of the board. 
 
Further tests were carried out reclassifying the companies to companies with female 
directors (FD) and companies with no FD.  The result from re-estimating Panel A 
using these alternatives shows that companies with FD (β = N129m, z = 5.59) are 
with positive significance at p<0.000 while companies with no FD (β = N17.4m, z = 
3.31) are with negative significance in the relationship with monitoring mechanisms.  
It implies that companies with more FD have more demand for monitoring 
mechanisms than companies with lesser FD.  About 41% of the Nigerian non-
financial listed companies are with no FD on their board of directors.  
 
6.2.1.3 Direct Effect of Compensation Structure on Monitoring Mechanisms 
(Directorship, Internal, and External Auditing)  
The results for Panel A show that significant negative relationship exist between 
compensation structure (CS) and the construct, monitoring mechanisms (MM), as 
well as construct's dimensions, directorship (NEDIR), internal auditing (IA), and 
external auditing (EA).  Thus, it supports hypothesis H3, H3i, H3ii, and H3iii that CS 
relates negatively to the demand for MM, NEDIR, IA, and EA.  It reveals that a unit 
increase in CS results in a decrease in the demand for MM as well as NEDIR, IA, 
and EA.  This implies that the interest of the management and shareholders are 
aligned, and there is an improvement in the performance of the company.  It is a tool 
to solving agency conflicts for which lesser amount is spent on monitoring as it helps 
to reduce auditors' efforts.  This is consistent with agency theory and the results of 
studies of Armstrong et al. (2010), Lishenga (2011), Sanda et al. (2011), Hope et al. 




monitoring.  However, the study of  Mustapha (2009) provides practical but no 
statistical evidence for the relationship between CS and MM. 
 
This study, therefore, provides evidence that compensation structure is an incentive 
for resolving agency conflicts in organizations.  It helps to align the interests of the 
management and the shareholders.  Hence, companies should adequately compensate 
the top management and board committees to spur them to be more effective and 
efficient in discharging their duties in maximizing shareholders’ value.  However, 
SEC 2011’s guide on the remuneration of the directors and senior management 
should be considered in making such decisions.  It should be noted, however, that 
this  finding is yet to be felt in the prevailing practice, more so, this study explains 
only 40% of the interactions in the audit market and corporate governance in 
Nigerian non-financial sector.  However, it may be an evidence of improvement for a 
change, which may not be easily noted where corruption and fraud are legendary. 
 
6.2.2 Quality-differentiated Auditors and Organizational Attributes (A Path) 
The results in Panel B testing the hypothesized variables for the relationship between 
the organizational attributes and quality-differentiated auditors suggest that the 
model is statistically significant (p<0.000) and a good predictive model of quality-
differentiated auditors for Nigerian data. 
 
The study suggests that the following hypothesized variables are significant and 
supported: 1) principal-principal conflicts, 2) board size, 3) risk management 
committee, 4) board independence, and 5) compensation structure.  Managerial 




opposite direction.  In addition, it finds that control variables, company size is 
positively significant and loss is negatively significant.    It also suggests that 
government ownership and board meetings are with practical but no statistical 
relevance, but board gender is in the opposite direction. 
 
6.2.2.1 Ownership Structure 
6.2.2.1.1 Direct Effect of Managerial Ownership on Quality-differentiated 
Auditors 
The results show a significant positive relationship between managerial ownership 
(MO) and quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) but in the opposite direction.  It 
reveals that a unit increase in MO results in an increase in the demand for QDAs.  
This implies that the interest of the management and shareholders are not aligned, 
and there is no improvement in the performance of the company.  It fails as a tool to 
solving agency conflicts triggering companies to spend more on monitoring.  This is 
consistent with the results of studies of DeAngelo (1981), Defond et al. (2000), 
Numan and Willekens (2012) that information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders increases with an increase in shareholding of the management.  The 
inside holdings have exceeded a level that results in increased agency costs, leading 
to competition in audit market and demand for a quality audit.  About 42% of the 
Nigerian non-financial companies are above 5% MO threshold.  The result is 
consistent with the findings of Jusoh and Che-Ahmad (2014) that MO could be 
detrimental if a certain threshold is exceeded.  The result from further test reveals 
that companies with MO are positively related to QDA (β=0.036, z=1.68, p=0.094) 
and those with no MO are negatively related to QDA (β=3.608, z=2.14, p=0.032).  
The study, therefore, provides evidence that MO is likely to promote opportunistic 




manager conflict, which is the basis of the demand through other organizational 
attributes for costly auditing.  Hence, quality-differentiated auditors may be required 
especially in companies with high MO as there are evidence of companies with MO 
in the range of 12% and 60% in the Nigerian non-financial respondent companies. 
 
6.2.2.1.2 Direct Effect of Individual Block-holders on Quality-
differentiated Auditors 
The results show a significant negative relationship between individual block-holders 
(IB) and quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs).  Thus, it fails to support hypothesis 
H41c that IB relate positively to QDAs.  It reveals that a unit increase in IB results in 
a decrease in the demand for QDAs.  This implies that the interests of the 
management and shareholders are aligned, and there is an improvement in the 
performance of the company.  It suggests that the IBs are inside-owners and have 
access to full information needed for decision making.  It means that the IBs are 
manager block-holders or family block-holders or are closely related to the 
management and have less information asymmetry with the management.  It, 
therefore, helps to resolve agency conflicts and attracts less monitoring.  Since the 
level of information asymmetry relates to the demand for a quality audit, and there 
exist little or no information asymmetry with IB, the demand for QDA will be less.  
This is consistent with the results of the study of Henry (2010) that IB encourages 
agency alignment and reduces the level of agency costs.  It is also consistent with the 
study of Habbash (2012), that block-holding faces less agency problems because 
ownership is separated from control, however, it is characterized by severe agency 
problems between the block-holders and minority shareholders.  Individual block-





6.2.2.1.3 Direct Effect of Principal-principal Conflicts on Quality-
differentiated Auditors 
The results show a significant positive relationship between principal-principal 
conflict (PPC), otherwise known as type II agency problem and QDAs.  The study 
supports hypothesis H41d that PPC relates positively to QDAs.  It reveals that a unit 
increase in PPC results in an increase in the demand for QDAs.  This implies that an 
increase in the shareholding of the second-largest shareholder (SLS) helps to demand 
high-quality audit that helps to resolve the conflicts among the shareholders.  The 
result is consistent with agency and shareholders theory the claims of Hope (2013) 
Gogineni, Linn, and Yadav (2011) Pagano and Roell (1998). Hope (2013) claims that 
the monitoring ability of the SLS increases with the increase in their stockholdings 
and are empowered to monitor the largest shareholders (LS).  It implies that SLS can 
help to prevent the LS from exploiting the minority shareholders.  Pagano and Roell 
(1998) claims that increase in the stake-holdings of second-largest owners (non-
controlling owners) lessens the expropriation of the minority shareholders.  The 
result is also consistent with the study of Gogineni et al. (2011) that the ability of the 
SLS to prevent the LS’ private benefits extraction is a function of the magnitude of 
stocks held by the SLS.  Furthermore, it conforms to the findings of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) that the number of shares determines the magnitude of the demand 
for monitoring.  It is also consistent with the study of Habbash (2012), that block-
holding faces less agency problems because ownership is separated from control, 
however, it is characterized by severe agency problems between the block-holders 





6.2.2.2 Board of Directors (Composition and Activities)  
6.2.2.2.1 Direct Effect of Board Size on Quality-differentiated Auditors 
The results show a significant negative relationship between board size (BS) and 
quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs).  The study fails to support hypothesis H42a 
that BS relates positively to QDAs.  It reveals that a unit increase in BS results in a 
decrease in the demand for QDAs.  This implies that as the BS is getting bigger, the 
demand for high-quality audit reduces.  It means that as the number of directors on 
the board of directors increases, more experts with diverse but relevant knowledge 
needed for adequate directorship monitoring are included in board composition.  
Thereby, the demand for QDAs may be exchanged for the medium-sized auditors or 
other auditors.  Thus, there will be a reduction in agency costs especially regarding 
external auditing because monitoring by financial expertise now on board can 
substitute for external auditors to a certain extent.  With adequate financial expertise 
on board due to BS, BS positively affects the quality of financial reports.  It also 
signals good strategies and services that promote effective board monitoring of the 
management.  The result is consistent with the claim of Ali and Nasir (2014), 
Lishenga (2011), Appah and Emeh (2013).  The study of Appah and Emeh (2013) 
reveals that larger boards of directors help to fortify the board’s monitoring capacity 
through diverse expertise on board.  The growth in the size of the board of directors 
ensures the presence of expertise on the boards of Nigerian non-financial companies.  
Hence, there have been reductions in agency costs of some of the companies. 
 
6.2.2.2.2 Direct Effect of CEO Tenure on Quality-differentiated Auditor 
The results show a significant relationship between CEO tenure (CEOT) and quality-




increase in CEOT results in a decrease in the demand for QDAs.  This implies that as 
the CEO's years in the company increases, the demand for high-quality audit reduces.  
The result is consistent with the findings of Miller (1991), Gomez-mejia and Nunez-
nickel (2001), Conger and Nadler (2004), Sanda et al. (2011).  A CEO with a lengthy 
tenure has established a relationship with members of the board of directors to the 
extent of being able to influence their decisions.  The relationship may be unhealthy 
for the company, which results in more agency costs.  CEO’s monitoring becomes 
less rigid as his tenure increases.  The CEO may relax his monitoring to the departure 
time with the aim of self-accomplishments contrary to corporation endeavours.  The 
implication of this result is that as the CEO becomes a stale in the saddle because of 
his lengthy tenure, it is likely that he will not recommend a QDA for board’s 
approval.  More than 35% of the CEOs of the Nigerian non-financial listed 
respondent companies have been with their companies for 6 to 33years.  Their 
lengthy periods of service have been increasing the agency costs.  Hence, more 
monitoring is required in such companies, and quality-differentiated auditors are 
likely to be preferred to ensure no expropriation of the companies' assets.  
 
6.2.2.2.3 Direct Effect of Risk Management Committee on Quality-
differentiated Auditors 
The results show a significant positive relationship between risk management 
committee (RMC) and quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs).  The study supports 
hypothesis H42d that RMC relates positively to QDAs.  It reveals that a unit increase 
in RMC positively contributes to the variations in the demand for QDAs.  The result 
is consistent with the findings of Yatim (2009) that companies with RMC are likely 
to demand QDAs.  It conforms to the findings of Subramaniam, McManus, and 




directors to ensure quality monitoring of management activities.  It implies that 
quality monitoring will require QDAs to complement directorship monitoring.  The 
existence of RMC also signals the presence of financial expertise on the board of 
directors.  It is also a signal for debt holders that the company is capable of 
discharging its obligations to pay back the borrowed money with accrued interests.  
Also, the importance of risk management, which is the focus of RMC is central to 
internal control, and internal control is also central to quality auditing.  Therefore, a 
significant positive relationship between RMC and QDA is supported.  About 37% 
of the Nigerian non-financial respondent companies are with separate committees for 
risk management and already reaping its benefits. 
 
6.2.2.2.4 Direct Effect of Board Independence on Quality-differentiated 
Auditors 
The results show a significant positive relationship between board independence (BI) 
and quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs).  The study supports hypothesis H42e that 
BI relates positively to QDAs.  It reveals that a unit increase in BI positively 
contributes to the variations in the demand for QDAs.  The result is consistent with 
the findings of Kim et al. (2007), Anderson et al. (2004), Omri et al. (2014), Latif et 
al. (2013), Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010).  It implies that BI: 1) helps to enhance the 
empowerment of minority shareholders. 2) is a vital instrument for a reliable 
financial report required to restore and build shareholders’ trusts and confidence. 3) 
helps to improve the quality of management's decisions because a proportional 
increase in the number of independent directors on the board of directors reduces the 
willingness of management to expropriate company's assets. 4) exposes poor 
performance and proposals, acting in the interests of the shareholders. 5) enhances 




and knowledge of the board. 7) helps to enhance monitoring within the firm.  Hence, 
it relates to audit quality and therefore, will demand QDAs. 
   
6.2.2.3 Direct Effect of Compensation Structure on Quality-differentiated 
Auditors 
The results show a positive significant relationship between compensation structure 
(CS) and quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs).  The study supports hypothesis H43 
that CS relates positively to the demand for QDAs.  It reveals that a unit increase in 
CS positively contributes to the variations in the demand for QDAs.  The finding is 
consistent with the study of Armstrong et al. (2010) that executive and non-executive 
compensation which is performance based helps to promote transparency.  It also 
helps to align the interests of the shareholders and management.  Hence, SEC Code, 
2011 directs that a company should establish a governance/remuneration committee 
as a committee of non-executive directors.  The result is also consistent with the 
findings of Lishenga (2011), Sakawa et al. (2012), Sarens and Abdolmohammadi 
(2011), Engel et al. (2010), and Deumes et al. (2010).  CS either or both for the 
management and board members is a useful tool for performance improvement to 
resolve agency conflicts. 
 
6.2.3 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors  
The study follows the conditions stipulated in Baron and Kenny (1986) and Zhao et 
al. (2010) to determine the probability of QDAs mediating between OAs and 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing).  Further to this 
is the specifications in the study by Zhao et al. (2010), Rivera (2012) and statistical 
principles to finally conclude on the findings.  Baron and Kenny (1986)’s four 




and the dependent variable (monitoring mechanisms) – ‘path c.’ 2) OAs and 
mediating variable (QDA) – ‘path a’. 3) QDA and monitoring mechanisms (MM). 4) 
and insignificant relationship between OAs and MM for QDA (path c’) with an 
extension that the mediation is partial if c’ is less than c.  All variables were tested 
for mediation following extant literature that the relationship between independent 
and dependent variables need not be significant to establish a mediation effect (Zhao 
et al., 2010; Hayes, 2009).  The extant literature further suggests that the significant 
relationship required is not necessarily from the study but from extant literature in 
which it previously tested significant (Zhao et al., 2010; Engel et al., 2010). 
 
Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 have shown that relationship exist between 1) organizational 
attributes (OAs) and monitoring mechanisms (MM), and 2) OAs and quality-
differentiated auditors (QDA) as the first two conditions to establish mediating 
effects following Baron and Kenny (1986).  QDAs significantly relate to OAs as the 
third condition following Baron and Kenny (1986).  This study also establishes the 
proportion of the total effect that QDA mediated.  The study also compares the 
results of the relationship between OAs and MM with no mediation (path c) and OAs 
and MM with mediation (path c’).  The essence of the test is to establish that c’ is not 
significant or less than c as the fourth condition following Baron and Kenny (1986).  
However, bootstrap result is more superior and overrules the fourth condition.  The 
results suggest that the model is statistically significant (p < 0.000) and a good 
predictive model of QDAs for Nigerian data.  Furthermore, none of the results is 
with zero confidential intervals for indirect effects, suggesting that there may be one 
or more other mediating variables in the relationship.  Thus, the research establishes 




to confirm its likelihood of being a mediating variable as suggested by Baron and 
Kenny, 1986; Kim et al., 2001.  The final results are discussed as follows: 
 
6.2.3.0 Mediating Effects of Quality-Differentiated Auditors on the Relationship 
between Organizational Attributes and Monitoring Mechanisms (b&c’-Paths) 
 
6.2.3.1 Mediating Effects of Quality-Differentiated Auditors on the Relationship 
between Ownership Structure and Monitoring Mechanisms 
The results reveal that quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) significantly mediate 
the relationship between ownership structure (OS) and monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
 
6.2.3.1.1 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Monitoring Mechanisms 
As already argued in section 6.2.1.1.1 this study finds that managerial ownership 
(MO) in the relationship with monitoring mechanisms (MM), as well MM’s 
dimensions (directorship and external auditing) is significant in the right direction.  It 
is likewise significant in its relationship with quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) 
but in the opposite direction as argued in section 6.2.2.1.1.  Thirdly, QDA relates 
significantly to MM and its dimensions (directorship, internal and external auditing) 
as demanded by Baron and Kenny (1986) as argued in 5.4.3.1.1.  Most importantly, 
this study finds that QDA mediates the relationship between MO and MM as well as 
MM’s dimensions (directorship and external auditing) as highlighted in 5.4.3.1.1 
following Zhao et al. (2010) and Rivera (2012). 
 
The findings of this study match Jusoh and Che-Ahmad, 2014 in which MO 
significantly and negatively relates to firms' performance.  Firms' performance is 




firms' performance is not favourable to shareholders’ interest due to management’s 
opportunistic attitudes, management’s demand for monitoring mechanisms will 
likely be low so as not to get exposed. 
 
The rationale behind the negative significant effect of managerial ownership (MO) 
on monitoring mechanisms (MM) or its dimensions, (directorship and external 
auditing) is that the firms’ performance reduces as the shareholding of the 
management increases (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2013) or when MO is very low 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Also, agency theory suggests that if shareholders fail to 
monitor the management, it is likely that management displays opportunistic 
behaviour and expropriate the assets of the company.  Agency theory suggests that 
agents and principals’ interests are always at variance (Brunzell & Peltomäki, 2015;  
Reddy & Sharma, 2014; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Eng & Mak, 2003; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976).  Quality monitoring is therefore needed to curb the opportunistic 
attitudes, provide quality information through quality financial reports to the 
shareholders, and regain their trusts and confidence in the management of the 
company.  A company's management with a reasonable shareholding will avoid 
engagement in the expropriation of assets and seek to produce quality financial 
reports.  However, if the shareholding of the management becomes enormous, it is 
likely that the management expropriates company assets and fail to choose quality-
differentiated auditors to examine the company's financial reports.  This implies that 
engagement of a quality-differentiated auditor in a company with managerial 





6.2.3.1.2 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Government Ownership and Monitoring Mechanisms 
As argued in 6.2.1.1.2, this study finds that government ownership (GO) in the 
relationship with monitoring mechanisms (MM) and MM’s dimensions (directorship, 
internal and external auditing) is significant in the opposite direction.  It fails to 
satisfy condition two of Baron and Kenny (1986) both in multivariate (Table 5.4.6) 
and univariate (Table 5.5.2) tests in its relationship with QDA.  However, the study 
tested the variable base on earlier arguments of extant literature (Zhao et al., 2010; 
Hayes, 2009) that the significant relationship is not compulsory to establish a 
mediation effect.  Thirdly, QDA relates significantly to MM and its dimensions 
(directorship, internal and external auditing) as demanded by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) and argued in 5.4.3.1.2.  Most importantly, this study finds that QDA 
mediates the relationship between GO and MM as well as MM’s dimensions 
(directorship and external auditing) as highlighted in 5.4.3.1.2 following Zhao et al. 
(2010) and Rivera (2012). 
 
The findings are consistent with the findings of Borisova et al. (2012) that 
government ownership is disadvantageous to quality monitoring in countries with 
civil law.  It demonstrates the disparity between the goals of the government and 
corporations.  The corporate goal is to maximize shareholders' wealth while the 
government is aiming at sufficient tax income to run the affairs of the nation.  A 
high-quality financial report is needed to blend these two different goals and a 
quality-differentiated auditor (QDA) is likely to be chosen for this purpose.  The 
likelihood of choosing a QDA is confirmed in the finding which demonstrates that 




al. (2009) that government ownership is important to monitor the ability of the 
management for the realization of corporate goals. 
 
Thus, it implies that engagement of a quality-differentiated auditor in a company 
with government ownership will help to protect the public fund in the company and 
thereby protect the interests of the shareholders as well. 
 
6.2.3.1.3 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Individual Block-holders and Monitoring Mechanisms 
This study finds that individual block-holders (IB) in the relationship with 
monitoring mechanisms (MM) is significant in the right direction as well as MM’s 
dimensions (NEDIR and EA) but in the opposite direction IB and IA relationship as 
argued in 6.2.1.1.3.  It is likewise significant but in the opposite direction in its 
relationship with quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) as argued in 6.2.2.1.2.  
Thirdly, QDA relates significantly to MM and all MM’s dimensions as demanded by 
Baron and Kenny (1986) and argued in 5.4.3.1.3.  Most importantly, this study finds 
that QDA mediates the relationship between IB and MM as well as MM’s 
dimensions (directorship and external auditing) as highlighted in 5.4.3.1.2. 
 
The findings of this study match Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2013) and Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) that outside shareholders are likely to monitor the inside shareholders 
and ensure the protection of their interests and that of the minority shareholders.  It is 
also consistent with the study of Connelly et al. (2010) that outside block-holders are 
more likely to represent better the interests of other shareholders compared to other 
types of ownership.  It also conforms with the study of Oyejide and Soyibo (2001) 




discretion of the manager to expropriate.  Hence, it encourages more monitoring and 
allows for economies of scale.  They may not be as influential as the institutional 
block-holders, they demand monitoring as the institutional block-holders.  The 
enormity of their investment requires quality auditing to protect their interests.  
Hence, they are likely to demand high-quality financial reports.  Therefore, they are 
likely to choose quality-differentiated auditors as the external auditors for their 
company. 
 
In addition, the results demonstrate that the individual block-holders are either family 
shareholders or management shareholders.  The result is consistent with the study of 
Connelly, et al. (2010). 
 
6.2.3.1.4 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Principal-principal Conflicts and Monitoring Mechanisms 
This study finds that Principal-principal Conflicts (PPC) is only significant in its 
relationship with the internal and external auditing as a monitoring mechanism in the 
right direction as displayed in Table 5.4.1, and argued in sections 5.4.1.3 and 5.4.1.4.  
Its relationship with monitoring mechanisms is in the right direction as argued in 
section 5.4.1.1.  This study follows literature that suggest that the significant 
relationship required is not necessarily from the study but from extant literature in 
which it previously tested significant (Zhao et al., 2010; Engel et al., 2010).  
Likewise, PPC tested significant when tested alone with MM as discussed in section 
5.5.2.  It tested practically but not statistically relevant in the relationship with the 
directorship in the univariate test considered in section 5.5.2 of this study.  It is 
significant also in its relationship with quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) in the 




MM and all MM’s dimensions as demanded by Baron and Kenny (1986) and argued 
in 5.4.3.1.4.  Most importantly, this study finds that QDA mediates the relationship 
between PPC and MM as well as MM’s dimensions (directorship and external 
auditing) as highlighted in 5.4.3.1.4. 
 
The findings of this study match Hope et al. (2012) and Pagano and Roell (1998) that 
PPC helps to monitor the controlling shareholders’ expropriation behaviour. Lei, Lin, 
and Wei (2013) also claim that PPC helps to control expropriation of minority 
shareholders.  It is also consistent with the study of Fan and Wong (2005) that 
companies with quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) are with less expropriation of 
minority shareholders.  Hence, QDA mediates the relationship between the PPC and 
monitoring mechanisms.  The findings in the relationship between PPC and NEDIR 
imply less monitoring by NEDIR because PPC is effective in monitoring both the 
management and the controlling shareholders.  The result implies that agency 
conflicts between the controlling and second-largest shareholders reduce the 
opportunistic attitudes of the controlling shareholders.  The reduction is due to the 
increase in their shareholdings, which lessens the power of the largest shareholder.  It 
also helps to protect both the foreign and local minority shareholders and enhance 
professional management of the company.  The conflicts among shareholders require 
high-quality monitoring.  Hence, quality-differentiated auditors are likely to be 





6.2.3.2 Mediating Effects of Quality-Differentiated Auditors on the Relationship 
between the Board of Directors (Composition and Activities) and Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
The results reveal that quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) significantly mediate 
the relationship between the board of directors (composition and activities) and 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing). 
 
6.2.3.2.1 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Board Size and Monitoring Mechanisms 
As earlier debated in section 6.2.1.2.1, this study finds that board size (BS) is 
significant in its relationship with monitoring mechanisms (MM) and one of its 
dimensions, directorship.  The deliberation in section 5.5.2 also reveals that BS 
significantly relates to MM's dimensions (internal and external auditing) in the 
univariate test.   It is significant also in its relationship with quality-differentiated 
auditors (QDA) but in the opposite direction as deliberated in section 6.2.2.1.4.  
Thirdly, QDA relates significantly to MM and all MM’s dimensions as demanded by 
Baron and Kenny (1986) and argued in 5.4.3.1.5.  Most importantly, this study finds 
that QDA mediates the relationship between BS and MM as well as MM’s 
dimensions (directorship and external auditing) as highlighted in 5.4.3.1.5. 
 
The findings of this study match Zéghal et al. (2011), Yasser et al. (2011), Appah 
and Emeh (2013) and (Kajola, 2008) that BS relates significantly to the timeliness of 
financial reports, earnings management and returns on equity.   It is also consistent 
with the findings of Lennox and Pittman (2010) that BS negatively relates to fraud.  
It is likewise consistent with the studies of Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Akhtaruddin et 
al. (2009) that BS has a significant contribution to the provision of quality voluntary 




relevant expertise, knowledge, and skills for reasonable decision making and 
adequate monitoring.  The result suggests that a sizeable board of directors is more 
intensive in its monitoring roles.  Hence, it is likely to reduce fraud.  The board aims 
at a high-quality financial report, and it is likely to choose quality-differentiated 
auditors to achieve its aim and objectives.  
 
6.2.3.2.2 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Board Meetings and Monitoring Mechanisms 
As earlier discussed in section 6.2.1.2.2, this study finds that board meetings (BM) 
are significant in the relationship with monitoring mechanisms (MM) as well as 
MM’s dimensions (directorship and external auditing).  The reflection from section 
5.5.2 indicates that BM is significant in its relationship with the internal auditing and 
also with quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) in the right direction in univariate 
tests.  Thirdly, QDA relates significantly to MM and all MM’s dimensions as 
demanded by Baron and Kenny (1986) and argued in 5.4.3.1.6.  Most importantly, 
this study finds that QDA mediates the relationship between BM and MM as well as 
MM’s dimensions (directorship and external auditing) as highlighted in 5.4.3.1.6.  
 
The findings of this study match Lishenga (2011) and Kajananthan (2012) that BM 
relates significantly to earnings management and returns on equity.  It is consistent 
also with the findings of Armstrong et al. (2010) that BM helps to establish the 
reputation of the board of directors in respect of their independence.  It is also 
consistent with the findings of Lennox and Pittman (2010) that there is likely to be 
less fraud in companies with frequent BM.  The result implies that the frequency of 
the meetings of the board of directors relates to the amount of information the 




effectiveness of the board of directors.  Frequent board meetings may likely reduce 
fraud occurrence because the more they meet, the more they demand monitoring.  
The board is likely to choose quality-differentiated auditors to achieve its aim and 
objectives for a high-quality financial report and comprehensive monitoring. 
 
6.2.3.2.3 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between CEO Tenure and Monitoring Mechanisms 
This study finds that CEO tenure (CEOT) is practically but not statistically relevant 
in its relationship with monitoring mechanisms (MM) as displayed in Table 5.4.1.  
Surprisingly, it is significant in its relationship with MM’s dimensions [directorship 
internal auditing, and external auditing] but in the opposite direction for CEOT and 
EA.  However, CEOT tested significant with MM in univariate regression as 
discussed in section 5.5.2.  This paper earlier argued in section 6.2.2.1.5 that CEOT 
is significant in its relationship with quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) but in the 
opposite direction.  Thirdly, QDA relates significantly to MM and all MM’s 
dimensions as demanded by Baron and Kenny (1986) and argued in 5.4.3.1.7.  Most 
importantly, this study finds that QDA mediates the relationship between CEOT and 
MM as well as MM’s dimensions (directorship and external auditing) as highlighted 
in 5.4.3.1.7.   
 
The findings of this study match the studies of Gomez-mejia and Nunez-nickel 
(2001), Conger and Nadler (2004), Sanda et al. (2011), Carver (2014), Miller (1991), 
Luo et al. (2014), and Sakawa et al. (2012).  The results reveal that lengthy tenure 
may empower the CEO to influence the decisions of the board of directors and/or 
any of its committees.  Such influence may not be favourable to the company if it is 




to delay actions to the end of the tenure or not to quit the job.  The intimacy 
developed between the CEO and the board members over the years of the lengthy 
tenure can mar the independence of the board.  There is likely to be opportunities for 
the expropriation of the assets of the company as board independence is challenged 
with intimacy with the CEO and lessened monitoring.  It is, therefore, likely that 
agency costs will be very high due to repercussions of the reduction of the CEO's 
interests in the company's activities and leniency regarding compliance to standards, 
policies, rules, and regulations.  Thus, there may be a need for more monitoring and a 
high-quality financial report may be required to ensure the protection of company's 
assets.  Therefore, a quality-differentiated auditor (QDA) may be required for this 
purpose. 
 
6.2.3.2.4 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Risk Management Committee and Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
This study finds that risk management committee (RMC) is significant only in its 
relationship with construct’s dimension, internal auditing in the right direction as 
revealed in section 5.4.1.  Its relationship with the construct and monitoring 
mechanisms construct's dimension, the directorship are in the right direction, though 
with no statistical relevance.  However, RMC tested significant with MM 
directorship, and external auditing in univariate regression.  Secondly, this paper 
argues in section 6.2.2.1.6 that RMC is also significant in its relationship with 
quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) and in the right direction.  Thirdly, QDA 
relates significantly to MM and all MM’s dimensions as demanded by Baron and 




mediates the relationship between RMC and MM as well as MM’s dimensions 
(directorship and external auditing) as highlighted in 5.4.3.1.8.   
 
The findings of this study are consistent with the studies of Subramaniam et al. 
(2009), Yatim (2009), Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011) and  Nworji et al. 
(2011).  An increase in RMC explains the contribution of RMC in the variation of 
monitoring mechanisms (MM).  Risk is central to MM and RMC enhances high-
quality monitoring.  Establishment of a separate RMC is indispensable especially as 
financial risk is increasing.  Since risk management is paramount to the desire for 
high-quality financial reports, the board is likely to choose quality-differentiated 
auditors (QDA) to achieve a high-quality financial report.  The risks of expropriation 
of assets resulting in economic melt-down and business failure brought 
discouragement to investors.  High-quality financial reports emanating from the 
existence of RMC and choice of QDAs can help to restore the trusts and confidence 
of investors in the management of a company. 
 
6.2.3.2.5 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Board Independence and Monitoring Mechanisms 
As already discussed in section 6.2.1.2.3, this study finds that board independence 
(BI) is significant in its relationship with monitoring mechanisms (MM) and MM’s 
dimensions (directorship and internal auditing) in the right direction.  Secondly, this 
study also argued in section 6.2.2.1.7 that BI is significant in its relationship with 
quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) in the right direction.  Thirdly, QDA relates 
significantly to MM and all MM’s dimensions as demanded by Baron and Kenny 




mediates the relationship between BI and MM as well as MM’s dimensions 
(directorship and external auditing) as highlighted in 5.4.3.1.9.   
 
The findings of this study are consistent with the studies of Omri et al. (2014), 
Anderson et al. (2004), Hashim and Devi (2008), Lishenga (2011), Al-Janadi et al. 
(2013), and Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010).  An increase in BI explains the 
contribution of BI in the variation of MM and each construct's dimension, NEDIR, 
IA, and EA.  The presence of independent directors on the board of directors upholds 
agency rule for separation of ownership and control.  BI guarantees the independence 
of the board of directors.  BI is likely to enhance adequate monitoring of the 
management and controlling shareholders.  The board is likely to choose quality-
differentiated auditors through the impact of BI. 
 
6.2.3.2.6 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the 
Relationship between Board Gender and Monitoring Mechanisms 
This study finds that board gender (BG) is significant in its relationship with 
monitoring mechanisms (MM) and MM’s dimensions (directorship and internal 
auditing) in the right direction as already argued in section 6.2.1.2.4.  Secondly, the 
discussion in section 5.4.2 shows that BG is also significant in its relationship with 
quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) but in the opposite direction.  Thirdly, QDA 
relates significantly to MM and all MM’s dimensions as demanded by Baron and 
Kenny (1986) and argued in 5.4.3.1.10.  Most importantly, this study finds that QDA 
mediates the relationship between BG and MM as well as MM’s dimensions 





The findings of this study validate the studies of Bøhren and Staubo (2015), Horak 
(2015), Lenard et al. (2014), Lincoln and Adedoyin, (2012), Bear et al. (2010), and 
Nawaz (2010).  An increase in Board Gender (BG) explains the contribution of BI in 
the variation of MM and each construct's dimension, NEDIR, IA, and EA.  The 
results show that female directors are likely to frown at poor corporate governance or 
any form of its breach.  There is likely to be a demand for more monitoring to ensure 
the protection of the interests of the shareholders.  Female directors are likely to 
make more contributions to guard against the expropriation of minority shareholders 
by management and controlling principals.  The presence of female directors aids the 
effectiveness of the board.  The composition of more women on the board of director 
strengthens the independence of the board and engenders the demand for quality 
monitoring.   BG helps to promote high-quality financial reports, and board of 
directors is likely to choose quality-differentiated auditors through the influence of 
BG to restore the trusts and confidence of investors in the management of a 
company.  
 
6.2.3.3 Mediating Effects of Quality-differentiated Auditors on the Relationship 
between Compensation Structure and Monitoring Mechanisms 
This study finds that compensation structure (CS) is significant in its relationship 
with monitoring mechanisms (MM) and MM’s dimensions (directorship and internal 
auditing) in the right direction as argued in section 6.2.1.3.  Secondly, the discussion 
in section 6.2.2.1.8 reveals that CS is also significant in its relationship with quality-
differentiated auditors (QDA) in the right direction.  Thirdly, QDA relates 
significantly to MM and all MM’s dimensions as demanded by Baron and Kenny 




mediates the relationship between CS and MM as well as MM’s dimensions 
(directorship and external auditing) as highlighted in 5.4.3.1.11. 
 
The findings of this study validate the studies of Wahab and Pak (2011), Armstrong 
et al., (2010), Lishenga (2011), Sakawa et al. (2012), Sarens and Abdolmohammadi 
(2011).  An increase in CS explains the contribution of CS in the variation of MM 
and each construct's dimension, NEDIR, IA, and EA.  Incentive compensation will 
encourage managers to align their interests with shareholders' interests.  Thus, 
compensation structure will help to reduce agency costs.  Hence, the demand for 
monitoring will be minimal, and cost of auditing will be lesser as the financial risk is 
reduced.  Therefore, a quality-differentiated auditor may not be needed.  
 
6.2.4 Impact of Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 
The result from seemingly unrelated regression for Nigerian code of corporate 
governance (SEC, 2011) on monitoring mechanisms for years 2010, 2011 and 2012  
supports SEC, 2011 that the code of corporate governance positively relates to the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms. 
 
6.3 Implications of the Study 
This study offers a new knowledge and understanding of the antecedents of 
monitoring mechanisms with significant empirical, theoretical, managerial and 
practical contributions.  This section, therefore, discusses the theoretical, practical, 





6.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
The results of this study reveal that most of the non-financial listed companies in 
Nigeria have adopted the 2011 SEC code conforming to directives on board size, 
audit committee size, internal control, separate chairman and CEO, and board 
composition.  The study finds that managerial ownership, government ownership, 
individual block-holding, board size, board meetings, board independence, board 
gender and compensation structure significantly influence the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms.  When tested alone, principal-principal conflicts, CEO tenure, and risk 
management also significantly influence the demand for monitoring mechanisms.  
The result shows inconsistent results for the three organizational attributes (principal-
principal conflicts, CEO tenure, and risk management).  However, there are also 
inconsistent findings in the extant literature [(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; and Ali & 
Lesage, 2013) on block-holding; (Amran &  Che-Ahmad, 2009; and Latif et al., 
2013) on board size; (Luo et al., 2014; and Carver, 2014) on CEO tenure] regarding 
each of the three organizational attributes as earlier discussed in chapter three of this 
study. 
 
While previous studies are on the direct relationship between organizational 
attributes (OAs) and monitoring mechanisms (MM), this study adds to knowledge 
and literature by investigating the mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors 
in the relationship between OAs and MM.   Also, most of the existing literature 
examine one or two aspects of monitoring mechanisms, but this study followed two 
literature that examined all the three aspects of monitoring mechanisms (Mustapha & 
Che-Ahmad, 2011; and Anderson et al., 1993).  It is likely to be the first to examine 





The study reveals the relevance of agency theory to the achievement of corporation 
objectives with reduction of information asymmetry and expropriation of assets by 
management and controlling shareholders.  It also reveals the relevance of the 
stakeholders’ theory by ensuring that all parties to the contract of the company 
contribute to decision making.  Likewise, it shows what the existence of one attribute 
or the other signals to the public, government, investors and other fund providers 
through signalling theory. 
 
Agency theory suggests that a company is a combination of contractual relationship 
involving principals and agents (Freeman, 1994; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  The theory addresses the problems of moral hazard and 
information asymmetry (Hashim & Devi, 2008).  It suggests the likelihood of 
management diverting the wealth of the company to serve their interest.  It, therefore, 
proposes mechanisms to monitor and provide incentives that can regulate agency 
costs resulting from the conflict of the interests of management and shareholders 
(Chitnomrath et al., 2011).  It suggests that an increase in agency costs necessitates 
more monitoring.  The greater the agency costs, financial risks, moral hazards, the 
greater the need for monitoring.  It, therefore, entails  improving the contracts 
between the principals and the agents (de T’Serclaes et al., 2007).  Agency theory 
attempts to resolve agency problems between management, board of directors and 
the shareholders.  The theory has been used to resolve many agency problems (type I 





The study supported agency theory with stakeholder theory to explain third parties’ 
relationship with the agents and the principals.  Stakeholder theory is concerned with 
the management and ethics of an organization (Phillips et al., 2003).  It also suggests 
that a company is a nexus of contracts involving the management and stakeholders 
(Jones, 1995).  According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), the theory comprehends 
attitudes, structures, and practices as related to managing the affairs of a company 
and all personalities affecting the policies of the company.  It recognizes only one 
master but with the responsibility to all stakeholders through one master, which in 
turn enhances accountability. 
 
Furthermore, the study supported agency and stakeholders' theories with the 
signalling theory because it is designed to handle information asymmetry in 
relationship affecting a company.  It provides explanations for signals from the 
actions of the company.  Hence, extant literature used it to determine the reputation 
of a company (Bear et al., 2010), the expected cash flows of a company through its 
dividends (Mouna & Anis, 2013).  It suggests that investors will likely invest in 
promising companies and mediate in board composition and top management 
structure to ensure that the company maximizes shareholders’ wealth (Chowdhury et 
al., 2014).  The rationale for this is that both the board and top management are 
important governance mechanisms for making tactical decisions on behalf of the 
investors of a corporation. 
 
Board independence and gender are part of the organizational attributes that should 
be used in every company to ensure effective directorship monitoring and quality 




help to align the interests of the management, board of directors and shareholders.  
Also, by stakeholders' theory the two attributes help to ensure that the interests of all 
parties to the contracts of a company are adequately protected.  The presence of 
independent and female directors also signal board independence, more expertise, 
skills and knowledge that guarantee the protection of the interests of all shareholders.  
Listed companies should, therefore, endeavour to have more of independent and 
female directors on board considering the benefits derivable from such board 
composition. 
 
This study tests both types I and II agency conflicts and considered board gender.  
Added to the uniqueness is the combination of directorship, internal, and external 
auditing in a study in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, in particular.  These contributions 
are rarely found in most of the extant studies in this context. 
 
6.3.2 Practical Implications 
The findings from this study create new knowledge about the prevalent monitoring 
practices and implementation of the code of corporate governance for the protection 
of shareholders' interests in the non-financial listed companies in Nigeria.  The study 
also creates new knowledge on the antecedents that influence the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms.  It also provides new knowledge in the antecedents of 
quality-differentiated auditors as a mediator between organizational attributes and 
monitoring mechanisms.  This study is vital to the governance of Nigerian non-





Listed companies on the verge of failure, business merger or closure due to agency 
costs could find the outcome of this study useful for possible sustenance and 
continuity.  The findings of this study are also useful for companies that wish to 
embrace good corporate governance.  The findings suggest full enforcement of the 
code of corporate governance in all listed companies and even private companies. 
 
Furthermore, the findings are likewise useful to the management, board of directors 
and regulators in new areas necessary for more relevant information.  Information 
like the breakdown of shareholdings into proportions held by each category of 
shareholders such as family and government as well as costs of internal auditing 
should be incorporated in the financial reports.  It may also be necessary to disclose 
the remuneration for each board committees.  Such information can be useful for 
further investigations and decisions.  It helps management and the board to decide 
the organizational attributes to adopt to achieve the corporate goals.  A proper 
understanding of monitoring mechanisms will help to align the interests of the 
management and shareholders and enhance corporate value. 
 
The accomplishment of the right mix of organizational attributes and demand for 
monitoring mechanisms possibly mediated by quality-differentiated auditors can, 
therefore, significantly minimize agency conflicts with this study assisting the board 
of directors, internal and external auditors to effectively and efficiently execute their 
monitoring roles.  The independent directors, female directors, individual block-
holders, and second-largest shareholders must be effective to ensure that monitoring 
mechanisms are strengthened to protect both their interests and the interests of the 




monitoring where a company is with a high managerial ownership, lengthy CEO 
tenure, or high financial risks.  The inclusion of more independent directors and/or 
female directors on the board of directors is likely to be of help in such instances. 
 
Every class of shareholders should be well represented on the board with diverse 
skills and knowledge to ensure protection of the interests of all shareholders.  
Regulators may consider competency for individual board member and management 
position in subsequent revision of the code of corporate governance for Nigeria. 
 
Risk management as an organizational attribute should be given more attention as 
risks are central to monitoring and key to the choice of auditor type.  Therefore, this 
study will be useful to the board of directors and regulators to acquire more 
knowledge on how to manage various risks with more emphasis on the financial risks 
by establishing effective risk management committee.  Hence, the empirical findings 
of this study on risk management committee are useful to the board of directors and 
regulators. 
 
The findings of this study are also of use to the internal auditors or companies for the 
effectiveness of their internal audit functions.  Issues of internal control and risk 
management are the essence of an internal auditing.  Internal audit departments, 
therefore, need to be strengthened and allowed to function with little or no 
intervention for adequate monitoring.  Internal auditing can adequately complement 
directorship in monitoring and reduces cost of external auditing with lesser risks and 





Companies should also take the compensation for members of audit committee, risk 
management committee and management very serious as it motivates them to be 
more effective and efficient in discharging their duties.  The guideline of SEC, 2011 
on remuneration of directors and senior management should be considered in making 
compensation decisions. 
 
The findings are also useful to the external auditors to ensure high-quality financial 
reports.  The result certifies that an auditor is an instrument capable of protecting the 
interests of the stakeholders which include auditor himself.  It, therefore, requires 
that an auditor has to aim at rendering a very high-quality audit to his client.  As 
many as wish to remain relevant in audit market should, therefore, aspire to install 
audit structure that enables high-quality financial reports.  
 
This study explains only 41.79% of the variations in monitoring costs, and attributes 
that affect the demand for the monitoring mechanisms.  It was still below 50% even 
with more encompassing variables for organizational attributes.  It implies that there 
are much more to corporate governance than competency of auditors, management, 
and board members.  It, therefore, implies that regulators, boards of directors and 
management with the help of academicians need to engage more investigations to 
identify such factors and ensure good governance. 
 
The results also reveal that there may be one or more other mediating variables in the 
relationship.  The study is, therefore, an eye opener for the management, board of 
directors, regulators and academicians to explore other mediating effects to 





Also, incidence of an organizational attributes significance and sign status changing 
when tested with certain attributes or tested alone or tested with larger variables 
implies that good corporate governance is not a function of the number of 
organizational attributes but right mixture of the attributes relating to monitoring 
mechanisms. 
 
Differences noted in the results of this study and extant literature in other countries 
also contribute to deliberations on corporate governance that companies should 
consider the uniqueness of their business environment to determine the best 
governance structure suitable for the company.  Consideration of business 
environment is essential because country specifics can make a lot of difference 
(Beneish & Yohn, 2008). 
 
The study also has practical implication for Nigerian market and regulatory 
authorities.  The understanding and knowledge of the mediating effect of the quality-
differentiated auditors on organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms will 
enhance adequate supply and demand of quality auditing as well as other monitoring 
mechanisms, directorship, and internal auditing.  High-quality financial reports that 
will emanate from the quality supply and demand for quality directorship and 
auditing will reflect in the stock value of the listed companies and restoration of 
shareholders’ trust and confidence in the management.  Appreciation in stock value 
will also help to build up the economy of the country.  Changes in stock value are 
important because the stock market performance drives economic growth, which, 




can help the regulatory authorities (SEC, NSE, NFRC, and CIBN) to enforce and 
review the codes of corporate governance as appropriate.   
 
6.3.3 Methodological Implication 
Many extant literature examined monitoring mechanisms and antecedents of 
organizational attributes using different analysis techniques like ordinary least square 
regression (Engel et al., 2010; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2013; Marra et al., 2011).  
Some other studies tested their hypotheses using fixed effect regression (Yaacob & 
Che-Ahmad, 2012b), random effect regression (Fidrmuc & Jacob, 2010), probit 
analysis (Eng & Mak, 2003), logistic regression (Yatim, 2009), generalized method 
of moments estimation (Luo et al., 2013;, general least square (Chang, 2015), 
descriptive statistics (Anderson et al., 1993), two-stage least square (2 SLS) 
(Veronica & Bachtiar, 2005).  However, this study used panel-corrected standard 
errors (PCSEs), logistic regression, binary-mediation analysis and bootstrap, and 
seemingly unrelated regression analysis.  To the best of the knowledge of the 
researcher, PCSE, and binary-mediation analysis have been scarcely used in testing 
monitoring mechanisms.  The results are made more robust with further tests using 
other analysis, structural equation model, and seemingly unrelated regression.  
 
Equally, to the best of the knowledge of the researcher, the introduction of mediation 
in the relationship between organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms is 
tested for the first time and makes the study unique in methodology in Sub-Saharan 





6.4 Limitation of the Study 
Numerous contribution of the study to the body of knowledge in respect of the 
antecedents of monitoring mechanisms and its implementation status in the non-
financial listed companies in Nigeria notwithstanding, the study has limitations. 
 
The measurement of the mediation variable, quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) is 
the first limitation because the measurement is nominal, big-4, 1 if not, and 0.  The 
power of prediction is limited as the annual reports do not provide detail information.  
Secondly, the study is limited to years 2010, 2011 and 2012.  However, some studies 
also adopted the same strategy using three years data.  For example Himmelberg, et 
al. (1999), Bambang et al. (2013), Fan and Wong (2005), Hashim and Rahman 
(2011), Che-Ahmad et al. (2006).  The constraint in this wise is due to the lack of 
information on internal audit costs in the annual reports for which questionnaire was 
applied.  It is very difficult to obtain information over years through questionnaire.  
Hence, the study uses three years data. 
 
Thirdly, only three aspects of organizational attributes are considered.  The study 
does not consider some ownership structure like family ownership, institutional 
block-holders.  Likewise, it considers only six out of many composition and 
activities of the board of directors.  It also excludes other organizational attributes 
like leverage, information system structure, dividend policy among others as it is not 
possible for a study to consider all aspects of an issue like organizational attributes.  






Fourthly, the study is only on the non-financial listed companies.   Financial listed 
companies are excluded from the investigation.  Likewise, the private or non-listed 
companies like MTN and some other communication companies are not inclusive 
even though we have some of them doing better than the listed companies. 
 
6.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
The limitations are potential opportunities for future researchers.  The short period 
covered may not represent the true position of the activities and operations of the 
companies.  Future research should, therefore, expand the period of investigation to 
obtain more data on the relationship between organizational attributes and 
monitoring mechanisms.  
 
There are other factors that can mediate the relationship between organizational 
attributes and monitoring mechanisms.  Future research may, therefore, consider the 
probability of such other factors like information system structure, information 
system, financial reporting standards, and board independence among others as 
mediating or moderating variables. 
 
Other aspects of organizational attributes not considered in this study could be 
explored for future research as the model for this study explains only 41.79% of the 
variations in monitoring costs and attributes that affect the demand for the 
monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Likewise, future researchers may consider qualitative methodology on the 




studies may also adopt other theories such as stewardship, economic, neo-
institutional and positive accounting for their investigations. 
 
Future studies may wish to extend to cover financial listed companies and non-listed 




This study investigates the mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors (QDAs) 
on the relationship between organizational attributes (ownership structure, 
composition and activities of the board of directors and compensating structure) and 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, and external auditing).  The 
motivation for the study is from the gap in extant literature and limited evidence in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria in particular in the light of the peculiarities of the 
corporate governance in Nigeria.  The type of organizational attributes (OAs) or 
system a company adopts determines the costs it incurs for monitoring.  A wrong 
mix of OAs can impact shareholders' wealth and continuity of the company.  This 
study, therefore, investigates the influence of OAs on monitoring costs and the 
mediating effects of QDAs on the relationship between OAs and monitoring 
mechanisms.  The OAs considered in this study are managerial ownership, 
government ownership, individual block-holders, principal-principal conflicts, board 
size, board meeting, CEO tenure, risk management committee, board independence, 





Individual block-holders, board size, board meeting, board independence, and board 
gender are significant.  However, principal-principal conflicts, CEO tenure, risk 
management committee though not significant in the model are significant when ran 
alone or with few or more other attributes.  Managerial ownership and compensation 
structure have inverse relationship with monitoring mechanisms in the right 
direction, consistent with agency theory and earlier studies in developed and 
transiting countries like U.S, UK, Australia, and Malaysia. 
 
For the relationship between organizational attributes and quality-differentiated 
auditors, managerial ownership, principal-principal conflicts, risk management 
committee, board independence and compensation structure are significant.  
Individual block-holders, board size, and CEO tenure have inverse relationship with 
quality-differentiated auditors in the opposite direction, consistent with mixed 
findings in extant literature in the developed and transiting countries. 
 
For mediating effects, quality-differentiated auditors (QDA), the results display 
complementary mediation except in compensation structure (CS) following Zhao et 
al. (2010).  The mediating effects of QDA on the relationship of CS with monitoring 
mechanisms (MM) and dimensions, directorship (NEDIR), and internal auditing (IA) 
are competitive while it is complementary in CS and external auditing (EA).  We 
also have competitive mediation in the relationship of other organizational attributes 
in their relationship with dimensions, NEDIR, IA OR EA while they are with 
complementary mediation in the relationship with the MM.  These are: 1) principal-
principal conflicts and NEDIR. 2) CEO tenure and external auditing. 3) risk 




of a company with QDA.  The general belief is that clients' satisfaction and good 
financial reports receive great attention base on consideration of a comprehensive 
performance structure of the client and relevant rules, regulations and standards by 
the QDAs.  
 
Overall, the study shows that monitoring mechanisms (MMs) are drivers to the code 
of corporate governance geared at protecting the interests of the shareholders.  
Companies incur costs to put each MM to work.  It demonstrates that the relationship 
between MMs and organizational attributes (OAs) promote either the success or 
failure of the company.  It also shows that the interaction of the quality-differentiated 
auditors (QDAs) in between the OAs and MMs is an indicator of high-quality 
financial reports.  The end result of these relationship helps to reduce information 
asymmetry, align the interests of the management and shareholders and promotes 
transparency and accountability in companies.  However, the achievement of all 
these put together requires that the auditors should endeavour to acquire necessary 
skills and technology knowledge. 
   
Only 11.51% of the Nigerian non-financial listed companies are with managerial 
ownership greater than 5% shareholdings.  The situation is healthy for companies as 
it helps to lessen agency conflicts.  However, most of the companies are with 
significant monitoring possibly due to the incessant business failures and mergers 
and difficulty in getting foreign investors with the few ones now withdrawing the 






This thesis investigates the mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors on the 
relationship between organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms in 
Nigerian non-financial listed companies.  The study broadens knowledge on the 
justification for each monitoring mechanism and its impact on the governance of a 
company as related to organizational attributes and the mediating effect of quality-
differentiated auditors.  The results provide evidence that the relationship between 
the principals, agents and third parties in the agency, stakeholders, and signalling 
theories are generally consistent as obtainable in the developed and transiting 
countries in developing countries.  In addition, the results also show unique 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
 




Research Survey on Corporate Monitoring Mechanisms by Nigerian Non-
financial Public Listed Companies 
 
I am a PhD student at the School of Accountancy in the College of Business of the 
Universiti Utara Malaysia under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Ayoib Che-Ahmad. 
 
I am conducting a study on the corporate monitoring mechanisms as part of my 
doctoral research. The primary purpose of this research is to examine the mediating 
effect of audit quality-differentiated auditors on organizational attributes and 
monitoring mechanisms of non-financial public listed companies in Nigeria. The 
findings of this study may contribute to the body of knowledge with respect to the 
mitigation of conflicts between the shareholders and management. 
 
It will therefore be tremendously appreciated if you can please assign a few moments 
of your treasured time to complete the attached questionnaire. Your input is very 
imperative for the accomplishment of this academic exercise. I thank you in advance 
for your kind cooperation. Be rest assured that the information you provide will be 
treated with utmost confidence. Results will be in aggregate form.  Neither you nor 
your company will be identified. A summary of our findings will be made available 
to the respondents that may desire to have them.  
 
Kindly submit the completed questionnaire to the undersigned either by self-
collection or by e-mail to aroldaot@gmail.com. 
 




Arowolo Rachael Oluyemisi (FCA) 
Ph.D Candidate 
Email: aroldaot@gmail.com 






SURVEY ON CORPORATE MONITORING MECHANISMSBY NIGERIAN 
NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES 
 
(Kindly note that the information solicited in this questionnaire is based on the 
company’s audited financial statements as at and for the years ended 2010, 2011 
and 2012. 
 
SECTION A: INTERNAL AUDIT 
Kindly read the information required and tick the box or fill in the gap as appropriate 
for the company: 
1. The company’s ownership status is 
(i)  Domestic   
(ii)  Multinational – 50+% Foreign owned  
(iii)  Multinational – 50+% Domestic company  
(iv)  Others (Specify)  
       
2. What is the staff population in this company? 
(i)  1   –      500   
(ii)  501   –   1,000  
(iii)  1,001 and above  
           
3. How does this company performs its internal audit functions? 
(i)  In-house    
(ii)  Outsourcing  
(iii)  Co-sourcing  
(iv)  Others (Specify)  
 
4. How many staff are in the internal audit department/section/unit? 
(i)  1 - 100   
(ii)  101 – 500  
(iii)  501 – 1,000  
 
5. What is the highest professional qualification of the head of the internal audit? 
(i)  Fellow Chartered Accountants (FCA)   
(ii)  Associate Chartered Accountants (ACA)  
(iii)  Fellow member of the Institute of Internal Auditor  
(iv)  Associate member of the Institute of Internal Auditor  
(v)  









(vii)  Qualification of other IFAC-member body  
 
6. What is the highest academic qualification of the head of the internal audit? 
(i)  PhD   
(ii)  M.Sc/MA/M.Ed  
(iii)  B.Sc/HND  




(v)  Others (Specify)  
 
7. The internal audit reports to: 
(i)  The Chief Executive Officer(CEO)   
(ii)  The Chief Financial Officer (CFO)  
(iii)  The Audit Committee  
(iv)  The Board of Directors  
(v)  Others (Specify)  
 
8. Are the external auditors given unlimited access to the working papers of the 
internal auditors? 
(i)  Yes   
(ii)  No  
(iii)  Cannot say  
 
9. Which one of the audit softwares does the internal audit use? 
(i)  Computer Assisted Audit Technique (CAAT)  
(ii)  Generalized Audit Software (GAS)  
(iii)  Audit Management Software  
(iv)  Others (Specify)  
(v)  None  
 
10. The internal audit personnel of this company are trained through one of the 
followings: 
(i)  Workshops  
(ii)  Seminars  
(iii)  Conferences  
(iv)  Online training  
(v)  On-the-job training  
 
11. How often does this company train the internal audit personnel? 
(i)  Quarterly  
(ii)  Half-yearly  
(iii)  Annually  
(iv)  Never  
 
12. How often is the internal audit function subject to an external quality 
assessment? 
(i)  Monthly  
(ii)  Quarterly  
(iii)  Half-yearly  
(iv)  Annually  





Kindly provide information from the year 2010 to 2012 with total costs of internal 
audit encompassing fixed assets for the department, allocated general expenses, 
remuneration and training costs of audit staff. 






13 Total internal audit costs (in-house portion 
only) for the year ended… 
(N’m)                    1      -      20 
                            21     -       40 
                            41     -       60 
                           60 and above 
(Actual figure preferred if possible) 
   
14 Total internal audit costs (outsource portion 
only) for the year ended… 
(N’m)                    1      -      20 
                            21     -       40 
                            41     -       60 
                            60 and above 
(Actual figure preferred if possible) 
   
15 Total internal audit costs (co-source portion 
only) for the year ended… 
(N’m)                    1      -      20 
                            21     -       40 
                            41     -       60 
                            60 and above 
(Actual figure preferred if possible) 
   
16 Total internal audit costs (others portion only) 
for the year ended… 
(N’m)                    1      -      20 
                            21     -       40 
                            41     -       60 
                            60 and above 
(Actual figure preferred if possible) 
   
 
17. Kindly indicate the internal audit type used for each of these three years 
STRUCTURE 2010 2011 2012 
In-house    
Outsourcing    
Co-sourcing    






SECTION B: INFORMATION SYSTEM 
Please each statement in table “B” below is to reflect the extent of the information 
system condition of this company. Kindly indicate this by circling, ticking or 
highlighting the appropriate box: 




1 The information system design of this company is performed 
by the central information system department 
    
2 The information system planning of this company is performed 
by the central information system department 
    
3 The information system data entry of this company is 
performed by the central information system department 
    
4 The information system output production of this company is 
performed by the central information system department 
    
5 The information system capacity planning of this company is 
performed by the central information system department 
    
6 The information system decision-making policies in relation to 
hardware (like selection of vendors, computer purchase) of this 
company is performed by the central information system 
department     
7 The development strategy for information system of this 
company is performed by the central information system 
department     
8 The decision to recruit and allocate human resources for 
information system of departments/subsidiaries of this 
company is performed by the central information system 
department     
9 The development strategy for information system of this 
company is performed by the departments/subsidiaries 
    
10 The departments/subsidiaries have the responsibility to make 
decisions of their own     
 
Kindly tick the box as appropriate: 
11 How does the executive/top management integrate the centralized activities in 
1-10 above: 
(i)  




(ii)  Project plans are developed and progress reports are frequently made  
(iii)  Completed projects are appraised  
(iv)  All of the above  
 
12 How does the top management integrate the decentralized activities in 1-10 
above: 
(i)  







(ii)  Project plans are developed and progress reports are frequently made  
(iii)  Completed projects are appraised  
(iv)  All of the above  
 
13 Please rate the following with the hint provided in the last five columns. 
    




a Strategy Alignment       
 
  
b Delivery of business value through IT           
c Performance Management           
d Risk Management           
e Control and Accountability           
 
14 Kindly indicate the structure used for each of these three years 
Structure 2010 2011 2012 
Centralized    
Decentralized    
 
SECTION C: Demographic Information 
Kindly tick or fill in the spaces as may be appropriate: 
1.  Company’s name (optional)  
2.  Designation  
3.  Years with the company  
4.  Years of working experience  
 
5. Gender  (i) Male 
(ii) Female 




Kindly state the website address where to download the company’s audited financial 
statements for years 2010 to 2012 or how to obtain the softcopies or scanned-copies 





You are highly appreciated for creating time out of your tight schedule to 
complete this questionnaire. 
You may wish to contact the researcher for further information or clarifications 
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Appendix C:  Nigeria Population 
 
 


























7 Nigeria 186,987,563 2.63 % 4,785,601 205 910,802 -60,000 5.74 18 49 % 2.5 % 
Source: Worldometers (www.Worldometers.info)  
Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 































2016 186,987,563 2.63 % 4,785,601 -60,000 18 5.67 205 49 % 91,668,667 2.52 % 7,432,663,275 7 
2015 182,201,962 2.71 % 4,555,444 -60,000 18 5.74 200 48.1 % 87,680,500 2.63 % 7,349,472,099 7 
2010 159,424,742 2.69 % 3,962,688 -60,000 18 5.91 175 43.6 % 69,440,943 2.45 % 6,929,725,043 7 
2005 139,611,303 2.59 % 3,346,916 -34,000 18 6.05 153 39.1 % 54,541,496 2.28 % 6,519,635,850 9 
2000 122,876,723 2.53 % 2,890,380 -19,000 18 6.17 135 34.8 % 42,810,252 2.14 % 6,126,622,121 10 
1995 108,424,822 2.55 % 2,561,495 -19,200 18 6.37 119 32.2 % 34,918,670 2.04 % 5,735,123,084 10 
1990 95,617,345 2.65 % 2,343,155 -18,300 18 6.6 105 29.7 % 28,379,229 1.97 % 5,309,667,699 10 
1985 83,901,570 2.63 % 2,040,695 -134,300 18 6.76 92 25.6 % 21,508,164 1.89 % 4,852,540,569 10 
1980 73,698,096 3 % 2,026,500 170,900 18 6.76 81 22 % 16,191,472 1.81 % 4,439,632,465 11 
1975 63,565,598 2.52 % 1,486,751 -7,700 18 6.61 70 19.8 % 12,573,568 1.73 % 4,061,399,228 11 
1970 56,131,844 2.24 % 1,178,655 -8,700 19 6.35 62 17.8 % 9,969,016 1.69 % 3,682,487,691 11 
1965 50,238,569 2.13 % 1,005,391 700 19 6.35 45 9 % 4,541,081 1.66 % 3,322,495,121 13 
1960 45,211,614 1.91 % 817,856 500 19 6.35 50 15.4 % 6,967,110 1.64 % 3,018,343,828 13 
1955 41,122,333 1.67 % 652,518 700 19 6.35 45 11 % 4,541,081 1.63 % 2,758,314,525 13 
Source: Worldometers (www.Worldometers.info)  





Appendix D:  Multivariate Analysis using Ordinary Least-square (OLS), Fixed 
Effect, Random Effect and Panel-corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) 















































































































































     
R
2
 0.3756 0.2605 0.3756 0.4179 
Note: *** significant at 1% level;     ** significant at 5% level;    * significant at 10% level 





Appendix E:  Sensitivity Analysis Result for Managerial Ownership, Government Ownership, Board Size, Meetings and Gender (Panels 





























































   








(0.206) (0.204) (0.205) (0.219) (0.021) 
 
Companies with MO  
-0.757*** 




     
(0.021) 
Companies with no MO 
 
18.982*  




     
(1.683) 
Companies with MO≥5% 
  -0.768***       
  (0.182)       
Companies with MO≤5% 
  -0.174**       
  (1.255)       
Government Ownership -2.324*** -2.545*** -2.328*** 
 
-2.322*** -2.430*** -2.276*** 0.002 0.027 
(0.375) (0.473) (0.380) 
 
(0.374) (0.314) (0.319) (0.048) (0.052) 
Companies with GO 
   
-1.602*** 
     
   
(0.335) 































































Companies with no GO 
   
-8.724* 
     
   
(5.639) 
     
Individual Block-holders 0.426*** 0.383*** 0.420*** 0.412*** 0.428*** 0.446*** 0.428*** -0.029** -0.025** 
(0.147) (0.137) (0.134) (0.139) (0.159) (0.146) (0.151) (0.013) (0.013) 
Principal-principal Conflicts 1.197 1.146 1.186 0.990 1.197 1.109 0.832 0.579** 0.661** 
(1.838) (1.855) (1.829) (1.926) (1.835) (1.828) (1.681) (0.290) (0.347) 
Board Size 1.100* 1.170** 1.114** 1.259** 
 
1.143** 1.532*** -0.211*** -0.238*** 
(0.485) (0.498) (0.506) (0.541) 
 
(0.488) (0.386) (0.079) (0.082) 
Companies with larger BS 
    
1.083*** 
    
    
(0.396) 
    
Companies with smaller BS 
    
0.805 
    
    
(1.100) 
    
Board Meetings 
11.156*** 11.566*** 11.182*** 11.272*** 11.152*** 
 
11.450*** 0.057 0.007 
(4.579) (4.756) (4.590) (4.587) (4.581) 
 
(4.751) (0.137) (0.141) 
Companies with more board 
meetings      
12.589*** 
   
     
(4.806) 
   
Companies with lesser board 
meetings      
15.411*** 
   
     
(6.130) 































































CEO Tenure 0.047 0.009 0.031 0.011 0.047 0.108 0.072 -0.072*** -0.075*** 
(0.185) (0.189) (0.199) (0.201) (0.194) (0.205) (0.201) (0.029) (0.031) 
Risk Management 
Committee 
3.734 2.900 3.872* 4.003* 3.742 3.101 2.049 0.659** 0.736** 
(3.082) (3.527) (2.965) (3.054) (3.133) (3.236) (3.346) (0.308) (0.315) 
Board Independence 39.568*** 41.524*** 40.050*** 39.018*** 39.534*** 39.225*** 36.867*** 0.874* 0.679 
(9.072) (10.087) (9.620) (8.922) (9.243) (8.787) (8.980) (0.617) (0.650) 
Board Gender 55.751*** 56.301*** 55.722*** 55.988*** 55.770*** 55.804*** 
 
-1.324 -1.391 
(19.400) (19.387) (19.302) (19.342) (19.408) (19.166) 
 
(1.600) (1.624) 
Companies with Female 
Directors       
128.919*** 
  
      
(23.079) 
  Companies with no Female 
Directors       
-17.415*** 
  
      
(5.269) 
  
Compensation Structure -11.386* -28.524*** -11.782*** -12.067*** -11.399*** -11.253*** -10.559** 1.156*** 4.548*** 
(4.558) (8.434) (4.675) (4.686) (4.786) (4.678) (4.592) (0.350) (1.686) 
Company Size 14.447*** 13.876*** 14.455*** 14.271*** 14.449*** 14.400*** 14.300*** 0.699*** 0.779*** 
(1.821) (1.873) (1.816) (1.859) (1.822) (1.719) (1.832) -0.129 (0.139) 
Loss -15.828*** -17.140*** -15.864*** -16.174*** -15.842*** -16.209*** -16.339*** -0.533* -0.400 
































































16.037*** 17.024*** 16.111*** 15.301*** 16.066*** 16.168*** 15.980*** 0.087 -0.066 
(3.649) (4.133) (3.793) (3.368) (3.780) (4.052) (3.630) (0.432) (0.436) 
Growth 
-2.557*** -3.044*** -2.572*** -2.548*** -2.556*** -2.394*** -2.283*** 0.055 0.227* 
(0.386) (0.675) (0.401) (0.382) (0.390) (0.430) (0.315) (0.127) (0.158) 
Complexity 
25.241*** 25.822*** 25.252*** 25.297*** 25.243*** 24.877*** 24.642*** 0.242 0.133 
(3.296) (3.546) (3.307) (3.347) (3.300) (3.503) (3.387) (0.198) (0.205) 
Constant 
-375.142*** -365.736*** -374.977*** -370.838*** -375.014*** -380.121*** -370.913*** -14.940*** -16.112*** 
(40.031) (38.463) (39.853) (40.130) (39.911) (37.907) (39.919) (2.780) (2.943) 
          Observations 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 
R-squared 0.418 0.420 0.418 0.418 0.420 0.420 0.422 
  Number of SN 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 




Appendix F: Summary Results of TTests for Managerial Ownership and Board 
Meetings 
Variable Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
 
   
Companies with Managerial Ownership 3.030 0.485 8.859 
Companies without Managerial Ownership 0.648 0.026 0.478 
diff 2.381 0.480 8.750 
 
   
companies with 5% and above Managerial Ownership 2.650 0.489 8.928 
companies with less than 5% Managerial Ownership 0.485 0.049 0.901 
diff 2.164 0.483 8.819 
 
   
Companies with more board meetings 4.252 0.068 1.242 
Companies with lesser board meetings 0.084 0.022 0.402 
diff 4.168 0.082 1.502 
 
Appendix G: Summary Results of Hypotheses Tests for Directorship, Internal, 








Direct effect on directorship 
H1ai Managerial ownership is negatively associated 
with the demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism 
 -  - Supported 
H1bi Government ownership is positively associated 
with demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism 
 +  - Not Support 
H1ci Individual block ownership is positively 
associated with demand for directorship as a 
monitoring mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H1di Block-holders are positively associated with the 
demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism with an increase in the ownership of 
second-largest shareholders. 
+ - Not Significant 
H2ai Board size is significantly associated with the 
demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism 
± + Supported 
H2bi Board meetings is positively associated with the 
demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H2ci CEO tenure  relates positively to the demand for 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H2di Risk Management Committee is positively 
associated with the demand for directorship as a 
monitoring mechanism 











H2ei Independent directors are positively associated 
with the demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H2fi Female directors are positively associated with 
the demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H3i Compensation structure is negatively associated 
with the demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism 
- - Supported 
 
Mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors 
H51ai QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Managerial ownership and the demand 
for directorship as a monitoring mechanism 
+ - Not Supported 
H51bi QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Government ownership and the demand 
for directorship as a monitoring mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H51ci QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Individual block ownership and the 
demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism 
+ - Not Supported 
H51di QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Block-holders with an increase in the 
ownership of second-largest shareholders and the 
demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H52ai QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Board size and the demand for 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism 
+ - Not Supported 
H52bi QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Board meetings and the demand for 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H52ci QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between CEO tenure and the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal, 
and external auditing). 
+ - Not Supported 
H52di QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Risk Management Committee and the 
demand for directorship as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52ei QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Independent directors and the demand 
for directorship as a monitoring mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H52fi QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Female directors and the demand for 
directorship as a monitoring mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H53i QDA positively mediates the relationship 
between Compensation structure and the demand 
for directorship as a monitoring mechanism 
+ + Supported 
H6i Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance relates 
positively with the demand for directorship as a 
monitoring mechanism 












Direct effect on internal auditing 
H1aii Managerial ownership is negatively associated with 
the demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
 -  + Not Supported 
H1bii Government ownership is positively associated with 
demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
 +  - Not Supported 
H1cii Individual block ownership is positively associated 
with demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
+ - Not Supported 
H1dii Block-holders are positively associated with the 
demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism with an increase in the ownership of 
second-largest shareholders. 
+ + Supported 
H2aii Board size is significantly associated with the demand 
for internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
± - Not Significant 
H2bii Board meetings are positively associated with the 
demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
+ + Not Significant 
H2cii CEO tenure is positively associated with the demand 
for internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H2dii Risk Management Committee is positively associated 
with the demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H2eii Independent directors are positively associated with 
the demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H2fii Female directors are positively associated with the 
demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 




Compensation structure is negatively associated with 
the demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
- - Supported 
 
Mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors 
H51ai QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Managerial ownership and the demand for internal 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ - Not Supported 
H51bi QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Government ownership and the demand for internal 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H51ci QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Individual block ownership and the demand for 
internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ - Not Supported 
H51di QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Block-holders with an increase in the ownership of 
second-largest shareholders and the demand internal 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52ai QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Board size and the demand for internal auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 











H52bi QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Board meetings and the demand for internal auditing 
as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52ci QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
CEO tenure and the demand for internal auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
+ - Supported 
H52di QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Risk Management Committee and the demand for 
internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52ei QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Independent directors and the demand for internal 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52fi QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Female directors and the demand for internal auditing 
as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H53i QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Compensation structure and the demand for internal 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H6i Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance relates 
positively with the demand for internal auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 










Direct effect on external auditing 
H1aiii Managerial ownership is negatively associated with the 
demand for external auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
 -  - Supported 
H1biii Government ownership is positively associated with 
demand for external auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
 +  - Not Supported 
H1ciii Individual block ownership is positively associated with 
demand for external auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H1diii Block-holders are positively associated with the 
demand for external auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism with an increase in the ownership of 
second-largest shareholders. 
+ + Supported 
H2aiii Board size is significantly associated with the demand 
for external auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
± + Not Significant 
H2biii Board meetings are positively associated with the 
demand for monitoring external auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H2ciii CEO tenure is positively associated with the demand 
for external auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ - Not Supported 
H2diii Risk Management Committee is positively associated 
with the demand for external auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 











H2eiii Independent directors are positively associated with the 
demand for external auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
+ + Not Significant 
H2fiii Female directors are positively associated with the 
demand for external auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
+ - Not Supported 
H3iii Compensation structure is negatively associated with 
the demand for external auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism. 
- - Supported 
 
Mediating effect of quality-differentiated auditors 
H51aiii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Managerial ownership and the demand for external 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ - Not Supported 
H51biii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Government ownership and the demand for external 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H51ciii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Individual block ownership and the demand for external 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ - Not Supported 
H51diii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Block-holders with an increase in the ownership of 
second-largest shareholders and the demand for 
external auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52aiii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Board size and the demand for external auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52biii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Board meetings and the demand for external auditing as 
a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52ciii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
CEO tenure and the demand for external auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
+ - Not Supported 
H52diii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Risk Management Committee and the demand for 
external auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52eiii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Independent directors and the demand for external 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H52fiii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Female directors and the demand for external auditing 
as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H53iii QDA significantly mediates the relationship between 
Compensation structure and the demand for external 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
H6iii Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance relates 
positively with the demand for external auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
+ + Supported 
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